

ACCEPT PLURALISM

Addressing Cultural, Ethnic & Religious Diversity Challenges in Europe

A Comparative Overview of 15 European Countries

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**Addressing Cultural, Ethnic and Religious
Diversity Challenges in Europe
A Comparative Overview of 15 European Countries**

ANNA TRIANDAFYLLIDOU

**WP1 Overview of National Discourses on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity
(Literature and Realities)**

D 1.2 Synthesis and Comparative Overview of the Country Reports

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Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM)

ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Tolerance Indicators' Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each country's performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou.

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Executive Summary

The aim of this report is to present and discuss **the main ethnic, cultural and religious diversity challenges that Europe is facing today**. In particular the report surveys 15 European countries, notably 14 member states (Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) and one associated country (Turkey) and identifies the minority groups or migrant populations that pose the most important ethnic or religious diversity challenges within them. The report concentrates in particular on challenges that have a currency across several EU countries. It discusses the ways in which different countries have dealt with similar diversity dilemmas and identifies appropriate courses of action for the future. The report is organised into seven parts. In parts 1-6 we offer working definitions, followed by a comparative review of state formation, conceptions of citizenship and national identity, and minority/immigrant groups in the 15 countries studied. We also discuss comparatively the challenges raised by three main minority populations: 'black' people, Muslims and Roma (and the policies addressing with these challenges). The seventh section of this report offers 15 short country profiles outlining the situation in each of the countries studied.

Which countries?

This report covers countries from five different regions in Europe: southern Europe (Greece, Italy and Spain), south-eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), Central Eastern Europe (Hungary and Poland), Nordic Europe (Denmark and Sweden) and northern and western Europe (Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland). We thus include in our study countries with different socio-economic profiles and different relationships with the EU (founding states, early members of the EEC, recent member states and a candidate country).

Which minorities?

This report is equally concerned with native and immigrant minorities according to their relevance for each country. A distinction between ethnic minorities and migrant populations is in order here as these two different types of minorities usually enjoy different sets of rights and different levels of public recognition. Native minorities are defined as populations historically established in a given territory and part of the formation of the (national or multi-national) state in which they live. In many cases their participation in state-building is recognised in the Constitution and they are guaranteed special rights regarding the preservation of their cultural, religious, or linguistic heritage. In some countries, there are special provisions for political representation of a native minority where that minority is numerically so small that it risks being left out of the political system.

What concepts and terms?

There are certain concepts and terms that occupy a central place in any debate on cultural diversity in Europe. Some of these concepts such as nationhood, citizenship or secularism have relatively clear cut definitions that are by and large accepted by most scholars and policy makers. Other concepts such as integration, multiculturalism or interculturalism are highly contested and there is little agreement on what they stand for and how they relate to one another. This report provides for a set of working definitions of the fundamental and most commonly used concepts in the area of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity with a view to setting the framework for the comparative discussion that follows.

In particular our focus is on tolerance, its definition, its meaning in different contexts, and the practices of tolerance in different countries and towards different minority groups. We propose tolerance as a middle range concept and practice that stands between intolerance (the non acceptance of individuals, groups or practices) and acceptance, respect and public recognition of minority individuals, groups or practices. We distinguish thus both empirically and normatively between:

- i) **Non-toleration:** Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which claims of toleration are made, but where toleration is not granted, and the reasons given in favour of or against toleration;
- ii) **Toleration:** Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which claims of toleration are made, and where toleration is granted, and the reasons given in favour of or against toleration;
- iii) **Recognition, respect as equal and admission as normal:** Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which it is claimed that toleration is not enough and other normative concepts, namely those that focus on majority-minority relations and the reform of institutions and citizenship, are or should be more relevant. These also include claims and procedures for the reconsideration of difference as a 'normal' feature of social life. Such concepts include equality, respect, recognition, accommodation and so on, and the reasons given in favour of or against these propositions.

It is important to clarify that the relationship between tolerance and respect or recognition of difference is not necessarily a hierarchical one. Respect is not necessarily nor always a better institutional or practical solution for accommodating difference. While tolerance may be appropriate for some diversity claims and may satisfy some requests of minority groups or individuals, respect and public recognition may be a better 'fit' for other types of diversity claims. It is our aim in this report to highlight some of the contexts in which tolerance is a better 'fit' than respect (or vice versa).

Old host countries: State formation, minorities and main diversity challenges

The report discusses six 'old host' countries in northern and western Europe: France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These are countries that have had small historical minorities but have large migration-related minority populations that have arrived in the post-war and post-1989 period.

Despite the predominantly civic definitions of the nation in five of the six 'old hosts' examined and their long experience in receiving migrants, the recent decade has seen, if not a retreat, at least a repositioning of cultural diversity policies and discourses with a view to emphasising a common, if still civic, sense of citizenship as the basis on which newcomers should integrate. Indeed, the Netherlands, a country that has been a forerunner in multicultural policies since the 1980s has now imposed not only integration courses for newcomers but also a civic integration test to be undertaken by prospective migrants before departure from their country of origin. In the face of mounting civil unrest and the social exclusion of second-generation immigrant youth, the French government has reasserted its Republican civic integration model banning ostentatious religious symbols from schools. Britain and Sweden have upheld in practice an approach of political multiculturalism (even if they changed the terminology used). However, there have been strong concerns for cohesion in Britain that have led recent governments to introduce a 'Life in the United Kingdom test' (a civic integration test) and civic ceremonies for citizenship acquisition. The concerns are however not fully allayed, as recent statements by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron show.

Nonetheless it is worth noting that Britain, the Netherlands, France and Sweden have upheld rather generous naturalisation policies, seeing citizenship as a tool for migrant integration. German naturalisation policy has become more liberal during the last decade, but its implementation remains relatively restrictive. Denmark also has a restrictive naturalisation policy although it has a very open civic integration policy at the local level (migrants can participate in local elections after two years of residence).

In these six 'old host' countries of northern and western Europe, Christianity and its traditions (including also monuments and the fine arts) are part of the national heritage (Catholic religion in France and to a certain extent in Germany and the Netherlands; Protestant religion in Sweden, Denmark, Britain and also to a certain extent in Germany). Catholic and Protestant denominations are

also recognised institutionally and given certain privileges as regards taxation or education. However, religion is not necessarily part of national identity in these countries. The link between a specific religion and the nation is quite loose, and what is distinctive of these countries is rather the moderate secularism that allows different religions and their institutions to flourish with some support from the state.

New host countries and the challenges of diversity

The new host countries studied here, notably Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain, have experienced immigration during the last two decades. Among them, the Spanish and the Italian nations are defined as mainly civically, while the Greek and Irish are conceived more ethnically. Spain and Italy have strong centrifugal tendencies due to regional nationalisms in Spain and regional identities in Italy. In both countries the nation is defined predominantly in territorial and political terms and is also contested by minority nationalisms in Spain and by regional nationalism in Italy. Interestingly in both countries there is a close link between national identity and the Catholic religion even though this link has been losing its importance in recent decades.

Overall new host countries are more ethnically oriented in their national identity definition compared with the old hosts, have more restrictive naturalisation policies and see citizenship as a prize rather than as a tool for integration. Their integration policies towards migrants have been under-developed and mainly guided by grassroots initiatives of civil society actors rather than framed as a state policy. The new host countries in southern Europe and Ireland have not yet re-considered their national identity in any way that would actively embrace cultural, ethnic or religious diversity like some of the old host countries did (notably Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands and to a lesser extent France). By contrast all the new host countries have had to face the cultural and ethnic diversity challenges of Roma and Traveller minorities and have done so with very little success. Indeed Roma populations in Spain, Italy and Greece and Travellers in Ireland are among the most harshly discriminated against and socio-economically disadvantaged minority populations in Europe.

Countries in transition and native minority incorporation

The countries in transition are new EU member states that are affected mainly by emigration towards the old member states and to a lesser extent by immigration from Eastern Europe. These countries have a long history of native minority integration (or assimilation) and share a recent past under Communism. Thus all the countries in this group (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) are relatively young democracies that have experienced a revival of national and religious identities in the post-1989 period.

The 2004 member states do not face a serious challenge of incoming migration; hence migrant integration is not a prominent issue in their agendas. Rather, their concern is with emigration of their nationals towards other member states. However, the EU migration policy emphasis on border control contributes to making these countries reluctant to address cultural diversity issues. Thus, while the rights of native minorities are guaranteed, there are no provisions for integrating newcomers under similar conditions of tolerance and/or respect. Hence there is a clear division between the cultural diversity that is considered to belong to these countries in historic terms and an 'alien'/foreign cultural diversity.

Modern Turkey is worth a special mention here as the country is characterised not only by significant emigration (Turks being among the largest immigrant groups in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, among the countries studied) but also by significant immigration from neighbouring Balkan and Asian countries as well as by the historical presence of large native minorities. Indeed Turkey is by definition a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country that bears within it both the multicultural tolerance tradition of the Ottoman Empire and its *millet* arrangements as well as modern nationalist intolerance towards minorities. Minorities in Turkey (the smaller historical minorities of Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians and Jews but most importantly the large minorities of Alevis, Sunni Arab Muslims, Circassians, Georgians, Lazes and Kurds) are integrated socio-

economically but are treated politically as second-class citizens because they do not belong to the dominant Turkish--Sunni-Muslim majority. However, since the Helsinki Summit of the European Union in December 1999, Turkey has become exposed to the celebration of ethno-cultural and religious identity claims in the public space. This process has been going on with certain ups and downs, putting to the test the consolidation of Turkish democracy.

Three European Minorities: 'Black' people, Muslims and Roma

There are three minority populations that pose the most significant diversity challenges across Europe today: 'black' / 'coloured' people; Muslims; and the Roma. These three groups are internally very diverse, coming from different countries, with different immigration or settlement histories and enjoying different statuses in their countries of residence. They are not 'groups' in the sense of having some sort of self-consciousness (although this may be to a certain extent true for some of the European Muslims as well as the Roma). They are identified here as three populations that raise major cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges and that are subject to the most unequal treatment in the 15 European countries under study.

Indeed, all three groups are subjected to widespread discrimination in the labour market, in education, housing and in social life in general. Both Roma and 'black' people are faced with negative stereotyping and ethnic/racial prejudice especially concerning assumed innate tendencies to violate the law and to engage in petty or indeed organised criminality. The three groups differ as regards the type of racism that they face. Muslims face predominantly religious racism (even though in France for instance ethnicity (for instance Moroccan) and religion (Muslim) are embraced in one term: '*maghrebin*') while 'black' people and Roma are faced with biological and culturalist racism that refers to their physical features, creating a link between their ethnic descent and their way of life.

Concluding remarks for researchers and policy makers

This report seeks to offer a European view of cultural, religious, ethnic and racial diversity challenges and the ways they are dealt with. It has succeeded in highlighting important similarities and differences and also in identifying the groups that are worse off in the countries studied. Future research needs however to dig deeper and consider whether there can be a common European approach to migrant and native minority integration that respects the specificities of each country but also allows a bird's eye view of the situation across Europe and identifies the challenges that are common and that can be best dealt with through EU legislation and EU consultations, exchanges of best practices and cooperation. Indeed the question of both the Roma and the Muslim populations is of particular interest here. While it may be difficult to devise policy approaches that are responsive to the needs of all the 15 European countries studied here (let alone the 27 EU member states), it is however possible to develop policies that address a number of European countries that share common or parallel migration and ethnic minority experiences.

1. Cultural Diversity Challenges in Europe Today

After the relative prominence of multiculturalism debates both in political and scholarly arenas, we witness today a change in the direction of debates and policies about how to accommodate cultural diversity. Europe has experienced increasing tensions between national majorities and ethnic or religious minorities, more particularly with marginalised Muslim communities. Such conflicts have included the violence in northern England between native British and Asian Muslim youth (2001); civil unrest amongst France's Muslim Maghreb communities (2005); and the Danish cartoon crisis in 2006 following the publication of pictures of the prophet Muhammad. Muslim communities have also come under intense scrutiny in the wake of the terrorist events in the United States (2001), Spain (2004) and Britain (2005) and there is growing scepticism amongst European governments with regard to the possible accession of Turkey into the EU, a country which is socio-culturally and religiously different from the present EU-27. Tensions are also exemplified in local mosque building controversies in Italy, Greece, Germany and France.

During the first years of the 21st century, politicians and academics have intensively debated the reasons underlying such tensions and what should be done to enhance societal cohesion in European societies. The question that is being posed, at times in more and less politically correct terms, is **how much cultural diversity can be accommodated** within liberal and secular democracies. **And what kind of diversity is that?** Predominantly ethnic? Cultural-linguistic? Or religious?

A number of thinkers and politicians have advanced the claim that it is almost impossible to accommodate certain minority groups, notably Muslims, in European countries because their cultural traditions and religious faith are incompatible with secular democratic governance. Others have argued that Muslims can be accommodated in the socio-political order of European societies provided they adhere to a set of civic values that lie at the heart of European democratic traditions and that reflect the secular nature of society and politics in Europe. Others still have questioned the kind of secularism that underpins state institutions in Europe. Some writers have also argued that citizen attitudes towards religion in Europe are not so much secular, but rather tend towards individualised forms of religiosity. Hence the tension with Muslims lies at the level of public or private expression of religious feelings rather than on religiosity as such.

In the face of rising tensions at the local level and growing concerns at the national and EU level on how to combine cultural diversity and societal cohesion, attention is drawn to **the concept and practice of tolerance**, as *the* historically available mode of cultural conflict-resolution in Europe. At minimum, tolerance means not interfering with somebody else's beliefs and practices or ways of life even if one disapproves of them. Tolerance finds its origins in the religious wars of the 16th century fought between Christian denominations on European soil.

Tolerance is a flexible concept that allows room for different responses and policies to the claims of both individuals and groups while not asking the parties involved in a conflict to agree with one another. Tolerance can be seen thus as an appropriate basis for solving the tensions described above between native or immigrant minorities (predominantly Muslims) and national majorities.

Tolerance, is the historically available mode of cultural conflict-resolution in Europe.

The aim of this report is to present and discuss **the main ethnic, cultural and religious diversity challenges that Europe is facing today**. In particular the report surveys 15 European countries, notably 14 member states (Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) and one associated country (Turkey) and identifies the minority groups or migrant populations that pose the most important ethnic or religious diversity challenges within them. The report concentrates in particular on challenges that have a currency across several EU countries. It discusses the ways in which different countries have dealt with similar diversity dilemmas and identifies appropriate courses of action for the future.

In order to put the study into its appropriate theoretical and empirical framework, section two of this report provides a set of working definitions of contested concepts such as nation and national identity, nationalism, national heritage, nationality, citizenship, integration, assimilation, multiculturalism, multiculturalism, interculturalism, secularism, that forms the basis for our discussion of the specific minority groups and countries. We also discuss at some length the concept of tolerance and the policy guiding and normative framework that it can provide for dealing with ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in Europe.

The third section surveys state formation, citizenship traditions, migration experiences and minority/immigrant groups in the different countries included in this study, casting light on what each country brings to the European landscape and to this debate.

Section four discusses the most important minority and immigrant groups across Europe and the ethnic, cultural or religious diversity challenges that they pose. The fifth section presents a selection of normative and policy responses to these challenges, illustrating dilemmas and possible solutions to them while the concluding section proposes issues for further research as well as points on which policy makers need to focus.

The aim of this report is not to replace the more detailed case studies on the selected countries which the ACCEPT PLURALISM project has produced¹ but rather to emphasise the common elements in the diversity challenges that European countries face as well as the differences. In other words, this report looks for the European dimension of these challenges

Our endeavour is distinctively European also in that it discusses conflict, contestation and compromise – as the well known historian Bo Strath argued; what is distinctive about European history and the European intellectual tradition is not a common set of values or any sense of a common identity but rather a tradition of debate and disagreement, of contestation and negotiation. Europe has predominantly been about how to deal with Others and how to define one's Self towards Others as much as it has been about traditions and elements that unite the citizens and peoples of Europe.

The report surveys 15 European countries, and identifies the minority groups or migrant populations that pose the most important ethnic or religious diversity challenges within them.

¹ Available at <http://www.accept-pluralism.eu>

Although the histories, experiences and policies of the countries studied here present a formidable variety – they are united by their common concern to address cultural diversity in equitable ways, build democratic and tolerant societies while safeguarding societal cohesion and a national heritage (perceived as unitary and common). In other words, these are country cases that present **a wide variety** of discourses, approaches, policies and experiences on the issues investigated but at the same time **a common concern** with these issues and the related policies.

2. Concepts and Terms

There are certain concepts and terms that occupy a central place in any debate on cultural diversity in Europe. Some of these concepts such as for instance nationhood, citizenship or secularism have relatively clear cut definitions that are by and large accepted by most scholars and policy makers. Other concepts such as integration, multiculturalism or interculturalism are highly contested and there is little agreement on what they stand for and how they relate to one another. This report provides a set of working definitions of the fundamental and most commonly used concepts in the area of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity with a view to setting the framework for the comparative discussion that follows.

2.1 Ethnic, Racial, Cultural and Religious Diversity

This study is concerned with cultural diversity writ large, notably with individuals or groups that have different ethnic descent from the majority group in a country (ethnic diversity), different physical traits (racial diversity), different cultural traditions, customs and language (cultural diversity), and/or different religion (religious diversity). In the interests of clarity we tend to specify which type of diversity challenges a particular group may raise. In sociological studies the terms ethnic and cultural diversity are often used synonymously to refer to different language, customs and traditions including codes of behaviour, codes of dress, and value orientations. Similarly it is often hard to tell whether a given group is facing ethnic or racial prejudice (see for instance the case of the Roma that are seen as an ethnic minority but also as a group with special physical traits). Religious diversity, by contrast, is more often clearly distinguished from the other three forms as a different identity that may over-ride ethnic affiliation. Indeed people of different ethnic backgrounds may share the same religion (e.g. Southeast Asians in Britain, Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands or in Germany).

It is often hard to tell whether a given group is facing ethnic or racial prejudice.

2.2 Nation, national identity, nationalism

Nationalism, and indeed the nation itself, appear in an ever greater diversity of forms and configurations. Even if no definition appears completely satisfactory given the complexity and multidimensionality of national identity, the following working definition (based on Anthony D. Smith's² writings) offers a good basis for discussion and analysis:

'a nation is a named and self-defining human community whose member cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or "homelands", create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws'

² Anthony D. Smith, "When is a nation", *Geopolitics*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002); Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991); Monteserrat Guibernau, "Anthony D Smith on nations and national identity: a critical assessment", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 10, No. 1-2 (2004): 125-142.

A nation presupposes the notion of 'national identity' of a 'feeling of belonging' to the nation. In order to analyse national identity as a concept and/or as a social phenomenon, it is often necessary to study the movement that is linked to the 'birth' or 're-awakening' of nations, that is nationalism. According to the well know nationalism theorist Anthony D. Smith, **nationalism** is defined as the

'ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation'.

The notion of national heritage refers to the cultural forms of the nation, notably the shared memories, values, myths, symbols and traditions as well as the repeated activities of the members of the nation. For the purposes of this study, **national heritage** is defined as

'a set of cultural forms that characterise a specific nation and which provide for the framework within which the members of the nation are socialised'.

In other words, the notion of national heritage refers not only to cultural contents but also to their socialising effects. There can of course be competing definitions of the heritage of a nation. There may be competing elites that promote different historical narratives of the nation's past. Or there may be competing definitions of the nation between elite and non-elite social strata. A typical case in point are the competing versions of Turkish nationalism, notably the early 20th century secular Republican version prompted by Kemal Ataturk and the more recent Islamic nationalism of Tahip Erdogan's party in the late 20th and early 21st century. Or, as in Greece, there can be more emphasis on the classical Hellenic heritage at the expense of the more recent Oriental Christian Orthodox heritage. Such conflicts about the dominant view of the national heritage and hence of the national destiny become acute at times of national crisis (that may arise out of political, military or indeed economic issues) and require reform so that the nation finds again its authenticity and its 'true' destiny. As A. D. Smith points out, such conflicts and crises lead to the re-interpretation of the national heritage so that, for instance, in the case of Britain, the imperial heritage is replaced by the Commonwealth and by a multicultural vision of a nation while in France, for instance, until today past identity crises have led to the re-affirmation of the Republican heritage rather than to any radical shift towards a new interpretation of the national heritage.

Smith's analysis points to the dynamic nature of national heritage, which, much more than a set of cultural forms, must be seen as a framework for the making of the nation's members and the forging of the nation's identity and sense of destiny.

2.3 Nationality and Citizenship

While the terms nation, national identity and national heritage are mainly linked to identity issues and feelings of belonging, the term nationality is generally understood as a legal term. It denotes the legal relationship between an individual and a state. The term **citizenship**, on the other hand, although largely used as synonymous to nationality, is defined as **the set of legal rights and duties of individuals that are attached to nationality under domestic law**. We do not use the term nationality here to denote an individual's belonging to a national minority group (in which case the individual's nationality is different from the individual's citizenship). In such cases we use different terms such as minority identity, minority nation, minority national identity.

There may be competing elites that promote different historical narratives of the nation's past.

Citizenship can be based on the right of territory (*jus soli*) or on the right of blood (*jus sanguinis*). In the first case, we refer to a **civic definition** of citizenship based on the place of birth of the citizen while in the latter case, we refer to an **ethnic definition of citizenship** based on genealogical origin (to put it simply: based on the citizenship of one's parents). Citizenship law in most countries uses a combination of the two elements. Some countries have a strong civic element in their citizenship definition and others pay more attention to the ethnic origin of a person.

In EU member states, citizenship acquisition is possible for foreign-born residents after a variable number of years (ranging between 5 to 10 years usually) of legal residence and some additional requirements such as not being convicted for a crime or having one's own means of subsistence (so that the new citizen does not become immediately a burden for the country's welfare system). In countries with a predominantly ethnic definition of citizenship preference is given to people whose parents are citizens sometimes without even requiring that a person is born or lives in the country of her/his parents' citizenship (for instance the child of Greek or German parents acquires upon birth Greek or German citizenship even if s/he was not born and does not live in Greece or Germany). In addition countries with a strong ethnic element in their citizenship definition may categorise entire minority groups (e.g. the Spätaussiedler in Germany or the Pontic Greeks in Greece, or the Kazakh Poles in Poland, and the Ingrian Finns in Finland) as co-ethnics and offer to them a preferential path to naturalisation.

In line with the definition of citizenship above as the set of legal rights and duties of individuals that are attached to nationality under domestic law, the term multicultural citizenship is used to refer to the set of rights and duties that are conferred on individuals who belong to different cultural or ethnic groups within a state. It is actually pertinent to note here that the term nationality often assumes the existence of a nation-state (notably a state where the population is ethnically and culturally homogenous, forms one nation) while in reality it refers to a national state (a state where a majority nation is numerically and politically dominant, but which also comprises other ethnic or national minority groups).

Multicultural citizenship is

'a set of rights and duties that takes into account the cultural, ethnic and religious diversity of the groups that make part of a state and integrates their needs appropriately into an existing set of rights and duties that follow their citizenship'.

2.4 Ethnicity, Race and Racism

Ethnicity and ethnic identity refer to the common cultural features that a group of people share including a common language, common customs and mores, a belief in a common genealogical descent and often (but not necessarily) ties with a specific territory. An *ethnie* is, according to Anthony D. Smith, a group that shares these common cultural traits but that is not necessarily self-conscious of its ethnic identity, and its being different from Others. An *ethnie*, in addition, does not raise claims for political autonomy as a nation does. For some historical sociologists and theorists of nationalism, ethnicity is the stage that historically precedes the birth of a nation.

The notion of race includes a variety of features such as parental lineage,

Multicultural citizenship is "a set of rights and duties that takes into account the cultural, ethnic and religious diversity of the groups that make part of a state".

Racism is associated with natural difference. It implies shared characteristics that cannot be chosen or shed.

physical features (skin colour, stature, and genetic traits) as well as the combination of physical attributes with cultural characteristics. Racism is not necessarily linked to ethnicity or nationalism. What is common to the various definitions of race is that it is associated with *natural* difference. It implies shared characteristics – physical, cultural or other – that cannot be chosen or cast off. This does not mean that racial difference is indeed natural, but rather that it is socially constructed as such.

There are two types of racism:

- an overtly biologising racist language, which, although condemned by the social and political norms of Western societies, is still involved in the process of social and political exclusion of immigrant and native minorities. And
- a cultural differentialist discourse, according to which there are irreducible differences between certain cultures that prevent the integration of specific immigrant or native minority populations in society. This second type of discourse has also been called ‘subtle’ or ‘symbolic’ racism. However the consequences of either approach to race (biological or cultural) are discriminatory and serve to maintain the privilege of one group (the majority) over another (the minority).

The discourse of cultural difference is similar to biological racism because it links culture to nature. Cultural difference is seen as irreducible, because it is dependent upon ethnic descent, a presumed psychological predisposition, environmental factors or a specific genetic makeup. Minorities are thus constructed as alien, unfamiliar and less developed. We may argue that nationalism brings with it the seed of racialisation of minorities. The notion of ‘purity’ and ‘authenticity’ of the national culture, language or traditions, intrinsic to civic and not only ethnic nationalism, implies that cultural difference is undesirable.

In reality, culturalist or differentialist discourses differ little from biological racism as regards their consequences: their effects are racist, even if their arguments are not explicitly racial. Cultural difference provides scope for fluidity and change in social patterns and allegiances: members of minority groups might make conscious decisions to abandon some, but hold on to other, attributes of the perceived minority culture. Or, minority groups might themselves strive to maintain cultural distinctiveness alongside full social and political integration.

Race, in contrast, applies to a population without the possibility of changing their skin colour. Yet, as the sociologist David Silverman³ pointed out two decades ago (in 1992, pp. 79-80), the two types of discourses are conceptually and historically interrelated:

‘Racism in the form of cultural differentiation comes from the post-colonial period, from a period of international circulation of labour and, to a certain extent, from the crisis of the nation-state. It relates to our national and cultural identity crises in the same way that the biological hierarchy of races related to that long period in history in which European nation-states were carving up the rest of the world and instituting first slavery and then colonisation. This is not the only determinant but it is a concrete and absolutely essential one.’

³ Silverman, M. (1992) *Deconstructing the nation: immigration, racism and citizenship in modern France*, London: Routledge.

When analysing racism and discrimination in real life situations it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between ethnic and racial prejudice (- is prejudice against the Roma, for instance, related to their construction as a 'racial' or as an 'ethnic' group? Does it have more to do with their presumed biological predispositions or with their cultural traditions?).

2.4 Integration and Assimilation

In the Asylum and Migration Glossary issued by the European Migration Network, integration is defined as a 'dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states'. The Glossary also adds that 'the promotion of fundamental rights, non discrimination and equal opportunities for all are key integration issues at the EU level.' Integration policy in the EU follows a set of common basic principles, although integration issues are the prerogative mainly of member states, in line with the principle of subsidiarity.

In sociology and political science 'integration' is considered a fuzzy term and for this reason quite problematic. A minimal working definition adopted in this work for integration is the following: integration is a social, economic and political process that regards the insertion of immigrants into their country of destination. Integration requires the effort both of migrants to adapt to the new reality and the of the host population to adapt to the presence of migrants and the changing character of the host society. Integration models can vary but these are discussed in more detail further below.

In common parlance, integration is often confused with assimilation. Assimilation is a social process by which the immigrants completely adapt to the traditions, culture and mores of the host country, and eventually become part of the host nation, gradually abandoning their own ethnicity, culture, and traditions. Assimilation is indeed a one-way process that involves the effort of immigrants to adapt and fuse themselves into the destination country and its dominant culture and is in this sense a distinct concept and term from integration.

Integration is a social, economic and political process that regards the insertion of immigrants into their country of destination.

2.5 Multiculturality, Multiculturalism, and Interculturalism

In several European languages, the terms multiculturalism, multiculturalism and interculturalism are often confused and are used synonymously. Multiculturalism, however, is a descriptive term which refers to the existence of several cultural or ethnic groups within a society with their distinct identity and traditions.

Multiculturalism by contrast is a normative term and is referred to by many as the dogma which dictates that different communities should not be forced to integrate but should rather be allowed to maintain their own cultures and identities and live in 'parallel societies' within a single state. However, multiculturalism has been used as a policy label and as a political science concept to encompass different policies and perspectives on how to deal with individual and collective ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. In fact it is a very minimal working definition that we shall adopt here of multiculturalism: multiculturalism is

'a divergent set of normative ideals and policy programmes that promote (in different ways and by different means) the incorporation and participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities into state and society, taking into account their modes of ethnic and religious difference'.

Interculturalism, or the intercultural approach, by contrast to multiculturalism, focuses on individuals rather than collectivities. It is predicated on dialogue and actual engagement between individuals from different cultures. The intercultural perspective acknowledges a multitude of cultures that may co-exist within a society. Individuals are seen as the carriers of different cultures, and hence intercultural dialogue involves the dialogue between individuals that belong to different ethnic or religious groups. This dialogue is not a private dialogue, such as takes place for instance within a family, but a public one that can take place in institutional contexts such as the school or the workplace.

The difference between multiculturalism and interculturalism essentially lies in the emphasis that the former puts on group identities and the incorporation not only of individual but also of collective difference into society, while the latter focuses on individual difference only.

In many languages the terms civilisation and culture are used as synonyms, and there is a single term for speaking for two different things. Here we define civilisation as the system of values that prevail in a society, while culture is the set of codified meanings by which people make sense of the world and orient themselves within it.

It is often unclear whether the terms intercultural or multicultural refer to culture or civilisation, and while culture is a dynamic and ever changing reality, it is often used in a static way to denote a supposedly stable and cohesive set of norms, values and worldviews.

2.6 Secularism and Laïcité

Current debates on cultural diversity in Europe are often actually about religious diversity. Hence the terms secularism and *laïcité* become pertinent here. Secularism literally means that the state should be separate from religion and religious beliefs. In other words, a secular state must be neutral in matters of religion. An absolute secularism confines religion to the private realm, separate from public institutions and politics (for instance there can be no religious parties, no state support for religious organisations, religion is kept out of public schools). Among EU countries in terms of official rhetoric perhaps France is the only country that is close to an absolute secularism model. In actual policies however, all the countries studied in this report, including France, practice different versions of moderate secularism including measures such as the funding of religious schools, adopting the official holidays of the majority religion, and generally accommodating the majority religious calendar within the school programme.

A moderate secularism upholds the division between political and religious institutions but recognises religion as an aspect of public and political life. Tariq Modood⁴ notes that moderate secularism recognises organised religion as a potential public good or national resource (not just a private matter) which the state in some circumstances can help to realise. In fact in many EU countries there is a state religion or a religion that is historically associated with the nation and occupies a prominent position in public and political life (for instance governments may take an oath on the Bible when starting their mandate,

A moderate secularism upholds the division between political and religious institutions but recognises religion as an aspect of public and political life.

⁴ Modood, T. (2010). Moderate secularism, religion as identity and respect for religion. *The Political Quarterly* 81(1): 4-14.

Catechism may be offered in public schools and even the Constitution of a state may refer to a specific religion as the majority one). In moderate secularism there may be support for minority religions too and actually most European states have some rules and/or conventions for officially recognising religions other than the majority religion of the state. Such official recognition often entails a series of privileges such as exemption from taxation, state subsidies, and official recognition of some religious celebrations.

The term *laicite* comes from the French language and is often used as synonymous to secularism, albeit it is not. *Laicite* refers to the absolute separation of church and state institutions and is thus a narrower concept than that of secularism.

2.7 Tolerance and Respect

The concept of tolerance is not new in the political theory literature. In its basic form, tolerance means to refrain from objecting to something with which one does not agree. It involves rejecting a belief or a behaviour, believing this objection to this behaviour or idea is legitimate, and disposing of the means to combat or suppress it and still deciding to tolerate this negative behaviour and even its possible consequences. As Preston King argues, tolerance is meaningful when the ‘tolerator’ has the power to suspend an act but does not exert this power. It can also be seen as a liberty which obtains only when a negative act, which has a genuine negative motivation (the objection to the said behaviour or action), is voluntarily suspended.

The term tolerance usually refers to the concept of tolerating someone or some practice while the term toleration is used to refer to the act of tolerating. However, the two terms are often used interchangeably to describe contexts and practices where practices or attitudes disapproved of, are allowed to exist. Tolerance also involves prohibiting discriminatory practices or behaviour towards those who engage in the ‘tolerated’ practices. In other words, tolerance may also be seen as a prohibition of discrimination.

Historically, the development of a body of theory on the subject of toleration began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in response to the Protestant Reformation and the Wars of Religion. It started as a response to conflict among Christian denominations and to the persecution of witchcraft and heresy. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, writers such as the French intellectual Michel de Montaigne questioned the morality of religious persecution and offered arguments supporting toleration. In the seventeenth century the concept of toleration was taken up by British thinkers such as John Milton and was further developed in the late seventeenth century by John Locke in his *Letters concerning Toleration* and in his *Two Treatises on Government*. Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire in France and Lessing in Germany further developed the notion of religious tolerance although these ideas did not prevent intolerance and violence in early modern Europe. Tolerance was then understood with reference to religious diversity (dominant religions’ toleration of minority religious groups) while today the concept is applied to all forms of difference including race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, gender.

Already during the Enlightenment, a distinction was made between mere toleration (i.e. forbearance and the permission given by adherents of a dominant religion to religious minorities to exist although they are seen as mistaken and harmful) and the higher level concept of religious liberty which involves equality

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between all religions and the prohibition of discrimination among them. Indeed this distinction is probably the main weakness or the main strength of the concept of tolerance. Some thinkers criticise it because they consider that toleration of something or someone implies a negative view and hence a form of discrimination. They thus privilege the notions of acceptance and recognition of cultural diversity (further discussed below).

Tolerance implies a relationship of power: only majorities have the power to tolerate minorities.

It is worth noting that tolerance implies a relationship of power: only majorities have the power to tolerate minorities. The object of tolerance may be the minority group as such, an individual that is member of a minority group and/or the 'divergent' customs or practices of the minority individual or group. A minority cannot tolerate a majority simply because it does not have the power to do so. However a minority may (or may not) adopt tolerance as regards diversity among its own members.

Susan Mendus and Preston King, two of the best known political philosophers who have written on the subject, see toleration/tolerance first as a practical consideration since each society or state has to set the limits of what and who it tolerates and does not tolerate, and second who consider it as an appropriate way to approach issues of cultural diversity and discrimination against minorities. Indeed Veit Bader, a well known contemporary political philosopher, argues that tolerance is an appropriate concept and norm for the wide variety of issues on which different groups in society may not and need not agree. Not all types of cultural, ethnic or religious difference need to be accepted or respected. While tolerance may thus appear as ethically minimalist (since it does not approve nor actually respect diversity) it may also be considered as politically appropriate and as a viable solution to ethnic, cultural and religious diversity dilemmas today.

Elisabetta Galeotti, in her book *Toleration as Recognition*, proposes an advanced concept of toleration that involves not only acceptance and recognition of cultural diversity but also combating negative stereotypes and identities that may have been attributed to 'tolerated' minority groups. While the classical form of tolerance discussed above may be also characterised as liberal tolerance, this second type predicated by Galeotti can be characterised as egalitarian tolerance. It remains however a subject for empirical and theoretical inquiry which, the liberal or the egalitarian notion of tolerance, responds better to contemporary diversity challenges in Europe.

In this report we propose tolerance as a middle range concept and practice that stands between intolerance (the non acceptance of individuals, groups or practices) and acceptance, respect and public recognition of minority individuals, groups or practices. We distinguish thus both empirically and normatively between:

- iv) **Non-toleration:** Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which claims of toleration are made but to whom/which toleration is not granted, and the reasons given in favour of or against toleration;
- v) **Toleration:** Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which claims of toleration are made and to whom/which toleration is granted, and the reasons given in favour of or against toleration;
- vi) **Recognition, respect as equal and admission as normal:** Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which it is claimed that toleration is not enough and other normative concepts, namely those that

focus on majority-minority relations and the reform of institutions and citizenship, are or should be more relevant. They also include claims and processes towards the reconsideration of difference as a 'normal' feature of social life. Such concepts include equality, respect, recognition, accommodation and so on, and the reasons given in favour of or against these propositions.

It is important to clarify that the relationship between tolerance and respect for or recognition of difference is not necessarily a hierarchical one. Respect is not necessarily always a better institutional or practical solution for accommodating difference. While tolerance may be appropriate for some diversity claims and may satisfy some requests of minority groups or individuals, respect and public recognition may be a better 'fit' for other types of diversity claims. It is our aim in this report to highlight some of the contexts in which tolerance is a better 'fit' than respect (or vice versa).

The relationship between tolerance and respect for or recognition of difference is not necessarily a hierarchical one.

3. National Identities, Migrants and Minorities

This report covers countries from five different regions in Europe: southern Europe (Greece, Spain and Italy), south-eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), Central Eastern Europe (Hungary and Poland), Nordic Europe (Sweden and Denmark) and northern and western Europe (Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland). We thus include in our study countries with different socio-economic features and with different relationships with the EU (founding states, early members of the EEC, recent member states and a candidate country).

This report is equally concerned with native and immigrant minorities.

This report is equally concerned with native and immigrant minorities according to their relevance for each country. A distinction between ethnic minorities and migrant populations is in order here, as usually these two different types of minorities enjoy different sets of rights and different levels of public recognition. Native minorities are defined as populations historically established in a given territory and which took part in the formation of the (national or multi-national) state in which they live. In many cases their participation in state-building is recognised in the Constitution and they are guaranteed special rights regarding the preservation of their cultural, religious, or linguistic heritage. In some countries, there are special provisions regarding the political representation of a native minority in cases where that minority is so numerically small that it risks being left out of the political system.

3.1 New and Old Hosts

Immigrant populations emerge as a result of international migration. Receiving countries adopt different approaches towards these populations, some encouraging not only socio-economic but also political integration of immigrants and their offspring (usually countries with a predominantly civic definition of citizenship). Other countries have restrictive policies that keep immigrants and sometimes their second-generation offspring in a status of denizen-ship, i.e. they have full socio-economic but no political rights (usually countries with a predominantly ethnic definition of citizenship).

Even when the members of a given immigrant group have acquired the citizenship of the country of settlement, collective minority rights do not automatically follow. In other words, any concerns that immigrant communities may have with regard to the safeguarding of their cultural traditions or language remain ongoing after they obtain citizenship rights, and usually have to be negotiated with the country of settlement.

It is worth noting that immigrant populations who come from former colonies may be considered as an intermediate category between native minorities and immigrant groups because they have special historical, cultural and political ties with the country of settlement. In fact, in several of the countries studied here (e.g. Commonwealth citizens in Britain, Algerians in France, Surinamese in the Netherlands) post-colonial migrants have enjoyed in the past and to this day a special status (preferential access to citizenship or special residence rights) as a recognition of their historical relationship with the country of settlement.

Before considering the specific diversity challenges that EU countries face today, it is necessary to outline briefly the main social, political and historical features that characterise each country and which frame the national debates on ethnic and

religious diversity. Based on their immigration history, the 15 countries studied here can be roughly categorised into three groups: the 'old hosts' that have experienced immigration in the post war period and in any case before 1989 but still continue to receive economic migrants. In this study there are 6 countries that belong to the 'old host' category: Britain, France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The 'new' hosts are countries that became immigrant destinations in the 1990s and 2000s. Here our study includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain. Last we study countries in transition, notably countries who receive immigrants but not in large numbers and which also send emigrants in smaller or larger numbers. The countries studied under this group include Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Turkey.

3.2 Nations, Migrants and Minorities

Our selected cases represent a variety of historical experiences of nation state formation, understandings of national identity, and native minority challenges: countries where the state was consolidated before national identity took shape (e.g. France or Spain), states with a strong ethnic definition of their identity (e.g. Germany, Greece, Cyprus), states with an uncertain national identity (e.g. Italy), states with a mainly civic understanding of the nation (e.g. France, UK or Sweden), post-communist states (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania), states where national identity is inextricably intertwined with religion (such as Ireland, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Poland), states that were predominantly secular during Communist times but are currently re-discovering the importance of religion for their national identity (Bulgaria and Romania), states with strong national identities but also large native minorities (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Spain to name only a few) and states with significant regional identities (see for instance the cases of Germany, Spain, the UK or Italy). Below we discuss in some more detail the relationship between nation, migration and religion in each of the countries studied.

Old hosts: With the exception of Germany where a strong ethnic conception of the nation was prevalent until the year 2000 (when German citizenship law was reformed), all other 'old host' countries have a predominantly civic and territorial understanding of national identity and citizenship. The United Kingdom is defined as a multi-national state composed of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. In addition to its multi-national character, Britain defines itself as a multi-ethnic state, or indeed as a 'community of communities' as the well known report of the Runnymede Trust on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain stated. Tariq Modood calls this model 'political multiculturalism' and sees as its core element the idea of multicultural citizenship, notably the idea that the rights and duties of individual citizens must take into account their individual as well as collective identities that may be ethnic, cultural, racial or religious in character.

France has a strong civic conception of the nation too, albeit radically different from that of the UK. The French can be all people living in France (the idea is here modelled on Ernest Renan's famous 'daily plebiscite' – the daily expression of the citizens' will to belong to the nation) provided however that they adhere to a common set of civic values. These values include a rather radical secularism and a complete separation of religion from state institutions. They are essentially liberal and republican values and recognise only individual

Britain defines itself as a multi-ethnic state, or indeed as a "community of communities".

France has a strong civic conception of the nation too, albeit radically different from that of the UK.

ethnic or religious difference, which in turn they relegate to the private realm. Thus, the French nation is predicated on a model of civic assimilation, embracing, however, all people who were born and/or live in France, regardless of creed.

The self-definition of the nation in the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden may be considered as roughly similar to the extent that they are predicated on a background of a Protestant identity (and the related work ethic), an ideology of a strong and egalitarian welfare state that provides a safety net for all but which comes at the price of high taxation, and a strong commitment to a civic and political culture that is moderately secular and liberal. The Netherlands is particularly marked by its tradition of separate pillars in society, which allows for the collective organisation and self-expression of people according to their religion (Protestant or Catholic) or political ideology (socialist). It was tacitly believed in the Netherlands that migrants from former colonies or third countries could eventually integrate into one of the existing pillars or even model their own separate (Muslim?) pillar. However, this has not been the case. Migrant communities, especially those from Morocco and Turkey, that are the largest and the most territorially concentrated, have instead developed parallel societies and own community organisations. There was a mutual failure on the part of both the Dutch native majority and the immigrant minorities to enter into dialogue and integrate with one another, forging a new understanding of being Dutch. During the last decade many scholars and politicians in the Netherlands have argued that the Dutch version of (pillarised) multiculturalism has failed and that a turn towards a civic assimilation model was both necessary and desirable.

In Denmark and to a lesser extent in Sweden the challenges of ethnic and religious diversity have been acutely felt during the last decade, with special reference to their Muslim populations. The answer to such tensions has largely been an emphasis on the civic values that underpin their citizenship traditions, notably on democracy, liberalism and moderate secularism.

Despite the predominantly civic definitions of nationhood and citizenship in five of the six 'old hosts' examined here and their long experience in receiving migrants, the recent decade has seen, if not a retreat, at least a repositioning of cultural diversity policies and discourses with a view to emphasising a common civic sense of citizenship as the basis for newcomer integration. Indeed, the Netherlands, a country that has been a forerunner in multicultural policies since the 1980s has now imposed not only integration courses for newcomers but also a civic integration test to be undertaken by prospective migrants before departure from their country of origin. In the face of mounting civil unrest and social exclusion of second-generation immigrant youth, the French government has reasserted its Republican civic integration model banning ostentatious religious symbols from schools. Britain and Sweden have upheld in practice a political multiculturalism approach (even if they have changed the terminology used). However, concerns for cohesion have been strong in Britain, and have led recent governments to introduce a 'Life in the United Kingdom test' (a civic integration test) and civic ceremonies for citizenship acquisition. The concerns, however, have not been fully allayed, as the recent statements by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron show.

Nonetheless it is worth noting that Britain, the Netherlands, France and Sweden have upheld rather generous naturalisation policies, seeing citizenship as a tool for migrant integration. German naturalisation policy has become more liberal during the last decade but its implementation remains relatively restrictive. Denmark also

The answer to such tensions has largely been an emphasis on the civic values that underpin their citizenship traditions, notably on democracy, liberalism and moderate secularism.

Table 1: National Identity, Native Minorities and Migrant Populations in the ‘Old Host’ Countries

Countries	Total population (2009)	Migrant population (size)	Largest immigrant groups	Size	Largest native minorities	Size
United Kingdom	61.8 million	4.6 million	Irish Mixed All ‘black’ All Asian Other ethnic	90,000 670,000 1,150,000 2,300,000 230,000	No	--
France	65 million	4.8 million	Other EU North Africa Sub-Sah.Africa Turkey Rest of world incl. China	2 million 1.5 million 570,000 220,000 600,000	Roma	250-450,000
Germany	81.9 million	15.7 million	Poland Greece Italy Romania Turkey Russian Fed. Africa America North-America Kazakhstan Other Middle-East South and South-East Asia	1.3 million 375,000 717,000 435,000 2.5 million 1 million 477,000 385,000 179,000 656,000 1.2 million 563,000	Roma German Danes Frisians Sorbs	60-70,000 50,000 400,000 60,000
Netherlands	16.3 million	3.35 million (with one foreign born parent)	Turkey Indonesia Morocco Surinam	383,000 382,000 349,000 342,000	Inhabitants of Friesland Inh.of Limburg Roma	644,000 1.12 million 3,500
Sweden	9.3 million	700,000	Iraq Sub Sah.Afr. Former Yugosl. Poland Iran Bosnia Herz.	118,000 80,000 70,000 70,000 60,000 56,000	Roma Meankieli Saami Swedish Finns	30-65,000 40-70,000 17,000 675,000
Denmark	5.5 million	540,000	Turkey Germany Iraq Poland	60,000 30,000 30,000 28,000	Roma Ethnic Germans Greenlanders	5-10,000 15,000 18,000

Source: Author’s own compilation on the basis of the ACCEPT PLURALISM project reports. For more see www.accept-pluralism.eu

has a restrictive naturalisation policy although it has a very open civic integration policy at the local level (migrants can participate in local elections after two years of residence).

In these six 'old host' countries of northern and western Europe, Christianity and its traditions (including monuments and the fine arts) are part of the national heritage (Catholic religion in France and to a certain extent in Germany and the Netherlands; Protestant religion in Sweden, Denmark, Britain and also to a certain extent in Germany). Catholic and Protestant denominations are also recognised institutionally and given certain privileges as regards taxation or education. However, religion is not necessarily part of national identity in these countries. The link between a specific religion and the nation is quite loose, and rather what is distinctive of these countries is the moderate secularism that allows for different religions and their institutions to flourish with some support from the state.⁵

Among these six countries, Germany is a federal state but has a unitary and strong national identity. Britain is a multinational state with a strong British identity but also equally strong Welsh, English, Scottish and northern Irish identities. The other four countries are relatively centralised in their governance and have no large national minorities. Interestingly there are numerically very small Roma populations in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden but not in Britain (see Table 1, below). Indeed in these six countries the main cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges are posed by post-war and more recent economic immigration.

New hosts: Among the southern European countries and Ireland that have experienced immigration during the last two decades, the Spanish and the Italian nation are defined mainly in civic terms, while the Irish and the Greek are mainly ethnically conceived. Spain and Italy have strong centrifugal tendencies due to regional nationalisms in Spain and regional identities in Italy. In both countries the nation is defined predominantly in territorial and political terms and is also widely contested - by minority nationalisms in Spain and by regional nationalism in Italy. Interestingly in both countries there is a close link between national identity and the Catholic religion, even though such a link has been losing its importance in recent decades.

In Greece and Ireland by contrast the nation is predominantly defined on the basis of ethnic descent (Gaelic in Ireland, and Greek in Greece), and a common national culture and traditions as well as the national language. Both countries are mainly centralised and have neither internal competing nationalisms nor strong regional identities. In Greece and Ireland religion is part and parcel of the national identity - being Greek involves also being a Christian Orthodox, while being Irish tends to mean also being a Catholic. In Greece, there is an established state church that largely monopolises the expression of organised religion. In Ireland, while there has been a significant Protestant minority, the Catholic Church has retained a predominant position. In both countries however, the arrival of migrants has brought with it religious diversity in the form of Christians from other denominations as well as Muslims.

All four countries experienced migration after 1989. Interestingly, while large scale immigration to Greece and Italy started in the early 1990s, in Spain and Ireland immigration took off only in the late 1990s. All four countries have

While large scale immigration to Greece and Italy started in the early 1990s, in Spain and Ireland immigration took off only in the late 1990s.

⁵ In France such support does not refer to religious but rather to cultural associations because of the more pronounced form of secularism that the French state adopts.

developed a set of tentative integration policies for immigrants, regarding mainly the schooling of immigrant children and some initiatives at the local level through trade unions and other NGOs, or, for instance in Italy, through the setting up of regional consultative bodies for immigrant participation. The perceived failure of the cultural diversity approach adopted by the 'old hosts' has discouraged multicultural integration policies in southern Europe, reinforcing the view that immigration may be economically a good thing provided that immigrants become assimilated into the dominant national culture. In none of the four countries, however, has there so far been a reconsideration of what it means to be Italian, Spanish, Irish or Greek with a view to embracing ethnic, cultural or religious diversity as part of national heritage and/or national identity.

In addition, in all four countries naturalisation policy has been rather restrictive. With the exception of Latin Americans in Spain (2 years) and co-ethnic returnees in Greece (upon arrival in the country), 'other' immigrants and their offspring find it hard to acquire the citizenship of their adoptive country. Naturalisation of first generation immigrants in Ireland, while liberal in principle, is subject to considerable delay and discretionary obstacles. In Ireland an initially extremely liberal policy granting citizenship at birth to all born in the country was restricted in 2004 because it was seen as giving rise to a birth-citizenship trade (it was a strategy of parents for receiving Irish residency through giving birth in Ireland to children who were thus Irish citizens). Thus the territorial element in Irish citizenship has been significantly curtailed.

Concerning native minorities, all four countries have significant nomadic Roma populations (in the case of Ireland they are not Roma but indigenous Travellers) that have lived in their territories for centuries. In addition Greece has a significant Turkish Muslim native minority. Italy has a number of bilingual regions where small national minorities live.⁶

All in all the new host countries are more ethnically oriented in their definition of national identity definition compared with the old hosts, have more restrictive naturalisation policies and see citizenship as a prize rather than as a tool for integration. Their integration policies towards migrants have tended to be under-developed and guided mainly by grassroots initiatives of civil society actors rather than framed as a state policy. The new host countries in southern Europe and Ireland have not yet re-considered their national identity in any way that would actively embrace cultural, ethnic or religious diversity as some of the old host countries did (notably Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands and to a lesser extent France). In contrast all the new host countries have had to face the cultural and ethnic diversity challenges of Roma and Traveller minorities, but have done so with very little success. Indeed Roma populations in Spain, Italy and Greece and Travellers in Ireland are among the most harshly discriminated and socio-economically disadvantaged minority populations in Europe.

In 'new' host countries integration policies towards migrants have been guided mainly by grassroots initiatives of civil society actors rather than framed as a state policy.

⁶ Law 482/1999 (<http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/99482l.htm>) recognises 12 minority languages (to which 12 native minorities correspond): Friulian, Ladino, German, Slovenian, Occitan, French, Franco, Albanian, Greek, Sardinian, Catalan and Croatian. These languages can be taught in schools, used in public offices and by the media. However in practice this is seldom the case.

Table 2: National Identity, Native Minorities and Migrant Populations in the ‘New Host’ Countries of Europe

Countries	Total population in 2009	Total migrant population (size)	Largest immigrant groups	Size	Largest native minorities	Size
Ireland	4.5 million	420,000	(data for 2006) UK Polish Lithuanian Nigerian	110,000 60,000 25,000 16,000	Irish travellers	22,000
Italy	60 million	4.9 million	Romania Albania Morocco China Ukraine Philippines Sub-Sah.Afr.	900,000 460,000 430,000 190,000 180,000 120,000 285,000	Roma	120-150,000
Greece	11 million	840,000	Albanians Bulgarians Romanians Georgians Pakistanis Russians	500,000 55,000 34,000 34,000 23,000 20,000	Turks/ Muslims of Thrace Roma	80-120,000 300-350,000
Spain	46 million	4.7 million	(data for 2010) Romanians Moroccans Ecuadorians Colombians UK Italy Bulgaria China Sub Sah.Afr	700,000 760,000 380,000 260,000 225,000 165,000 155,000 152,000 ~110,000	Roma	650,000

Source: Author’s own compilation on the basis of the ACCEPT PLURALISM project reports. For more see www.accept-pluralism.eu

Countries in transition:

The countries in transition are new EU member states that are affected mainly by emigration to the old member states and to a lesser extent by immigration from Eastern Europe. These countries have a long history of native minority integration (or assimilation) and share a recent past under Communism. Thus all the countries in this group (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) are relatively young democracies that have experienced a revival of national and religious identities in the post-1989 period.

Poles, Bulgarians and Romanians have been the most mobile nationalities in the EU, emigrating in large numbers in the 1990s and early 2000s and particularly after Poland's accession to the EU in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria's joining in 2007. These countries so far have seen little immigration, perhaps with the exception of Poland, where official data put the number of immigrants at 50,000, although the UN population division puts it at 700,000. These four countries have large native minorities (see table 1 below) in their territories that are officially recognised in their respective Constitutions. The case of Bulgaria is noteworthy, as the two larger native minorities, the Turks and the Roma, account for approximately 15% of the country's population, while in Hungary ethnic minorities account for between 5 and 10% of the total population (depending on estimates of the size of the Roma population).

The case of Central and Eastern European countries that have joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007 is worth special attention as their migration and minority policies and politics have been heavily shaped by their process of accession to the EU. These countries have had to adopt, among other measures, specific policies protecting native minority rights in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria for accession. At the same time, they have had to adopt migration policies that are geared towards securing the external EU borders disregarding regional specificities of cross-border trade and labour mobility.

The 2004 member states do not face a serious challenge of incoming migration; hence migrant integration is not a prominent issue in their agendas. Rather, their concern is with emigration of their nationals to other member states. However, the EU migration policy emphasis on border control contributes to making these countries reluctant to address cultural diversity issues. Thus, while the rights of native minorities are guaranteed, there are no provisions for integrating newcomers under similar conditions of tolerance and/or respect. There is thus a clear division between the cultural diversity considered to belong to these countries in historic terms and 'alien'/foreign cultural diversity.

In South-eastern Europe, in the Balkan Peninsula and in Turkey, the issue of ethnic and cultural diversity is further complicated. While these countries aspire to become members of the European Union, they are still struggling with issues of internal cohesion, accommodation of ethnic, cultural or religious diversity in their institutional make-up and respect for human rights, not to mention collective minority rights. In most cases, democratic consolidation is still incomplete. Overcoming the recent violent conflicts that broke up Yugoslavia and that still trouble Turkey with regard to its Kurdish minority is not an easy task. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that these regions have an important (albeit today neglected) heritage of respect, tolerance

The countries in transition are new EU member states that are affected mainly by emigration to the old member states and to a lesser extent by immigration from Eastern Europe.

In South-eastern Europe, in the Balkan Peninsula and in Turkey, the issue of ethnic and cultural diversity is further complicated.

and recognition of cultural and religious diversity which is part of their imperial legacy. The Ottoman Empire to which most of these countries belonged, recognised and tolerated – as this concept was defined and understood in that particular historical context - religious and cultural diversity, elevating religious communities to political self-governing entities, the well known *millet* system. Thus, it is relevant to consider whether and to what extent this heritage has been lost, since it appears to have been overshadowed by the ideological hegemony of the nation state and its presumption of cultural and ethnic homogeneity within a state. In other words, there are probably important lessons to be learnt from the history of the wider South-eastern Europe region even if the present situation appears quite bleak in terms of tolerance and respect for cultural diversity.

Table 3: National Identity, Native Minorities and Migrant Populations in the Countries ‘in transition’ as regards migration

Countries	Total population in 2009	Total immigrant population (size)	Largest immigrant groups	Size	Largest native minorities	Size
Hungary	10 million	No	--	--	Total Germans Slovaks Croat Roma Romanian	0.8-1.2 million 200,000 100,000 80,000 400-800,000 25,000
Poland	38 million	700,000 (estimate for 2005)	Ukrainians	Unspecified	Germans Belarussians Ukrainians Silesians Roma	150,000 50,000 30,000 170,000 20-30,000
Bulgaria	7.6 million	No	--	--	Turks Roma	750,000 370,000
Romania	21.5 million	No	--	--	Ethnic Hungarians Roma	1.5 million 0.55-1 mill.
Turkey	72 million	(no data available)	Bosnians Pomaks Circassians Iranians EU migrants Transit migrants Refugees	2 million 600,000 2.5 m 500,000 170,000 200,000 20,000	Jews Greeks Armenians Assyrians Alevis Arabs Kurds	40,000 3,000 60,000 53,000 15 million 1 million 13 million

Source: Author’s own compilation on the basis of the ACCEPT PLURALISM project reports. For more see www.accept-pluralism.eu

Modern Turkey is worth a special mention here as the country is characterised not only by significant emigration (Turks being among the largest immigrant groups in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, among the countries studied) but also by significant immigration from neighbouring Balkan and Asian countries as well as by the historical presence of large native minorities. Indeed Turkey is by definition a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country that bears with it both the multicultural tolerance tradition of the Ottoman Empire and the *millet* arrangements as well as the modern nationalist intolerance towards minorities. Minorities in Turkey (the smaller historical minorities of Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians and Jews but most importantly the large minorities of Alevis, Sunni Arab Muslims, Circassians, Georgians, Lazes and Kurds) are integrated socio-economically but are treated politically as second-class citizens because they do not belong to the dominant Turkish--Sunni-Muslim majority. However, since the Helsinki Summit of the European Union in December 1999, Turkey has become exposed to the issue of celebration of ethno-cultural and religious identity claims in public space. Recently, prior to the general elections in June 2011 and in parallel to the preparatory works of a more inclusive Constitution, such groups have become vocal again to test the consolidation of Turkish democracy.

Having presented here a comparative overview of the 15 European countries studied, the following section presents the main groups that pose important ethnic, cultural and religious diversity challenges in Europe today.

Indeed Turkey is by definition a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country that bears with it both the multicultural tolerance tradition of the Ottoman Empire and the millet arrangements as well as the modern nationalist intolerance towards minorities.

4. Cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges

The survey of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges provided by the ACCEPT PLURALISM project and documented in the Country Profiles presented in this report, suggests that there are three main types of visible minority groups in Europe today: People of Colour ('Blacks') notably from sub-Saharan Africa or the West Caribbean; Muslims, that may be of Turkish, North African or southeast Asian background; and Roma, that are usually indigenous or originate from other EU member states. Below we discuss the cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges that each of these populations raise in the different countries and how they have been addressed thus far.

4.1 'Coloured' People

'Coloured' immigrants are almost totally absent from Central Eastern and South-eastern European countries but present in relatively large numbers in some of the 'old' host countries, notably the UK, France and Sweden, and in smaller but visible numbers in Italy, Spain, and Ireland (and in even smaller numbers in Greece).

The country in which race relations and protection against racism is probably most developed is **Britain**. Indeed it may relate to the fact that Black Caribbeans arrived in Britain in the 1950s, earlier than other sub-Saharan African immigration to Europe. These populations were highly anglicised, coming from a former colony, and had rights of entry⁷ and abode in the UK as citizens of the Commonwealth. However, the multi-ethnic character of the Empire was not welcome when it led to the arrival of large numbers of non-white immigrants on the British mainland. The hostile environment in the UK (with 'No Coloured' and 'Europeans only' frequently displayed at restaurants, bars and shops) revealed that the idea of a multi-ethnic Commonwealth did not translate into a positive acceptance of cultural diversity at home.

The characterisation of what made the presence of 'coloured' or more specifically 'black' migrants problematic, evolved with time. In the late 1950s, it was mostly biological racism and powerful cultural conceptions about how 'blacks' were different from 'whites.' These led to stereotypes of laziness, drug use and prostitution that were later, in the 1970s, complemented by the theme of 'black criminality'. In addition racism led to views inimical to racial mixing and inter-ethnic partnering.

Socio-economically, West Caribbean immigrants (like all ethnic minorities) entered British society at the bottom. The need in Britain was for cheap, unskilled labour to perform those jobs in an expanding economy which white people no longer wished to do, and the bulk of the immigration

"Coloured" immigrants are almost totally absent from Central Eastern and South-eastern European countries but present in relatively large numbers in northern and southern Europe.

⁷ Citizenship law was modified and related rights of entry and stay in the UK were restricted from 1962 onwards.

occurred in response to this need. Research from the 1960s onwards established quite clearly that non-white people had a much poorer socio-economic profile than white people and that racial discrimination was one of the principal causes.

Anti-discrimination legislation was introduced in Britain in 1965 and strengthened in 1968 and 1976. While this eliminated the open discrimination that was common up to that time (the 'colour bar' experienced in employment but also housing and public services), it did not mitigate its less visible forms. Anti-immigration rhetoric in the 1960s spoke of cultural incompatibility and conflict (Enoch Powell's Rivers of Blood address in the 1960s; Britain, according to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1970s, being 'swamped' by immigrants). Indeed from the late 1960s, the extension of racial equality was connected to restriction of entry: "without integration, limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible". Despite the abolition of the open "colour bar" however through anti-discrimination legislation, racism persisted in crude and polite forms.

Britain, France and the Netherlands are the only countries among those examined whose coloured immigration and related race relations and anti-discrimination legislation concerned people coming from the Caribbean (West Indies for the UK, Martinique and Guadeloupe for France, Surinam and Dutch Antilles for the Netherlands), thus relating to the overall issue of the slave trade in previous centuries and to the contemporary (in the 1960s) civil rights movements of African Americans in the USA. In all the other countries studied here, 'coloured' migrants have come from sub-Saharan African countries either as economic migrants or as asylum seekers.

Indeed this is the case in **Ireland, France, Sweden, and Italy**, the countries with relatively large 'coloured' migrant populations. In France 'black' immigrants come from west and sub-Saharan African countries that are former colonies, notably Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Mali. Sub-Saharan African immigration to Italy is different from France in that there are no former colonial ties, but the countries of origin are to a large extent the same, notably Senegal, along with Nigeria but also Ghana, and the Ivory Coast. The Nigerian community is also large in Ireland, but, in contrast to Italy, where Nigerians arrived as economic migrants, Nigerians in Ireland have come mostly as asylum seekers.

In Sweden by contrast 'coloured' immigration comes from East African countries, notably Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and there too these communities have formed mostly as a result of spontaneous refugee inflows.

As in Britain, discussed more specifically above, **the challenges that coloured immigration brings to the countries studied concern three main issues:**

- (a) **Biological and culturalist racism:** Race as skin-colour and physical appearance, seen as related to specific personality and cultural traits,
- (b) **Discrimination:** Poor socio-economic integration that is related both to the fact that most sub-Saharan Africans arrived as low skilled economic immigrants, but also to the significant and persisting discrimination that 'coloured' people face in the labour market and in other areas such as housing and social life generally,
- (c) **Ethnic/Racial Prejudice:** in relation to both (a) and (b) their assumed association with illegality. This illegality can relate to unlawful

"Coloured" migrants have come from sub-Saharan African countries either as economic migrants or as asylum seekers.

crossing of the Italian and Spanish borders for instance, to their 'black criminality' in Britain, for instance a presumed culturally-defined propensity of Nigerian women to become prostitutes. This type of prejudice is mixed, both ethnic and racial, as it is predicated on the racial features of 'coloured' people but also on their specific ethnic traits (a predisposition of Nigerians in particular, not necessarily of all 'black' people).

As biological racism has become largely politically unacceptable, discrimination and racial prejudice discourses in the countries studied have taken a culturalist overtone

As biological racism has become largely politically unacceptable over the last three decades, discrimination and racial prejudice discourses in the countries studied have taken a culturalist overtone. Thus people of 'colour' are taken to be intrinsically different from 'whites' not because of some concept of biological race but simply because their cultures are seen as incompatible with the western way of life.

Both in France and Sweden second generation sub-Saharan African youth experience intense racial categorisation and discrimination as part of their everyday life, when looking for a job, at work and in social life. In Sweden such racism is a mixture of racial and cultural prejudice: 'African' or 'Somali' culture is perceived as very far removed from the Swedish way of life, and racial difference is seen as 'radical' difference that cannot be integrated nor assimilated.

African-born migrants in Sweden are the group most likely to be unemployed or subjected to discrimination in the labour market, and employers perceive African-born migrants as more different than those that are European-born. For example, the chance that a migrant from Sub-Saharan Africa will find a job which matches his/her education or training is over 60 percent less compared with a native Swede. Also, the lowest-paid groups in the Swedish labour market are found among African born migrants.

In France survey studies have shown that both 'natives' and immigrants from North Africa and their descendants perceive 'coloured' people as different even when they are French citizens. Although racism is illegal in France since 1973, and in 2004 the French government created a High authority to fight discrimination and promote equality (*Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l'égalité*, Halde) incidents of racism towards people of colour persist and remain part of everyday life.

In Italy and Spain, sub-Saharan Africans are particularly associated with street-peddling and the selling of counterfeit goods. While this is largely tolerated by 'natives' who buy fake CDs or DVDs and leather bags at very low prices in these open-air stalls, it still reinforces a view that 'coloured' people live at the margins of legality. In many of the most visited cities of Spain and Italy (e.g. Barcelona or Madrid, or Rome, Milan and Florence) police controls have intensified in recent years with a view to stopping the trading of counterfeit goods, or at least to relocating it to less central spots.

In Ireland by contrast they are more likely to be seen as welfare scroungers, because many arrived as asylum seekers and also because some African women arrived in the early 2000s (before the reform of the citizenship law) in the latter stages of pregnancy supposedly to avail of the provision within Irish law that children born on Irish soil had a right to Irish

Commemorating the Abolition of Slavery in Britain. An example of multicultural accommodation of diversity

Britain's imperial and colonial past has thrown up a number of considerable challenges, among them the concern with how the British 'national story' may be changed to acknowledge past injustices and the place of non-white people. Examples of past injustice are abundant: The plantocracies of the Caribbean relied on forced labour, such as in the production of sugar. English port cities, Bristol among them, were the hubs of transatlantic enslavement and of trade in commodities produced by slave labour. With the immigration of Black Caribbeans after the Second World War, this fraught history has become a matter of considerable importance. The challenge is how black history may be acknowledged and woven into national and local self-representations.

Various initiatives have emerged since the 1980s and 1990s to contribute to a history 'from below' that acknowledges the contributions of black people and considers not only historical injustice but their relevance for continued experiences of discrimination. Such considerations have for example come to the fore in the 2007 celebrations of the 'abolition of slavery' in Bristol.

The idea that 1807 had seen the 'end of slavery' (and that this 'end' could be attributed to the actions of white abolitionists) caused offence not least as slavery, in various forms, continued on territories under British control well into the 20th century. Both nation-wide and locally, such debates occurred in the run-up to the 2007 commemoration of the bicentenary of abolition. For Bristol, £2 million were provided for Bristol by the Heritage Lottery Fund and £150,000 by Bristol City Council to fund 24 local initiatives in the context of 'Abolition 200'. Where local commemorations up to the mid 1990s had largely ignored Bristol's fraught history, this represented a significant move towards acknowledging the city's role in the transatlantic slave trade.

Simultaneously, however, a significant number of local actors and black grassroots groups expressed considerable uneasiness with some elements of the official discourse and in particular with how it continued to reflect a white, majoritarian perspective. Various protests occurred during the 2007 commemoration (notably by the Bristol-based group 'Operation Truth'). A 'steering committee' made up of local groups was set up. Bristol's Lord Mayor together with various other local dignitaries publicised a declaration that 1807 was not the end but "beginning of the end of slavery".

The question how to narrate the 'national story' continues to be a contested issue not only between social majority and minorities but also among and within the various post-immigration groups. In the case of 'Abolition 200', it was not merely the official commemoration but the active contestation and the participation of various individuals and groups in these debates that points to elements of a 'best practice' example for how multicultural accommodation may be furthered.

citizenship. This was perceived by the government and some sections of the population to be unacceptable.

'Coloured' immigrants face racist prejudice and discrimination in the labour market in all the European countries studied in this section. In Britain, which experienced 'coloured' immigration earlier than the other countries, there have been important policy efforts to eradicate racial prejudice through measures promoting equality and fighting discrimination in all spheres of life. One relevant example is the 200 year commemoration of the abolition of slavery and the related debates as to how to incorporate the contribution of West Indian people to contemporary Britain (see text box 1).

Nonetheless, race remains an important obstacle to socio-economic integration in Britain. In France and Sweden the case is the same: 'black' colour lowers one's chances of getting a good job and 'black' people face discrimination in all areas of life. In the new immigration countries like Ireland, Italy and Spain, coloured immigrants are, to varying degrees, portrayed negatively as either welfare scroungers or irregular immigrants. They are generally associated with a propensity to violate the law and engage in criminal acts. Although all EU countries have anti-discrimination laws in line with the Race and Equality Directives of 2000, these have not so far succeeded in eradicating negative stereotypes of 'coloured' migrants and the related problems they face in insertion in the labour market and integration in society.

European Muslims cannot be considered as a uniform group in any respect, as they come from different countries, live in different countries, speak different languages, adhere to different versions of Islam, are more or less moderate in their beliefs.

4.2 Muslims

Muslims are the largest immigrant (non-indigenous) group in Europe that is perceived to raise important challenges of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. European Muslims cannot of course be considered as a uniform group in any respect, as they come from different countries, live in different countries, speak different languages, adhere to different versions of Islam, are more or less moderate in their beliefs and claims. Despite this multi-level difference within the Muslim communities of Europe, they are often portrayed in the media and policy discourses as a single community, as a population that shares common traits and that can be dealt with by the same type of policies – or indeed that cannot be integrated or assimilated in several countries for the same type of reasons.

Indeed since the 1990s there is a tendency across Europe to label immigrants in religious terms rather than in light of their ethno-cultural background or social roles in society. This tendency, whereby Muslims in particular are seldom categorised as Turks, Moroccans or Pakistanis (or as students or workers), exists in all the countries studied, where debates over integration and toleration of differences invariably centre on Muslims, and where religion is often associated with potential conflict. Public discussions tend to take place in an 'us-them' framework: Islam is increasingly constructed in opposition to western (British, Dutch, Swedish, Spanish, French and so on) values of democracy and equality.

The countries with the largest Muslim populations in Europe are Germany (3.8-4.3 million), France (estimated at 5 million), the UK (1.6 million), the Netherlands (1.1 million), Italy (1 million), Bulgaria (1 million), Spain (0.7

million), Greece (0.5 million) and Sweden (0.35 million). These numbers are estimates based on the countries of origin and of both first and second generation migrants, as there are no official religious statistics in Europe. In Bulgaria Muslims are a native historical minority. The first Muslim communities settled in Bulgaria in the 14th century. Apart from Turks and Tatars, who are almost exclusively Muslim, numerous ethnic Bulgarians and Roma also belong to the Bulgarian Muslim community. Similarly, the estimated 85,000 Muslims that live in the north-eastern part of Greece in the region of Western Thrace are mainly of Turkish and Roma ethnicity. All other Muslim populations cited here are of immigrant origin. In the UK and France they are linked to pre-existing colonial ties and the decolonisation process of North Africa and Southeast Asia. While in the case of Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Greece and Sweden, Muslims came as economic migrants without any previous special relationship between the country of origin and the country of destination.

In terms of nationality the vast majority of Germany's Muslims are Turks (or of Turkish origin). French Muslims are mainly of Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian origin. British Muslims are south-east Asians for the most part, in particular Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. In the Netherlands the largest Muslim populations are Turkish and Moroccan. In Italy and Spain the vast majority of Muslim residents are of North African origin (Moroccans predominantly). In Greece, and also to some extent in Italy (in addition to the Moroccans), Muslims are mainly southeast Asians (Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Afghani and Somali citizens). In Sweden, Muslims are mainly Somalis, Iranians, Iraqis and Bosnians.

In Britain, France, the Netherlands and Germany Muslim immigrants arrived in the 1960s. After the 1970s and the oil crisis these countries put a stop to primary economic immigration, however, secondary (family reunification and family formation) migratory inflows have continued to this day. In Italy, Spain and Greece Muslim immigrants arrived during the last two decades as these countries emerged, after 1989, as poles of attraction for economic migrants. Contrary to the cases of Britain, France, the Netherlands and Germany, where primary immigration took place largely legally and sometimes as part of bilateral agreements (for instance between Turkey and Germany), the newly arrived Muslims in southern Europe mostly came illegally. They managed, however, to regularise their status (like all other immigrants in these countries) and to settle down.

Apart from the Muslims of Bulgaria and northeastern Greece, all other Muslim populations in Europe are of immigrant origin.

4.2.1 Diversity Challenges and the Muslim 'Other' in Europe

In France, where religion is seen as a private matter issue and where public space is thought of as secular, Muslims are constructed as 'different' from other native French because of their religion and ethnicity, including even their physical features (darker skin). However, in the French context, the term "Muslim French" tends to refer mainly to the community of believers. In a situation where religious belonging is seldom used as a basis for political mobilisation, it is more common to hear of "*maghrebins*" to refer to the members of minorities who trace their ancestry to North Africa. Islam in France is thus constructed as an ethnic marker that encompasses a religious dimension as well. Muslims in France can be considered a 'visible' minority and are discriminated against in employment, housing and social service, much as coloured people are. However, since ethnic

statistics are a contentious issue in France, there are no official statistics that can appropriately document these phenomena.

Muslims in France pose a specific challenge to the dominant concept of *laïcité*.

Muslims in France pose a specific challenge to the dominant concept of *laïcité*. Concretely, *laïcité* is the complete separation of church and state and represents an institutional arrangement that sets the conditions for the exercise of religion and the limits of religious forms of expression. This is a specific feature of the French case, even though in most countries Europe's Muslims, and their claims, challenge the limits of the moderately secular democratic national and European institutions.

It was only in the 1990s, and increasingly in the 2000s, that Turks became 'Muslims' in the German public debate.

In Germany Muslims were previously generally referred to as Turks, i.e. by reference to their nationality or ethnicity. It was only in the 1990s, and increasingly in the 2000s, that Turks became 'Muslims' and that the public debate on immigrant integration centred on the notion of a common German 'leading culture' (*Leitkultur*). Proposed by a conservative politician, Friedrich Merz, the idea of the German *Leitkultur* demanded that immigrants adapt to this leading culture, if they want to stay in Germany for good. Thus, the socio-economic dimension of the problems of Turkish/Muslim migrant integration in German society was set aside, and integration challenges were increasingly seen as issues of culture and religion – especially after 9/11. In Ireland, however, Muslim immigrants were highly educated and were mostly professionals, and integrated smoothly without particular challenges.

This culturalising of social problems (which attributed all contested issues such as arranged/forced marriages or homophobia to the religious beliefs and identity of the group) contributed to the stigmatisation of all Muslims in Germany, regardless of their personal beliefs, and to the politicisation of these issues. Especially since the relaxation of the naturalisation provisions in Germany in 2000, there has been a simultaneous reactionary turn towards scrutinising whether Turkish citizens, even those established in Germany for decades, espouse the main German values, or constitute some kind of suspect and dangerous 'Others' in the midst of the German nation. In this context, the term 'tolerance' became particularly relevant, as Muslims were seen as asking for tolerance of their difference, while they were themselves supposedly intolerant of the German national majority and/or their own members who held dissenting views. In Germany there was a clear shift from the 1990s, when it was mainly right-wing extremists who were considered intolerant in society, to the post-2001 years where it is the Muslims who are the 'intolerant' ones.

This public discourse in Germany, which also flourishes widely in Denmark and the Netherlands, ignores the fact that in Germany, for instance, Turks and people with Turkish background are not the only Muslim groups – and many of them are not practicing Muslims or not Muslims at all. **The Muslim populations of European countries are ethnically diverse although the level of such ethnic diversity varies among countries.** Thus in France, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain there are some ethnic groups that numerically predominate (Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians in France, Pakistani and Bangladeshi in Britain, Turks in Germany, Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, Moroccans and Tunisians in Italy and Spain).

Other European countries have Muslim communities that are highly diverse in terms of ethnic origin. For instance, Sweden has one of the most heterogeneous Muslim populations of all Western European countries. They have different ethnic, political, linguistic and/or educational backgrounds and come from over forty different countries in north and sub-Saharan Africa; from Arabic, Turkish or Persian parts of Asia, and from Europe. They come from secularised states as Turkey, religious states such as Iran, and from former socialist states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and several of the new states that formerly belonged to the Soviet Union. The same is true for Ireland, where Muslims come from Malaysia, Somalia, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Bosnia and Pakistan. Greece has a moderately diverse Muslim population: while native Muslims are of Turkish, Roma and Pomak ethnicity, immigrant Muslims are of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Afghani and Somali origin.

The definition of the 'Muslim problem' as essentially one of a radical (fundamentalist) religion and a culture incompatible with western values also obscures in Germany (but also in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK and France) the socio-economic dimension of Muslim stigmatisation, exclusion and indeed inability to integrate successfully. The poor educational attainment of Turkish and Moroccan children in France, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, or of Bangladeshi and Pakistani children in Britain (documented in numerous studies) has a lot to do with their socio-economic background (profession and schooling of parents, socio-economic level, area of residence) but also with the discrimination that they face at schools and later in the labour market. Indeed ambitious studies such as the well known book by Anthony Heath and Sin Yi Cheung, *Unequal Chance: Ethnic Minorities in Western Labour Markets* (Oxford University Press, 2007), find it hard to explain why inequalities persist and which are the factors that matter most: socio-economic background, discrimination, unequal opportunities, religion, specific ethnic background, structure of the educational system, or indeed a variable combination of all these factors.

In Denmark, Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and France, Muslims have been treated with increasing suspicion after the events of 9/11. Indeed the rise of a fundamentalist international terrorism – in which only a handful of European Muslims were directly involved – has contributed to the stigmatisation of both Islam and Muslims. Social scientists have coined the terms '**Islamophobia**' and '**Muslimophobia**' to analyse these phenomena. Islamophobia is the irrational fear of and prejudice against Islam as a faith and a culture without any discrimination between different Islamic religious currents. Muslimophobia is the irrational fear of and prejudice against Muslims as individuals, assuming that all people who are nominally Muslims experience their identity and faith in a fanatical and absolutist way that involves, among other things, the fusion of religious and political power, the subjugation of women to men, and certain other customs that are indeed incompatible with dominant western values such as forced and under-age marriages, homophobia and anti-semitism. This post-2001 discourse overlooks the fact that some of the issues seen as emblematic of Muslim incompatibility with European secular and liberal democracies, notably homophobia or anti-semitism, are persisting issues of tension among Christian or secular majorities in these countries.

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Muslimophobia and Islamophobia were initially phenomena noted in the countries with large Muslim immigrant populations, i.e. the 'old host' countries. However, such prejudice and irrational fear exists also in the new host countries. The case of Greece with respect to recent irregular migrants arriving in the country is an interesting case in point, which shows how a fundamentally socio-economic or humanitarian problem can be framed as a question of culture and religion.

Indeed Greece has an increasing Muslim immigrant population, which was, however, largely invisible until the last 2-3 years. The vast majority of Muslim immigrants in Greece were in fact of Albanian origin and hence not practicing Muslims, raising no claims for mosques, headscarves or religious education. For Albanian Muslims, faith was a personal and private matter and had little to do with their integration in Greek, predominantly Christian Orthodox society. The south-east Asian immigrants who have arrived in Greece during the last two decades were also mainly male workers who had left their families back home in Pakistan or Bangladesh. Hence there were no challenges of integration of Muslim children in schools, nor any women wearing the veil in public places.

Islam has, however, been instrumentalised in the last few years as part of the irregular migration crisis. Most irregular migrants / asylum seekers arriving through Turkey to Greece without documents, crossing the Greek Turkish border illegally, are Afghani, Somali, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. Afghans in particular have been arriving as families with women and young children. In addition these new arrivals have become concentrated in some of the central neighbourhoods of Athens, thus becoming socially visible on account of their destitute conditions and their dress code and physical appearance.

While the challenges they pose are so far mainly legal and socio-economic in nature (they have no documents, some are awaiting the processing of their asylum applications, they have no jobs nor accommodation), the issue of religion has suddenly come to the fore, largely through the discourse of extreme right wing groups (but not only these) that have mobilised against immigrants in central Athens during the last two years.

4.2.2 The Institutionalisation of Islam in European societies

In the 'old host' countries studied in this report, Islam has been institutionalised to a significant extent. Thus, France and Sweden have state-funded schools for educating imams, and Germany has just begun to establish such a religious school too. Denmark, the Netherlands and Britain allow for semi-state funded Muslim faith schools, a few of which also exist in Germany. In Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and France Islam is a recognised religion and enjoys specific privileges such as tax exemption, the right to construct its places of worship (provided certain requirements are fulfilled) and to have its own burial grounds. This is not, however, the case in most of the new host countries that have important Muslim populations. Thus there are no Muslim cemeteries and there are no provisions for Muslim faith schools, state-aided or not, in Greece, Spain or Italy.

In Greece there is a special set of religious and educational rights for the native Muslim minority of western Thrace which include bilingual (Greek-Turkish) schools, religious high schools and Shari'a law for family and inheritance matters, but these are part of an international treaty signed in Lausanne in 1923 to settle the conflict between Greece and Turkey and to guarantee the rights of the Turkish Muslim populations in Greece and the Greek Christian populations in Istanbul. This treaty has been both a blessing and a curse for the native Muslim community in Greece. While it has allowed the community to live its cultural and religious life to the full, the treaty is not subject to change. It does not follow socio-economic developments in the region, and provides a set of rights that is fossilised and cut off from the rest of Greek society and/or developments in other Muslim countries where shari'a law for instance is in force.

Bulgaria's Muslims suffered persecution under the Communist regime, but their rights were restored after 1989. This did not occur smoothly, however. Significant opposition to the reversal of the assimilation policies that they had experienced under Communism appeared, especially among Bulgarians living in ethnically mixed areas and among the members of the security sector (the Ministry of Interior, secret services, army), who were directly involved in the implementation of "the regeneration process." In their opinion, the process had achieved certain results and brought Bulgaria into a position from which there should be no retreat – otherwise the national interests of the country could be threatened. On the other hand, the Turkish community, encouraged by the restoration of their names, raised other demands. Some, such as the study of the Turkish language and Islamic religion in schools in regions with a predominantly Turkish population, were eventually recognised. Although ethnic and religious parties are not allowed in Bulgaria, the *Movement for Rights and Freedom* is effectively the Turkish party of Bulgaria. This party has been a partner in several coalition governments since the transition to democracy and has generally proven to be a factor of political and social stability in the country.

The precise form of Islamic institutional recognition varies among countries with large Muslim immigrant populations. In Denmark there are 23 Islamic communities recognised separately. In France the government created (in 2004) the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM) with a view to organising a central institutional presence of this religion. In Britain, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was established in 1997, representing over 500 affiliated organisations, mosques, charities and schools, and functioned for some time as a privileged interlocutor with the state. It recently experienced a shaky relationship with central government and was, for some time, cut off from consultation for allegedly radical views among some of its members.

In Sweden the institutionalisation of Islam is mainly at the local level. Several 'umbrella' organisations however emerged as early as 1974 (United Islamic Communities in Sweden) or in 1982 (United Muslim Communities of Sweden). The emergence of these organisations has been spontaneous, coming from below, to serve the needs of Muslims in Sweden, but was also motivated from above, since these organisations can compete for state grants for religious organisations. The largest umbrella organisation today (formed in 1988) is "*Islamiska Samarbetsrådet*" (Islamic Cooperation Council), whose

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principal function is to coordinate collaboration with the Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities. The Islamic Cooperation Council brings together 120 local organisations with approximately 110,000 members.

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In Italy, while most associations operate at the local level, there was an attempt to institutionalise Italian Islam and give it a national voice through the creation of 'the Assembly for Italian Islam' in 2005. However, the Assembly has so far had little impact on the way in which Italian Muslims and their claims are handled by the state. After an abortive attempt to establish a Charter of Values that would form the basis of Muslim integration in Italian society, the Assembly resumed its meetings in 2008. However, it has not produced yet any significant results in addressing Muslim claims and generally resolving tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in local contexts.

In Spain, the Islamic Commission of Spain is the representative body which negotiated the 1992 national agreements on state-Islam relations and remains the only representative organisation at state-level. It results from the association of the two major federations of Islamic associations in the country : *Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España* (UCIDE) and *Federación Española de Entidades Religiosas Islámicas* (FEERI).

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Of course most of the Muslim institutions are self-funded by the communities rather than state supported. However, this institutional presence is an important factor of normalisation and integration of Muslim claims in European democracies.

Mosque building has been a particularly controversial issue in most European countries and there is a rich bibliography on the subject which it goes beyond the scope of this report to survey.⁸ In Britain, France, the Netherlands and Germany Muslim communities began their search for proper mosques in the mid 1980s. Since then the emergence of a new generation of educated Muslim leaders has advanced the level of negotiation with local authorities. Discussions on newly built mosques often involve a redefinition of public space to incorporate Islamic elements.

In the Netherlands and Germany there have been several incidents of public controversy over mosque architecture. In Cologne, in Germany however such a controversy was eventually resolved in a peaceful and inclusive way, in respect of the claims of the city's Muslim populations (see text box 2).

In France there has been quite a spectacular increase of the number of new mosque buildings over the past ten years. These buildings are now often depicted as "local neighbourhood mosques" that cater to the needs of Muslims in the neighbourhoods. Resistance to new mosques continues to be strong in

⁸ For more information see Allievi, S. (2009) *Conflicts over mosques in Europe. Policy issues and trends*. NEF Initiative on religions and democracy in Europe. London: Alliance Publishing Trust and Cesari, J. (2005) (ed.) "Mosque conflicts in European Cities" Special Issue, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Issues*, Vol.31(6).

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countries such as Spain and Italy where Muslim immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon, and in Germany where the realisation of the definitive nature of immigration is relatively recent.

The Construction of a new Mosque in Cologne

In 2006 the Turkish Muslim organisation DITIB presented a plan for a big new mosque in Cologne to the public. Members of the conservative party CDU criticised the architecture, which was closely linked to the Ottoman traditional style and thus, in their opinion, excluded non-Turkish Muslims. In the same year the rightwing populist organisation Pro-Köln started a petition for a referendum against the building of the mosque.

In 2007 the author and Holocaust survivor Ralph Giordano in a TV debate with Bekir Alboga, commissioner of the mosque for intercultural dialogue, demanded that the building of the mosque be stopped, because in his opinion it was 'not an expression of the Muslim will to integrate, but a centre of an anti-integrative maintenance of identity' and the symbol for 'an attack on our democratic way of life'. In this dialogue as well as in other parts of the media debate around the building of the mosque in Cologne, issues of integration and prejudices towards Islam entered the debate.

Giordano expressed similar ideas to the rightwing movement Pro Köln that a Muslim minority with an alien religion was creating a parallel society, that was not able to integrate into German society or did not respect the German constitution, with veiled women who offended the aesthetic sense of ordinary people, and demonstrated general difficulties of Muslims in adapting to modernity.

The mayor of Cologne Fritz Schramma, against many of his party members of the conservative CDU, defended the 'constitutional and moral right' of the 120.000 Muslims of the city to have their own place of worship. He expressed the hope that the mosque would also be 'eingekölscht' soon, meaning that it would be embraced in the local environment.

An International congress against the 'Islamisation of Europe', that was to be held in Cologne in 2008, using the mosque conflict in their own interest, and a demonstration against the building of the mosque, organised by Pro Köln were finally prevented by the broad resistance of the people of Cologne. The public protest against the rightwing movement was so strong that the Cologne police finally forbade the demonstration against the mosque, which had in any case been blocked by thousands of Cologne citizens and officials. Additionally most of the international leaders of rightwing populist movements, who had come for the anti-Islam congress could not leave Cologne airport, because the taxi drivers refused them transport, they could not find accommodation, because hotel owners refused to accommodate them, and the owners of bars refused them drinks.

The mayor of Cologne declared after the manifestations: "With strong commitment, humour and intelligence we fought against this racist nonsense."

It is worth noting that in almost all the new host countries there is a reluctance to authorise the building and operation of official mosques, but there is a widespread tacit (sometimes also reluctant though) acceptance of the existence and operation of numerous informal prayer rooms. Thus in Athens there is no official mosque but an estimated 120 prayer rooms, while in Italy there are three recognised mosques, but police authorities estimate the total number of prayer rooms at 735 in 2010. However, in Ireland there has so far been no mosque controversy, and in both Spain and Ireland there are Muslim cemeteries.

The limits of the institutionalisation of Islam in Europe have been tested most widely in the so-called headscarf issue, l'affaire du foulard. While in France this issue was eventually settled by the law that prohibits the wearing of ostentatious religious symbols in public places and schools in particular, in other countries such tensions have been resolved in a softer, decentralised manner. Thus, in Spain for instance, public opinion has been divided between those who defend religious symbols as part of religious freedom and those who would like to see the prohibition of religious signs in the public sphere in the name of liberal-republican values. When schools prohibited girls from wearing the Islamic veil (hijab), based on the internal rules of the central state that prohibits all elements of discrimination, the responses were also diverse. For instance, the Catalan government intervened in 2007 to reverse the school prohibition by arguing that the right to education had priority over the regulation of (religious) symbols.

In Germany the debate started in 1998, when the federal state Baden Württemberg refused to engage a young Muslim teacher because of her headscarf and the woman filed a suit to be allowed to teach. The case went as far as the Federal Constitutional Court, which decided in favour of the teacher, because no laws yet existed to justify the refusal. In the following years about half of the German federal states established laws that, in one way or the other, prevented teachers with headscarves from working. In some federal states the laws explicitly targeted Muslim head coverings, while in others all ostensible religious symbols were excluded. Apart from public schools, some federal states also excluded women with headscarves from other civil service jobs such as the judiciary or the police.

The laws that were originally intended to uphold state neutrality had a detrimental effect within the private economy, where the job situation for Muslim women wearing headscarves deteriorated immensely. In addition, the NGO Human Rights Watch judged the German laws as going against the human rights of the respective women, and the debates are still going on in the different regions of Germany.

The Danish version of the head scarf debate began as a controversy about whether cashiers in supermarket had a right to wear headscarves on the job, or whether it was a legitimate interest of the employer to ensure that no customer was 'inconvenienced' by the headscarves, and that they were therefore ultimately allowed to fire employees who insisted on wearing headscarves. The controversy was settled with the right of the employer to dictate a job uniform. In most cases practical solutions have been found, with a large majority of

In many countries there is a reluctance to authorise the building and operation of official mosques, but there is a widespread tacit acceptance of the existence and operation of numerous informal prayer rooms.

employers accepting the headscarf. Similarly debates over headscarves in schools have not been as protracted or politicised as in France or Germany, in part because of a relatively decentralised system of school administration, which has facilitated local solutions. Interestingly in 2008 the Danish court agency [*Domstolsstyrelsen*] had announced that Muslim female judges could wear headscarves in court, but the government disregarded the statement and banned the wearing of any kind of religious or political symbols in court.

In Spain, Italy and Greece headscarves have not attracted particular attention and have not raised important public controversies so far.

In Spain, Italy and Greece headscarves have not attracted particular attention and have not raised important public controversies so far. In schools the issue was usually solved internally and in a decentralised manner. The headscarf issue however has been an emblematic case of Muslim difference because it is seen as the proof that Islam is incompatible with the fundamentally secular and liberal values of European democracies that include gender equality. Indeed the headscarf has been framed as the epitome of Muslims' excessive attachment to their religion and culture and hence their presumed lack of willingness to integrate into the societies in which they have settled. In text boxes 3 and 4 we present some interesting examples from Bulgaria, Britain and France on ways to accommodate Muslim diversity in school life and in particular with regard to the question of the headscarf.

Summarising the diversity challenges that Muslims raise in European societies, we note that they are faced with:

- (a) ***Religious Prejudice and Religious Racism:*** Islam and Muslims are viewed as a homogenous group, are negatively stereotyped and their religion is seen almost as a 'racial' trait: they are all the same and they are almost genetically predisposed to fundamentalist, pre-modern customs such as gender inequality, arranged or forced marriages, homophobia and violence.
- (b) ***Discrimination:*** Poor socio-economic integration that is related both to the fact that most Muslims arrived as low-skilled economic immigrants, but also to significant and persisting discrimination that Muslims face in the labour market and in other areas such as housing and social life generally.

The headscarf issue in Bulgaria: tolerating diversity through ad hoc exemptions to the rules

In July 2006, the Organisation for Islamic Development and Culture from the town of Smolyan in southern Bulgaria filed a complaint before the Bulgarian Commission for Protection against Discrimination (CPD). According to the complaint, the by-laws of the Smolyan professional economy high school, which prescribed the wearing of school uniform, countered the Constitution and hindered personal freedom and choice. The plaintiff organisation claimed that the compulsory wearing of school uniforms was especially aimed at preventing the wearing of clothes typical for the local Muslim population. The complaint focused specifically on two Muslim girls, who wanted to visit the school wearing headscarves and robes instead of school uniforms. They were told by the school principal that they should remove the headscarves as they were violating the internal rules of the school, however they were not prevented from attending their classes.

In its decision the CPD not only dismissed the discrimination claim, but also ruled that the school principal's decision to allow the girls to attend their classes wearing headscarves violated the school by-laws, which led to unequal treatment of the other high school students, who wore the prescribed uniforms. As a result the CPD imposed sanctions against all parties - the plaintiff organisation, the school board and the Ministry of Education and Science for actions inciting discrimination and unequal treatment.

The case was solved by allowing the two girls to finish their education in a special way – preparing for the final exams at home with the help of the teachers from the school. This incident received nation-wide media coverage and provoked public attention. The found solution was regarded as quite fair by the majority of actors involved as it allowed the girls to keep their individual religious affiliation and to complete their secondary education. It was largely perceived as an example of tolerance and acceptance of diversity because the compromise satisfied all parties.

It is worth noting that wearing a school uniform is not a universal rule applied in all schools in Bulgaria. On the contrary, schools which have decided to introduce school uniforms are an exception. In all other schools, where there are no requirements regarding the way pupils dress, Muslim girls can wear headscarves in classes without problem.

The headscarf issue in France: Banning the veil but accommodating religious diversity in other aspects of school life

In France, the wearing of an Islamic veil by a female pupil in school is perceived as infringing the principle of *laïcité*. *Laïcité* is the French understanding of separation of Church and State that stipulates that expression of religious beliefs should be kept private and not be articulated in public spaces such as public schools, for instance. In 1989 and again during the 1990s, Muslims girls have tried to attend classes wearing an Islamic veil. In 2004, a law was passed that stipulates that no visible (“conspicuous”) display of religious sign should be made in public school and for this reason, French girls who try to attend school wearing a Muslim veil are now asked to take out their veil.

Since 2004, teachers explain to children entering secondary schools (6-7 year old) that they can wear religious signs outside school but once they are inside a public school they should take them out.

Teaching *laïcité* includes telling children that religious beliefs, but also political views, should be kept private. It is a way to teach tolerance: one should not impose its religious or political views to the other.

However, since the 2004 law, children and school staff can ask to be absent on the day of a special holiday for their religion. The ministry of National Education issues the calendar of each religious holiday (Armenian, Buddhist, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim and Protestant), therefore pupils can celebrate their religious holidays with their family at home.

Resolving tensions over religious dress in a British school

Begum was a pupil at Denbigh High School in Luton who claimed that she was required by her Muslim faith to wear a jilbab (a full length gown) to school. The school viewed this as a contravention of its uniform policy and decided that Begum was not allowed to attend until she wore the official uniform. In response Begum sought a judicial review of the school's decision on the grounds that the school had interfered with her right to manifest her religion and her right to education (both rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights). The school argued that as nearly eighty per cent of its pupils were Muslim, it had already accommodated uniform changes that incorporated trousers, shalwar kameez (a tunic and baggy trousers) and headscarves in school uniform colours. The school, administered by a Muslim headmistress, also argued that this had been decided in consultation with local mosques and parents.

Begum lost the case in the High Court, but later won on appeal at the Court of Appeal. The school appealed against this decision, and in 2006 the case was heard by the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords which eventually ruled in favour of the school. In doing so, Lord Bingham of Cornhill stressed at the outset of his judgment that "this case concerns a particular pupil and a particular school in a particular place at a particular time. It must be resolved on facts which are now, for purposes of the appeal, agreed. The House is not, and could not be, invited to rule on whether Islamic dress, or any feature of Islamic dress, should or should not be permitted in the schools of this country". Nevertheless, he concluded that "it would, in my opinion, be irresponsible for any court, lacking the experience, background and detailed knowledge of the headteacher, staff and governors, to overrule their judgment on a matter as sensitive as this. The power of decision has been given to them for the compelling reason that they are best placed to exercise it, and I see no reason to disturb their decision."

Although the particular case of Begum has not been resolved to universal satisfaction (notably not to hers), it has reaffirmed a tradition of considering diversity challenges that puts value on local deliberations and compromise. Rather than being concerned with the stipulation of abstract principles of what is permissible or not, it reaffirms a pragmatic form of multicultural accommodation that considers claims when and where they arise.

4.3 Roma

It is estimated that there are 9 million Roma in the EU.

The Roma are a native minority in all the countries studied in this report, and are present in higher numbers in southern, central-eastern and south-eastern European countries, notably in 'new' and 'emerging' hosts rather than in the old host countries of northern and western Europe. It is estimated that there are 9 million Roma in the EU. A special feature of the Roma populations that differentiates them from other native or immigrant minorities is the fact that they have no national homeland, no territory that provides for a point of reference for their ethnic identity.

Several of the countries studied here, most notably Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Britain, and the Netherlands have native and immigrant Roma populations. Roma populations in Italy for instance include Roma who are native to the country and Italian citizens, EU citizens – Roma people coming from Romania in particular, refugees, irregular migrants, and stateless people. All these subgroups are different from each other not only in terms of their legal status but also in their history, language and migration processes: there are Rom, Sinti, Rom Harvati, Rom Khorakhanè, and other sub-divisions within them.

The size of the Roma populations in the countries studied varies from a few thousand in Germany, Denmark or Sweden to several hundred thousand in Romania, Hungary, Greece or Bulgaria. There are no accurate statistics about the Roma, as individuals of Roma ethnicity are not classified by their ethnicity but by their citizenship.

A nomadic way of life is seen as a characteristic of Roma populations, although it appears that only a minority of Roma live a true nomadic life.

A nomadic way of life is seen as a characteristic of Roma populations, although it appears that only a minority of Roma live a true nomadic life. In Italy for instance, of the estimated 120-150,000 Roma, it is estimated that only 15%-30% follow a nomadic way of life. In Greece, there are 300-350,000 Roma of whom only about half are tent-dwelling.

The view of the nomadic way of life is supported by the typical representation of the Roma as living in 'camps'. These camps include makeshift homes and tents. Such camps are situated on the outskirts of large cities (in Rome, Milan, Athens, Madrid, Sofia, to name only a few) and should have been temporary but are often permanent settlements, although they are not suitable in terms of hygienic conditions, access to services (usually there is no electricity, no running water and no sewerage system), and decent housing. The living conditions are of course better (in terms of hygiene and access to basic facilities) in organised camps or public housing made available to Roma families with a view to helping them settle down and integrate in specific localities. However, in both cases these 'Roma settlements' contribute to the ghettoisation of the Roma population and to their construction as an internal 'Other' in European societies.

The largest Roma populations live in southern and central Eastern Europe, notably in Greece (300,000-350,000, about 3% of the total population), Bulgaria (370,000, just under 5 % of the total population), Hungary (400,000-800,000, between 4% and 8% of the total population) and Romania (550,000 to 1 million between 2.5% and 5% of the total population). They usually speak the national language and the Romani

dialect. In all these countries the Roma are native populations that have lived there for centuries.

In northern, central and western European countries Roma populations are much smaller in size. For instance in Poland there are only 20,000 Roma, in Germany about 60-70,000, in Italy between 100,000 and 150,000; in Denmark and the Netherlands there are fewer than 10,000 (in Denmark mainly of Yugoslav origin); in Ireland Travellers are estimated at 22,000 and in Sweden at between 30,000 and 65,000, thus accounting for less than 1% of the total resident population in these countries. In France Roma populations are estimated to range between 250,000 and 450,000. Even if this number is significantly higher than that of other western European countries, it is still small compared with the total size of the French resident population (over 60 million).

In German-speaking countries, a distinction is made between 'Sinti', who have been living in Western Europe since the late Middle Ages, and actual 'Roma' of south European descent. In France they are referred to as "travellers" (*gens du voyage*) and they have a specific legal status: they are people of French nationality who trace their roots to the nomadic people who came originally from India. And sub-groups are distinguished such as Roma, Gipsy, and Manouche.

A case apart from other Roma populations in Europe is the Irish Travellers, as they do not have Indian origins. They are a cultural minority regarded as Irish. The historical origins of Irish Travellers are the subject of academic and popular debates. It was once widely believed that Travellers were descendants of landowners or labourers made homeless by Cromwell's military campaign in Ireland and in the 1840s famine. However, their origins may be more complex and difficult to ascertain because through their history the Travellers have left no written records of their own. Furthermore, even though all families claim ancient origins, some families adopted Traveller customs centuries ago, while others did so in more modern times. Irish Travellers perceive important internal differences based on origin myths, economic and occupation traditions, marriage patterns, language and behaviour, which suggests that we view this society as a series of micro-ethnicities, comprising intermarrying clusters that see themselves as distinct from other Travellers.

4.3.1 Diversity Challenges and Processes of Socio-Economic Exclusion

The Roma pose important ethnic and cultural diversity challenges in the countries where they live. Their physical features (skin-colour, facial features) and their traditions and way of life (tent-dwelling, nomadic, traditional dress code for women, under age marriages, patriarchal extended families) make them appear alien in their western, southern and central eastern homelands despite their centuries-long presence there. Even though a large part of the Roma populations are Christian (Orthodox or Protestant), religion does not seem to function as a bridge between majority populations and Roma minorities. (The Roma in western Thrace, Greece and about one third of the Bulgarian Roma are however Muslims.)

The trajectory of socio-economic marginalisation of the Roma populations in all the countries studied can be summarised as follows: while members of the Roma group share the formal civil and political rights included in national citizenship with the rest of the population, they do not actually enjoy many of these rights. Since these populations have been largely forced to abandon their main occupations and

While members of the Roma group share the formal civil and political rights included in national citizenship with the rest of the population, they do not actually enjoy many of these rights.

forms of life associated with them, they have tended to concentrate (or have been relocated by government initiatives) at the periphery of urban centres, in shanty towns, living off informal trade, the recycling of metal and other waste materials, begging and sometimes also getting occasional work in manual jobs.

Their living standards are lower than average, they have a lower life expectancy and a higher infant mortality than average populations. In most of the countries studied it is estimated that between 60% and 80% of adult Roma are unemployed. Most Roma children do not complete primary school, and very few continue to secondary school. Discrimination against Roma is widespread in all the countries studied. Their unemployment rate and overall socio-economic exclusion is the result of several factors including failures of the educational system, lack of demand for services for “traditional” Roma occupations, discrimination in the labour market and widespread negative attitudes towards Roma in general.

Institutional channels and cooperation between different native minorities in a state, including the Roma, are important to combat discrimination and address some of the socio-economic inequalities that Roma populations face in the labour market and in education. The example of Sweden’s native minorities is telling here (see text box 6).

The pattern of Roma exclusion differs slightly in countries with a Communist past. In Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary during the years of the Communist regime (1945-1989), Roma minority populations were forced to abandon their traditional nomadic lifestyle and were included in (even if not really integrated into) the country’s social-economic system. They received housing, access to health care and education, and were included in the labour market.

Indeed the Communists considered the ‘Roma question’ as a social problem. At the same time the Roma were viewed as a reserve of manpower to fulfill the regime’s industrial ambitions. Due to this (and alongside more generic communist goals of full employment), the majority of the Roma were indeed employed as unskilled workers in the communist years. In Hungary in particular the state had plans to resettle the majority of Roma who continued to live at the edges of towns and villages. This resettlement program, which began in the 1960s, however, resulted in numerous local conflicts. By the 1980s, though, most of these old colonies had disappeared, with their populations dispersed. This ultimately led to the next problem: the increasing concentration of Roma in poor urban areas and the emergence of new urban ghettos.

The relatively high employment rates of Roma during the Communist years ensured that rates of absolute poverty remained relatively low. The social distance separating the Roma from the majority population, however, did not decrease during this period. Although the Communist regime claimed that the Roma were fully tolerated and accepted into society, in reality the Roma experienced very real problems of discrimination in housing, healthcare, education, and employment that were systematically ignored by a ‘colour blind’ state committed to a policy of assimilation. In fact the policies of the Communist regime towards the Roma managed to keep

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Dialogue between national and linguistic minorities in Sweden including the Roma minority

Sweden is home to five recognised minority groups. The official minority languages in Sweden are Finnish, Saami, Yiddish, Tornedal Finnish and Romani Chib. The fact that a linguistic and national minority receives official recognition as a historical, national minority can, among other things, imply that the various group's languages and cultures are given more space and attention at schools and universities – and – that the groups receive the right to communicate with public authorities and courts of law in their own languages.

Sweden ratified in 2000 the European Council's two framework conventions (the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Charter on Protection for National Minorities) on national and linguistic minorities. Thus, since 2002 various conferences have taken place at local, regional and national levels discussing common problems and strategies – not at least in the northern part of Sweden, a region which is characterized by historical territorial minorities such as Swedish Finns, Tornedalfinns and the Saami indigenous population. Some of these conferences has been initiated by the Swedish government, for example, the conference – “Alla har rätt” (“Everyone has rights”) while in other cases they were organized by regional authorities. For instance the county administrative board in the northern part of Sweden (Norrbotten) has organized conferences concerning the support of minority languages in schools.

These conferences offered for the first time in Swedish history the opportunity to members of the various minority groups to meet in an organized manner and discuss in a systematic way their problems with one another. The lack of substantial resources with reference to the new minority policies has been a salient topic in several of the conferences. Hence, crucial questions that have been addressed are what kind of interests and circumstances are common for the national minorities, and what kind of problems are more group specific. The Roma population has, for example, specific educational problems in comparison with the other national minorities. In some of these conferences members from the government have participated and there have also been opportunities to voice serious political demands from the various groups. This is also a process that has continued in recent years with several conferences in different municipalities around Sweden – a process that has stimulated the different minority groups to engage in broader political activities.

poverty rates lower than they had been or they are now, but they also paradoxically cemented the marginal position of the Roma.

When Communist countries entered the period of socio-economic and political transition, the state system that kept Roma adults in employment collapsed. The situation of Roma populations in Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria dramatically deteriorated. They have been largely excluded from the legal labour market and work predominantly in grey and black sectors. Their access to proper health care is very limited, while the drop-out rate from schools has dramatically increased. The prejudices and stereotypes about Roma are exceptionally negative – they are described as “dirty,” “lazy,” “thieves,” “liars,” “cheaters,” “irresponsible” and “hopeless.”

Indeed studies on ethnic discrimination in Bulgaria or Hungary show that Roma are victims of institutional discrimination on a daily basis. In most cases, however, this discrimination is not officially noted, because Roma rarely use the legal and institutional resources available for protection of their rights. This is a result not only of the lack of information, but above all of their lasting distrust and fear of majority state institutions.

Neighbourhood and school segregation in post communist democracies have further exacerbated the marginalisation of Roma. In some of the poorest areas of Hungary for instance there are so-called "Roma Villages" without access to public transport or public services. Nearly three quarters of the Roma live in segregated areas, in which most are trapped in the most deprived and unemployment stricken areas of the country.

Similar problems of residential and school segregation are encountered in all the countries studied in this report. In some cases schools and/or local authorities take the decision to organise all-Roma school classes supposedly to help Roma children integrate and catch up. However, the real reason behind such decisions is more often than not the intolerance of non-Roma parents and their unwillingness to accept Roma children in their children's schools, as well as the stereotypes and prejudice of the teachers and local authorities. Similarly to the conclusions of Danaher, Kenny and Leder⁹ regarding Irish Travellers, we can present in a few sentences the problems faced by Roma populations in all the countries studied in this report:

They fare poorly on every indicator used to measure disadvantage: unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, health status, infant mortality, life expectancy, illiteracy, education and training levels, access to decision making and political representation, gender equality, access to credit, accommodation and living conditions. Individuals, when recognised as Roma or Travellers, are sometimes refused access to public places or services such as shops, pubs, restaurants and leisure facilities. Individuals often experience verbal or physical abuse because of their identity.

In Hungary however we have registered important initiatives favouring school de-segregation and innovative approaches to combat ethnic prejudice and improve the educational attainment of Roma children (see text box 5 below).

Roma are victims of institutional discrimination on a daily basis in Bulgaria or Hungary.

⁹ Danaher, P. A. Kenny, M. and Leder, J. R. (2009) *Traveller, Nomadic, and Migrant Education*. New York: Routledge.

Addressing ethnic prejudice in schools and promoting Roma children integration

The Horvath street school is adjacent to an 'urban ghetto' in Budapest where the majority of the Roma children live. The school also has a high proportion of children from less disadvantaged backgrounds, thus giving the school a very mixed social and ethnic composition overall. School administrators have made serious efforts to address this situation and ensure that all children complete the school successfully. The school's two main priorities are to nurture the talents of its students and providing them with equal opportunities. In many other parts of Hungary, and, indeed, the world, these two priorities are often regarded as mutually exclusive. This institution, however, insists the two belong together.

The school organizes both specialized and non-specialized classes. The selection of children for these classes is done based on learning ability that usually (but not always) correlates with social background. The specialized classes are about 30-40% Roma (with many from mixed marriages), and in the non-specialized classes they are 80%.

The school makes efforts to compensate for the inequalities between these two classes. Classes with more disadvantaged children devote special attention to cultivating other types of talents beyond good learning skills (e.g., sports). Both classes employ modern pedagogical methods, including cooperative learning and small group activities. Equally, great emphasis is put on communication with parents: parents are strongly encouraged to get involved with the activities and life of the school. The school actively continues its outreach to these parents in an attempt to widen its support base.

In contrast to most other Hungarian schools, this school openly confronts issues having to do with Roma culture and otherness. This has two dimensions. First, the school has introduced a curriculum that is explicitly designed to construct positive Roma self-image by developing and nurturing their cultural identity through the organization of after-school music clubs and integrating Roma history into the overall curriculum. Second, about the school has an open and inclusive dialogue on negative, discriminatory events and cases affecting the Roma.

The 'success' of the school can be measured by the uncommon ways in which both teachers and pupils talk about ethnicity. Teachers invoke a 'social argument' which accounts for Roma disadvantage in terms of unemployment, poor living conditions, and discrimination. This is in sharp contrast to the views of teachers in most other schools which are typically prejudiced and often blame minority cultures for their shortcomings. Roma children in this school are in mixed groups with non-Roma children and they have developed a more positive self-image as Roma in comparison with Roma children in other schools.

Roma marginalisation & stigmatisation has increased in recent years as a result of intra EU migration.

Roma marginalisation and stigmatisation has increased in recent years as a result of intra EU migration. Italy has been one of the countries where public demonstrations were organised to protest against the presence of 'too many' Roma in the country. These protest marches were sparked by the murder of an Italian woman by a young Romanian man who lived in a Roma camp. The crime became the pretext for starting a whole campaign against Roma and Roma camps. The demonstrations have occasionally been extremely violent (setting Roma camps on fire), without any real protection provided by the police, who have also carried out violent Roma camp raids. The demonstrations have received the direct or indirect support of centre-right political forces and mass media. The crisis ended with the approval of an emergency decree in May 2008 which ordered the Prefects of three Italian regions (Lombardy, Lazio and Campania – notably the regions where the three largest cities in Italy are situated: Milan, Rome and Naples) to monitor and authorise settlements; to carry out censuses of the persons living there; to adopt measures against convicts that may live there; to adopt measures of eviction; to identify new areas where adequate settlements may be built, and finally to adopt measures aimed at social cohesion, including schooling. A proposal was made in particular to fingerprint all the Roma living in Italy, but this had eventually to be abandoned due to internal mobilisation and pressures against this in the European Parliament.

These early protests in Italy have been followed more recently (October 2010) by massive expulsions from 'old' member states (such as France and the Netherlands) of EU citizens from other EU countries (Bulgaria and Romania in particular) who were of Roma ethnicity. These expulsions were met by indignation in many EU countries and Commissioner Reading strongly criticised the Sarkozy administration for these measures and sought explanations. Similarly a recent expulsion from Denmark of 23 Roma with citizenship in other EU countries, which was justified on the grounds of their threat to public order, created some debate on the discrimination and prejudice experienced by the Roma in Denmark. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) in Budapest is currently preparing a court case against the Danish state, claiming that the expulsion violates EU law (EU citizens' right to free movement) and is discriminatory.

Summarising the diversity challenges that Roma minorities raise, we argue that Roma populations in Europe face:

- (a) ***Biological and Culturalist Racism:*** they are seen as racially distinct from native majorities and as culturally incompatible with western democracies. The argument is that Roma people share some intrinsic personality traits (being cunning, dishonest, and lazy) and some cultural traits (very strong loyalty to the extended family, under-age marriages, violence, nomadic life style) that make them impossible to integrate into European societies. The ethnic explanation to this non-adaptability of the Roma is to be found in their Indian origins – they are not properly Europeans even if they have lived in Europe for several centuries.

- (b) **Discrimination:** Roma face both institutional and individual, both direct and indirect discrimination in all the countries studied. There is a vicious circle between early school abandonment, widespread adult unemployment, on the one hand, and discrimination in both schools and the labour market, on the other hand.
- (c) **Ethnic/Racial Prejudice:** in relation to both (a) and (b) Roma are generally associated with criminality. This criminality may take the form of begging in the streets, obliging one's children to become beggars, different forms of petty crime (petty theft, drug pushing), as well as drug trafficking and other organised crime.

There is indeed a striking similarity between the diversity challenges and the racism, prejudice and discrimination faced by 'coloured' and Roma people in Europe.

Roma populations face both institutional and individual, both direct and indirect discrimination in all the countries studied.

5. Concluding Remarks: Diversity and Tolerance on-the-ground

Having surveyed the main minority groups (immigrant or native) that pose important cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges in Europe today, and having outlined what these challenges are and how they are dealt with in different countries, here we develop a more detailed typology of what tolerance means in different contexts.¹⁰

5.1 Tolerating the Minority

The reasons invoked for tolerating, i.e. not actively suppressing or persecuting minorities or practices are primarily pragmatic: maintaining public order, upholding peaceful relations with other countries, or protecting the interests of commerce.

In the first section of this report we defined tolerance as a relationship between a majority and a minority: a majority disapproves of a minority but decides not to interfere with it even though it has the power to do so. The values, beliefs and norms of the majority are thus represented as normal, whereas those of minorities are seen as deviating and as inferior for moral, religious or cultural reasons. Diversity becomes an issue when minorities claim recognition for their position in society and demand a more equal say in affairs of the state. The reasons invoked for **tolerating**, i.e. not actively suppressing or persecuting **minorities or practices** are primarily pragmatic: maintaining public order, upholding peaceful relations with other countries, or protecting the interests of commerce.

In contemporary debates one comes across the notion that minorities have to be tolerated, but that this also entails obligations on the side of these minorities. For instance in discussions concerning the presence of Islam in Dutch society, some argue that Islam should not be too visible in the public realm and that Muslims should not cause 'offence'. To that end Muslims should express their differences in a 'more reticent' or 'modest' style. There is in this sense a certain **liberal intolerance** of non-western minority groups that value their collective traditions and way of life 'too much'. Similarly ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey such as the Allevi, the Sunni Arabs or the Kurds are tolerated but it is demanded of them that they do not raise too many claims for recognition or respect of their difference in public life.

There are also more **critical perspectives** concerning toleration of difference. These basically argue that toleration alone is not enough, and that minorities are entitled to full recognition and equal treatment in society. Illustrative is the case of Muslims in Britain, who demand a more equal position in British society. Their demands include the accommodation of their dietary requirements or religious festivals in public life, the recognition of discrimination that they may suffer as indeed religious rather than ethnic discrimination, and also the creation of state aided Muslim schools. Indeed, toleration of deviance from the perspective of the tolerated can be unsatisfactory. The tolerated demand acceptance and equality from the

¹⁰ This section borrows from the detailed discussion of different types of tolerance emerging in Dutch society in the Dutch ACCEPT PLURALISM project report, available at: <http://www.accept-pluralism.eu>, 2011.

majority, instead of their being seen as merely a minority group whose practices are to be 'tolerated'.

5.2 Tolerance as Principled Acceptance

Tolerance can also be understood as a matter of mutual toleration between (minority or majority) groups that live together. This approach is more principled because it builds on the assumption that there are different ethnic, cultural or religious 'philosophies of life' that should respect one another. Also these philosophies of life should have equal positions in society and within the state. The aim is a **plural society** wherein these different views can be visible and institutionalised, whilst keeping sufficient distance between them to allow separate communities to sustain themselves

The more positive perspectives on principled acceptance view it as a way of organizing a deeply pluralistic society with profound differences. Communities should respect one another's sovereign spheres and the state should aim to be equidistant from all citizens. Thus the state needs to guarantee the associational freedoms which allow cultural and religious communities to institutionalise their presence and live-out their respective conceptions of the good life. In the 1980s and 1990s this model of acceptance was applied to the cultural incorporation of immigrants in the Netherlands. The main view here of **principled tolerance** is that of 'live and let live', which requires not complete indifference but still a certain level of avoidance or non-engagement between groups that may have profoundly different opinions on certain issues.

In the past decade the merits of tolerating diversity and allowing groups to live parallel lives have come under intense scrutiny in Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark (where the state had encouraged such institutional arrangements), in France and Germany where parallel societies were rather the result of combined socio-economic and ethnic-religious disadvantage. Critics argue that 'parallel societies' jeopardise social cohesion in societies that are already highly individualised and receive a large number of immigrants.

Social goals such as economic participation and social integration require, it is argued, a socialisation into a dominant culture (a *Leitkultur*). Indeed the recent emphasis on civic citizenship and on civic assimilation of immigrant populations that is seen in northern and western European countries such as Britain, Denmark, Germany or the Netherlands testifies to the gradual abandonment of the Tolerance as Principled Acceptance view in favour either of the first version of tolerance (tolerating the minority but not respecting it) or of a more advanced version of toleration as multicultural recognition.

In the past decade the merits of tolerating diversity and allowing groups to live parallel lives have come under intense scrutiny.

5.3 Toleration as Recognition

A third perspective on tolerance is that of equal respect for cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences in a society. These concepts build on the notion that inter-group relations in a multicultural society require both **virtuous citizens** who are open-minded, free of prejudices and want to embrace difference, and **institutional guarantees** to protect vulnerable newcomers, both individually and collectively. Examples of the latter are anti-discriminatory and anti-racist

legislation, state grants to maintain and develop ethnic or religious identities, and institutional guarantees allowing for cultural and religious practices. Dominant in multicultural recognition is the notion of 'acceptance' by the host society which should be willing to change its ethnocentric views, primarily on national identity and cultural norms. Also, the host society should make a principled choice to allow newcomers to participate on equal footing in society and affairs of the state.

These notions of multicultural recognition developed in the post-war period in the 'old host' countries, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands in particular, and remained dominant in these countries until the 1990s. These conceptualisations of acceptance had several institutional counterparts such as the Race Relations Acts in Britain, or legal arrangements in the Netherlands to combat discriminatory and racist speech and the extreme right. Another set of social practices in these three countries that supported multicultural recognition and the incorporation of minority cultures and viewpoints into national identity were education policy measures that aimed to teach children about other cultures and revisions of curricula to include more reference to issues such as slavery and colonialism.

Despite the fact that in contemporary public debate the ideas associated with multicultural acceptance have come under heavy fire, it still has articulate defenders. They argue both for a principled decision in favour of equality and pluralism and for a pragmatic defence of multiculturalism: multiculturalism provides for a sensible approach to deal with differences in societies that are highly individualised and where immigrant and native populations form a mosaic of cultural differences that cannot be assimilated into a dominant culture.

The critics of multiculturalism argue however that it is predicated on excessive subjectivism and cultural relativism. Subjectivism has resulted in the notion that being tolerant or 'having an open mind' means refraining from judging others. Cultural relativism has led to the notion that all cultures are of equal worth and that it is inappropriate to impose western or European cultures on immigrants. It is argued that multiculturalism actually creates **intolerant minorities** that are not willing to tolerate difference in their midst or to adapt mutually to the dominant culture. In the Netherlands and in Denmark for instance, there is a growing concern that freedom of expression is jeopardised when forms of speech or behaviour that could be seen as offensive to minorities or hurting the feelings of immigrants are banned from the public sphere.

Toleration can be achieved only when it is very clear where the boundaries between the tolerable and the intolerable lie.

5.4 The divide between the tolerable and the intolerable

Regardless of which of the three versions of tolerance presented above we choose, toleration can be achieved only when it is very clear **where the boundaries between the tolerable and the intolerable lie**, and when different groups and individuals spell out very clearly where they stand and what their differences are. In terms of institutional arrangements these conceptualisations entail a firm protection of free speech. This includes the right to offend and to critique religious dogmas, religious practices, and

cultural practices. It also entails an obligation for minorities to justify their actions and worldviews, entailing the risk that these will not be tolerated. Thus, certain moral or legal norms, such as non-discrimination and gender equality, can result in the limitation of associational autonomy, notably of religious institutions such as confessional schools and political parties, but also of social practices in communities and families.

In a more positive evaluation this way of thinking about tolerance entails the opportunity to maintain a free society in which individual rights and opportunities are guaranteed. To some it also means that there should be a willingness to challenge conservative groups, especially if they violate the rights of vulnerable minorities (including women and children).

More critical perspectives entail, first, that despite the fact that this is presented as a conceptualisation of tolerance, the main thrust of the discussion is liberal intolerance, i.e. to point out what is *not* to be tolerated and to ban specific practices or limit associational freedoms. Especially in the case of Muslims or Roma populations the category of intolerable practices and symbols becomes larger and larger, and the ways in which disapproval is expressed become more and more violent. To that extent, the notion of toleration as ‘putting up with what one disapproves of’ becomes an empty signifier.

The notion of toleration as “putting up with what one disapproves of” becomes an empty signifier.

6. Key Messages for Future Research

The aim of this report has been to outline the main patterns of ethnic, cultural, racial and religious diversity in Europe (in the 15 countries studied: Greece, Spain and Italy in southern Europe; Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey in south-eastern Europe; Hungary and Poland in central-eastern Europe; Sweden and Denmark in Nordic Europe; Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland in western and northern Europe) and the policies adopted to address these challenges. The report does not discuss in detail each country (country profiles are provided in Part Seven of this report) but rather highlights the similarities and differences among them as well as the common diversity challenges that they face.

The report starts by offering working definitions of a number of concepts and terms used in the study of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges in Europe and the related policies to address them. The aim is thus to offer a tool for the reader to better understand the later comparative discussion, but also to keep these for reference in future work.

Part Three of the report explains the main features of national identity in each of the 15 countries studied and reviews their migration experiences as well as the policies used to deal with migration-related or native minority diversity. The report proposes a classification of the 15 European countries studied into three groups in terms of their migration experience: 'old hosts', 'new hosts', and 'countries in transition – between emigration and immigration'. It outlines the predominantly ethnic or civic conception of the nation in each country, the role of religion within it, and the presence of native and immigrant minorities in their territory. The report thus presents in a concise form the multi-cultural mosaic of which these 15 European societies are composed.

Part Four discusses the three native and immigrant populations that pose the highest diversity challenges across Europe today: 'black' / 'coloured' people; Muslims; and the Roma. We accordingly identify the common patterns of ethnic and racial prejudice that 'coloured', Muslim and Roma people face in different countries. We also highlight the common policy approaches adopted by different countries to deal with Muslim for instance, or Roma populations.

All three groups are subjected to widespread discrimination in the labour market, in education, housing and in social life in general. Both Roma and 'black' people are faced with negative stereotyping and ethnic/racial prejudice especially concerning their innate tendency to violate the law and engage in petty or organised criminality. The three groups differ as regards the type of racism that they face. Muslims face predominantly religious racism (even though in France for instance ethnicity [for instance Moroccan] and religion [Muslim] are embraced in one term: '*maghrebini*') while 'black' people and Roma are faced with biological and culturalist racism that refers to their physical features and their ways of life.

Muslims face predominantly religious racism while "black" people and Roma are faced with biological and culturalist racism that refers to their physical features and their ways of life.

In the concluding part of the report we have also discussed the different views and the forms that tolerance can take in different national contexts and towards different groups.

This report seeks to offer a European view of cultural, religious, ethnic and racial diversity challenges and the ways in which they are addressed. It has succeeded in highlighting important similarities and differences and also in identifying the groups that are worst off in the countries studied. Future research needs however to dig deeper and consider whether there can be a common European approach to migrant and native minority integration that respects the specificities of each country but also allows for a bird's eye view of the situation across Europe and identifies the challenges that are common and that can be best dealt with through EU legislation and EU consultations, exchanges of best practices and cooperation. Indeed the question of both the Roma and the Muslim populations is of particular interest here. While it may be difficult to devise policy approaches that are responsive to the needs of all 15 European countries studied here (let alone the 27 EU member states), it is however possible to develop policies that address a number of European countries that share common or parallel migration and ethnic minority experiences.

This report seeks to offer a European view of cultural, religious, ethnic and racial diversity challenges and the ways in which they are addressed.

7. Country Profiles

Below we present short profiles of the 15 countries studied in this report, their main minority and immigrant groups, the diversity challenges that these groups pose and the ways in which each country has tried to address them. Countries¹¹ are presented in alphabetical order.

7.1 Country Profile: Bulgaria

Bulgarians have been accustomed to living in a multi-cultural environment since the times of the Ottoman Empire. When the modern Bulgarian state was formed in 1878, Bulgarian society and state institutions had to face the problem of finding a balance between the accommodation of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity in the country and the aspiration to build a mono-national Orthodox-Christian nation-state.

All Bulgarian Constitutions and principal laws have noted the existence of various ethnic and religious communities in the country and upheld the principle of equal rights and obligations. However, at the same time they guaranteed that the Bulgarian language and Bulgarian Orthodox Church enjoyed a privileged position. The perception of a mono-national state has resulted in corresponding policies towards the minorities. They were accepted as a part of the Bulgarian society, but at the same time were in practice highly marginalised.

The process of recognition of diversity and multiculturalism in Bulgarian society and of protection of minority rights truly started only after 1989 as an inseparable part of the democratisation of Bulgaria and its aspiration to join the EU. In addition to the political recognition of different ethnic and religious groups, minorities were also “discovered” by researchers in various fields in social sciences, and were quickly put on the ethnographic map of Bulgaria. An avalanche of studies dedicated to the ethno-cultural situation in Bulgaria soon followed, including the first sociological studies about levels of tolerance and mechanisms for coexistence of different communities.

Despite this, the majority population and the minorities largely continued to live side by side. Otherness in Bulgaria is tolerated without being actually accepted. In other words, Bulgarians and minority groups accept otherness, and there are numerous areas of public life (politics, culture, economy, sports, media, etc) where members of different ethnic and religious communities interact. At the same time, the psychological dividing line is preserved, and in private space, the boundaries of formal parallel existence are seldom crossed.

In recent years, scholarly debates turned to the question of whether tolerance in Bulgaria truly exists or whether the notion of tolerant Bulgarians

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¹¹ A detailed analysis of the situation in each country is offered in the ACCEPT PLURALISM project web site www.accept-pluralism.eu.

is basically a well-entrenched myth. Numerous studies conducted between 1990 and 2010 show that Bulgarians perceive themselves as very tolerant. This stereotype has been actively promoted by the media and leading Bulgarian politicians.

More recent studies argue that coexistence and cohabitation of Bulgarians with other communities were not a result of conscious tolerance towards diversity and otherness, but merely a manifestation of putting up with it. In other words, what can be observed in Bulgaria is above all liberal tolerance. While allowing for the free expression of ethnic, religious and cultural identity of minorities, the majority society is not really prepared to respect and accept them as equals.

A perception that people of Bulgarian ethnic origin should enjoy a privileged position in the country has been reflected also in the *Law on Bulgarian Citizenship* (1998, last amended in April 2010). The amendments of April 2010 eased and accelerated the procedure for citizenship acquisition for ethnic Bulgarians from other countries. The “fresh blood” brought by ethnic Bulgarians from abroad is expected to overcome the demographic crisis and reverse the “percentage battle” – the increasing share of ethnic and religious minority communities among the population of Bulgaria.

The data about people who have obtained Bulgarian citizenship between 1990 and 2010 show that even without the amendments, the overwhelming majority of new Bulgarian citizens were people who have claimed to be of Bulgarian descent and were previously citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro), or Albania. Between 2002 and 2010, 98.14% (59,677) of all those who obtained Bulgarian passports were (or claimed to be) of Bulgarian ethnic origin, while only a tiny minority (1,129) received citizenship through non-facilitated procedures and for other reasons.

Due to the level of immigration to Bulgaria, which is still relatively low, immigrant communities are not perceived as a diversity challenge. The most important “significant others” for the Bulgarian majority population are the native minorities. There are over 15 ethnic communities in Bulgaria. Bulgarians represent 83.9% of the population. The three largest minorities are Turks, Roma and Pomaks (or Muslim Bulgarians). Pomaks have not been included as a special ethnic group in the census as they are considered a religious and not ethnic minority. These are also the three groups with the most significant tolerance-related problems – each in a different way and for different reasons.

Due to the level of immigration to Bulgaria, which is still relatively low, immigrant communities are not perceived as a diversity challenge.

Table 7.1.1 Division of the population of Bulgaria according to ethnic group

Ethnic group	1992	%	2001	%
Total	8 487 317	100	7 928 901	100
Bulgarians	7 271 185	85.67	6 655 210	83.94
Turks	800 052	9.43	746 664	9.42
Roma*	313 396	3.69	370 908	4.68
Russians	17 139	0.20	15 595	0.20
Armenians	13 677	0.16	10 832	0.14
Vlachs	5 159	0.06	10 566	0.13
Macedonians	10 803	0.13	5 071	0.06
Karakachans	5 144	0.06	4 107	0.05
Greeks	4 930	0.06	3 408	0.04
Ukrainians	1 864	0.02	2 489	0.03
Tatars	4 515	0.05	1 803	0.02
Jews	3 461	0.04	1 363	0.02
Romanians	N/A		1 088	0.01
Gagauz	1 478	0.02	540	<0.01
Circassians	573	<0.01	367	<0.01
Arabs	N/A		328	<0.01
Albanians	N/A		278	<0.01
Others	N/A		11 369	0.14
Undeclared	N/A		62 108	0.78
No answer	N/A		24 807	0.31

Source: <http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Ethnos.htm>

* Most experts consider that the real number of Roma in Bulgaria is almost double the official number – between 600,000 and 700,000.

The religious division of the population is the following (according to the 2001 census – see NSI, 2001): 82.6% are Eastern Orthodox Christians, 12.2% are Muslims (the majority are Sunni, while about 5.5% of them are Shia), 0.6% are Catholics and 0.5% are Protestants. There are also small communities of Armenian-Gregorian (6,500 people) and Jewish (650 people) religions.

Table 7.1.2: Permanently resident foreigners in Bulgaria by citizenship as of 31.12.2009

Citizenship	Permanently resident foreigners					
	31.12.2004	31.12.2005	31.12.2006	31.12.2007	31.12.2008	31.12.2009
Total	50756	53197	55653	63615	66806	69423
Europe	35437	37051	38988	44261	47106	49379
EU – 27	5690	5949	6245	6861	6904	6948
Other European	29747	31102	32743	37400	40202	42431
						including:
Albania	99	113	142	198	229	265
Belarus	283	306	326	351	362	377
Bosnia and Herzegovina	46	47	48	50	58	63
Macedonia	821	918	1115	2188	4375	5507
Moldova	1643	1626	1703	2071	2203	2403
Russian Federation	18639	18947	19216	21171	21309	21483
Serbia	1068	1116	1121	1326	355	593
Turkey	1880	2583	3361	3778	3828	4092
Ukraine	4500	4659	4861	5263	5350	5514
Asia	7060	7700	8162	9308	9623	9888
Armenia	873	1018	1142	1268	1322	1380
Viet Nam	796	832	867	1033	1043	1040
Iraq	359	366	369	430	437	443
China	1081	1421	1581	1785	1934	2011
Lebanon	794	817	832	913	932	953
Syria	1617	1648	1690	1929	1945	1987
Other Asia	1540	1598	1681	1950	2010	2074
Africa	546	562	591	611	627	651
America	618	669	732	821	838	890
Australia and New Zealand	30	34	39	39	44	48
Stateless	1749	1896	1903	2157	2167	2171
ex-USSR	5316	5285	5238	6404	6386	6372

Source: http://www.nsi.bg/ORPDOCS/Pop_5.8_Migration_DR_EN.xls

Turks are well integrated, politically organised and with a very clear and well-expressed self-awareness, but are faced with the increasingly intolerant attitude of the majority population, which sees Turks as controlling too much political power in the country. Education in the Turkish language is provided on all levels, Turks can freely practice their religion, they have newspapers and electronic media in their language and are actively involved in political life in Bulgaria.

Unfortunately, full integration into the political and public space did not lead to genuine coexistence based on respect and acceptance on the side of the Bulgarian majority population and for the larger part of the last 20 years, their attitude towards the Turkish minority can best be described as a case of liberal tolerance. Furthermore, in recent years anti-Turkish sentiments and intolerant attitude have been on the rise. The majority believes that the Turkish community has too much political and economic power and finds this situation to be intolerable. Turks are a minority and should therefore know their place – they are tolerated as long as they keep a low profile in public space. On the other hand, Turks do not want to be simply tolerated – they want to be included and actively participate in all spheres of social, political, cultural and economic life in the country.

Roma are almost completely excluded from society. They are rejected not just by the majority population but by other minorities as well. The widespread perception is that the state institutions “tolerate” Roma too much and that instead of tolerating, the state should control them. On the institutional level, state policies towards Roma can be rated as tolerance but with the reservation that it is tolerance with the clear goal of social-economic integration. Despite these measures (many of which suffered from poor implementation, insufficient funding and lack of commitment), the situation of the Bulgarian Roma has not changed substantially yet. If anything, the situation became worse. The general public still perceives them in overwhelmingly negative terms and continues to reject and exclude them. This is visible in the education system, health care, housing, labour market and numerous other areas.

Acceptance and toleration of Roma are a precondition for their successful inclusion into the society, but at the same time, only their participation in all fields of social life can reduce the distance and rejection. For now, the Bulgarian Roma are entangled in a web of rejection, exclusion and intolerance and the prospects for this to change in the near future are not very bright.

Pomaks are tolerated as a religious minority, but any attempt to assert their different ethnic or national identity is met by a furiously intolerant rejection of such claims. Pomak self-identification is often presented as a threat to national interests and an attack on national unity. State policy towards Pomaks is thus a combination of tolerance and exceptional intolerance. While Pomaks are free to practice their religion and manifest their cultural identity without hindrance in both the private and social sphere, the state and the majority population strictly refuse to acknowledge their right to genuine self-identification. All attempts from within the Pomak community to assert their identity as different from the Bulgarian majority

For now, the Bulgarian Roma are entangled in a web of rejection, exclusion and intolerance and the prospects for this to change in the near future are not very bright.

usually lead to an excessively negative and aggressive reaction from the state institutions, media and the public. The overall attitude towards Pomaks can thus be rated as intolerance. Without recognising its existence, there cannot be any discussion about tolerance and acceptance of a particular community.

Two smaller minority communities (Armenians and Jews) are perhaps the only indicator giving ground to the claim that Bulgarian society is not a complete stranger to mechanisms of tolerant attitude and acceptance of otherness. Both minority groups have been treated with respect and recognition and have always enjoyed full freedom to express their ethnic, religious and cultural identity. One pragmatic explanation for this is the small number of members of both communities. For this reason, the majority has never perceived them even as a potential threat to the national unity. Both communities have been fully accepted and are respected both on the state level and by the society, as is manifested by numerous highly respected individuals from both communities who have left their mark in Bulgarian politics, culture, science and sports.

For the majority of Bulgarians, the mere fact of practical cohabitation in a multi-cultural environment is often enough to perceive themselves as being tolerant. However, the “tolerance” in the Bulgarian case can be understood only as “putting up with someone different,” without accepting and understanding them. The term “tolerance” is thus above all a synonym of bearable and parallel cohabitation. The situation could be classified as liberal tolerance – the right of the minorities to express their ethnic, religious and cultural characteristics is respected, but only as long as it is considered (by the state institutions, political actors and even the majority population) that this is not in contradiction with the national interests.

The situation is rather similar in academic circles. Bulgarian intellectuals have only recently (through importing European discourse) begun to understand tolerance in a broader way – as acceptance of the different groups. Such discourse for now exists predominantly in the projects and work of the non-governmental organisations. Studies show that the attitude of the majority of Bulgarians towards otherness is still based on deeply entrenched disregard, apprehension and prejudice.

Bulgarian intellectuals have only recently (through importing European discourse) begun to understand tolerance in a broader way – as acceptance of the different groups.

Table 2: Main minority groups in Bulgaria and their dimension of difference from the majority population

Dimension of difference	Citizenship	Racial	Ethnic	Religious	Cultural	Linguistic
Native minorities						
Turks			x	X	x	x
Roma			x	partial x	x	x
Pomaks			x	X	x	
Jews			x	X		
Armenians			x			
Immigrants						
Bulgarian descent	partial x				partial x	
Non- Bulgarian descent	x	x	x	X	x	X

7.2 Country Profile: Denmark

Until the inflow of guest workers from especially Turkey, Yugoslavia and Pakistan in the late 1960s, immigration to Denmark was limited and often resulted in assimilation. In the 1980s a significant number of refugees from the Middle East and Sri Lanka arrived, while the 1990s brought significant groups of refugees from Bosnia, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq. As of January 1st 2010, 9.8 percent of Denmark's 5.5 million residents are immigrants and descendants of immigrants, with 6.6 percent of the population from non-Western countries. The largest group is of Turkish descent and comprises roughly 60,000 persons.

The overriding concern with cultural and religious differences in Denmark today pertains to minorities of immigrants and descendants from non-western countries, most of whom are (identified as) Muslims. National minorities and older religious minorities of Greenlanders, Germans, Poles and Jews are today uncontroversial and rarely raise claims themselves about special or equal rights, symbolic respect and recognition. One exception is the small number of Romas (between 5,000 and 10,000) in Denmark, who still face the stereotype of the Roma as stealing, cheating, lying, poor, uneducated, lazy and unwilling to integrate, inducing many to hide their background. Immigrants from non-western countries, on the other hand, are very controversial because of (what is perceived to be) their low ability or willingness to integrate into 'modern' Danish society and democracy. The main diversity challenges that politicians consider important can be summed up in three core themes:

Unemployment: It is often emphasised that the percentage of non-Western immigrants on social security is out of proportion with the rest of the population. This is seen as a problem for the sustainability of the Danish welfare model.

Parallel societies (ghettoisation): It is often noted that we need to avoid a situation where Muslims are living in their own secluded communities impervious to the rules and institutions of the rest of society and that we are heading towards such a situation if something is not done now. The fear is one of parallel societies hostile and indifferent to one another, of *Sharia* law being de facto implemented outside Danish law, and generally the erosion of society's social cohesion.

Radicalisation/extremism: There has been a growing concern with radicalisation within Muslim communities. In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or indifference towards problematic beliefs and practices among minorities that in a worst-case scenario could lead to acts of terrorism. Concern for the democratic mind-set of Muslims is often expressed. However, both in order to counterbalance the symbolic exclusion of immigrant youth and thereby avoid radicalisation, and in order to counteract anti-Semitism in larger urban

The overriding concern with cultural and religious differences in Denmark today pertains to minorities of immigrants and descendants from non-western countries, most of whom are (identified as) Muslims.

areas, the concept of toleration is being brought back onto the political agenda.

Since the mid-1990s, Denmark has seen a long period of politicisation of integration and refugee issues, particularly focusing on Muslims. This has resulted in the comparatively liberal immigration laws of 1983 being replaced through gradual reform since 1999 with one of the toughest immigration regimes in Europe. Parallel to this politicisation of Muslims, the right-wing Danish People's Party (DPP) became increasingly influential. In 2001 the new liberal-conservative government became dependent on the DPP for their parliamentary majority, and the following years saw further restrictions and an even tougher political discourse that often focused on the (negative) effects immigration has on what is described as a high level of social cohesion in Danish society.

In both discourse and law on integration a comprehensive notion of citizenship is established, drawing on central elements in Danish national identity history. The period in the early to mid-19th century especially, where democratisation coincided with Denmark being reduced through several wars to a minor European state, has had a lasting impact on notions of nation, national identity and citizenship. The separation from its former lands created a Danish state without noticeable diversity in nationality and language. This transition coincided with the country's relatively early democratisation and led to an intense concern with the concept of the *Danish people* upon whom sovereignty had been conferred. This nationalist re-awakening produced an inward-looking Danish nationalism inspired by romanticism and based on the rural society and peasant virtues. The movement was placed within a Lutheran framework.

In the current discourse on national identity five elements can be identified, of which the first four especially are related to the nation building stages of the 19th century. Firstly, *Christianity* remains significant despite a decline in religiosity. Lutheranism is often described as having been instrumental in creating a political culture which strictly separates religion from politics. Secondly, the *Danish language* constitutes an important element in national belonging. Today, the expectation of mastery and public use of the Danish language by immigrants goes well beyond what is required to function in the labour market and ordinary communication. Thirdly, Denmark is often described as a *small* and *culturally homogeneous* country, with a characteristic social ideal of tight knit 'cosiness'. Current debates on cohesion in Denmark, the valuation of sameness, and mistrust of cultural pluralism per se draw on these themes. Fourthly, smallness and homogeneity are connected to values of *egalitarianism* (anti-authoritarianism, social levelling and the comprehensive welfare state) and a special way of understanding and organising *democracy* (as conversational and consensus-oriented). Finally, pride in the *welfare society* translates into a requirement of reciprocity and solidarity, and concretely as an obligation to work and pay taxes, which may be seen as the key currency of symbolic recognition – i.e., the idea that membership depends on the ability to do one's share.

Since the mid-1990s, Denmark has seen a long period of politicisation of integration and refugee issues, particularly focusing on Muslims.

In the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic and religious identities.

In the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic and religious identities. The discourse of integration is explicitly set against the notion of multiculturalism. The latter is seen as synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and political failure to demand and further the integration into society of all its members. In general, cultural and religious differences are seen as illegitimate to the extent that they stand in the way of integration, understood as one's ability to live up to one's duty as an economically self-sufficient and taxpaying individual and as a participating citizen at all levels of civil society and political institutions.

In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices among minorities. This criticism of tolerance as indifference or *naïveté* relies on a historical preference for 'free mindedness' or 'liberality' over 'tolerance'. In the Danish debate about liberality vs. tolerance, tolerance is construed as form of moral failure: it implies giving up the forming of judgements over what is right and wrong. Liberality, on the other hand, entails fighting for the values 'you hold dearly' while insisting on the same right for all others. The basis of this Danish interpretation of tolerance is, first, a strong commitment by all to equal citizen rights and to their protection by the state. Liberality, secondly, implies criticising and even ridiculing all that you find wrong. Liberality is a 'republican' virtue that enables you to participate in blunt public exchanges with a 'thick skin' so that you are able to reach negotiated, consensual democratic agreements with your opponents at all levels of society.

Table 7.2.1: Immigrants and descendants in Denmark, 1 January 2010.

	Immigrants	Descendants	Total	% of all foreigners
Turkey	32,255	26,961	59,216	10.9%
Germany	28,234	2,678	30,912	5.7%
Iraq	21,306	7,958	29,264	5.4%
Poland	25,443	2,958	28,401	5.2%
Lebanon	12,012	11,763	23,775	4.4%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	17,911	4,310	22,221	4.1%
Other African countries	17,054	4,586	21,640	4.0%
Pakistan	11,169	9,223	20,392	3.8%
Yugoslavia	11,021	5,938	16,959	3.1%
Somalia	10,127	6,704	16,831	3.1%
Norway	14,663	1,404	16,067	3.0%
Other Asian countries	11,907	3,509	15,416	2.8%
Iran	12,098	3,111	15,209	2.8%
Sweden	13,233	1,921	15,154	2.8%
Vietnam	8,919	4,959	13,878	2.6%
Great Britain	11,832	1,221	13,053	2.4%
Afghanistan	9,966	2,664	12,630	2.3%
Sri Lanka	6,715	4,088	10,803	2.0%
Latin America	9,352	870	10,222	1.9%
Morocco	5,140	4,691	9,831	1.8%
China	8,506	1,182	9,688	1.8%
North America	8,773	908	9,681	1.8%
Thailand	8,849	562	9,411	1.7%
Phillipines	8,377	930	9,307	1.7%
Iceland	7,876	1,090	8,966	1.7%
Other Countries	81,684	12,126	93,810	17.3%
All Countries	414,422	128,316	542,738	100.00%

Source: reproduced from Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2010: 29.

Table 7.2.2: Main minority groups in Denmark and their dimensions of difference

Dimensions of difference	Racial	Ethnic	Religious	Cultural	Linguistic
Native minorities					
Greenlanders	X	X		X	X
Germans					X
Jews		X	X	X	
Catholics			X		
Immigrants (non-Muslims)					
Scandinavians (Norwegians, Swedes, Icelanders)					(X)*
Germans					X
Poles			X	X	X
Iranians (Christian)	X	X		X	X
Asians (Sri Lankans, Vietnamese, Filipino, Thai)	X	X	X	X	X
Roma	X	X	X	X	X
Immigrants (Muslims)					
Iranians (Muslim)	X	X	X	X	X
Turks	X	X	X	X	X
Arabs (Iraqis, Lebanese, Moroccans)	X	X	X	X	X
ex-Yugoslavs (Serbs, Bosnians)	X	X	X	X	X
Asians (Pakistanis, Afghans)	X	X	X	X	X
Somalis	X	X	X	X	X

* In general Norwegian, Swedish and Danish are very similar. Icelandic however is not understandable for Danes.

7.3 Country Profile: France

The demographic diversity of France is a product of both labour and postcolonial migration in the post-war period. On the one hand, France established recruiting offices in Southern European countries (Spain and Portugal) to attract European workers and their family. On the other hand, the dismantling of the colonial empire in between 1953 and 1962 led the French government to sign bilateral agreements to secure its economic interests that also favoured the circulation of former colonial subject to the Metropole. Successive immigration waves created a diverse society i.e. a society that encompasses populations with various origins from a geographical and cultural point of view.

Yet, the diversity of French society is hard to capture in figures. The official census only classifies the resident population under three categories: French by birth, French by naturalisation, Foreigners.

In 2007, there were 61,795,000 people living in France, out of which:

- 89.9% were French by birth,
- 4.3 % were French by naturalisation,
- 5.8% were Foreigners.

The fact that official statistics only records nationality results in statistically concealing the diversity of the population after a few generations. This leads us to distinguish two levels of analysis of cultural diversity in France:

- the first level of analysis is objective; it looks at the breakdown of **immigrants** according to their nationality in the national census (see *figure 1*), it includes the **historical minority** of the Roma community in France;
- the second level of analysis is subjective; it looks at **visible minorities** in France i.e. French people of immigrant descent who are perceived as different by the majority population and are likely to be the target of discriminatory practices (their number are not recorded in official statistics); an other category is that of **regional identities**, individuals who identify themselves as belonging to a regional identity and who may be challenging the state for their practice of a regional language.


Individuals of North African descent, although French citizens, are targeted as different by the larger society, authorities, etc. which leads to their *ethnicisation*. This process dates back to colonial times. French people who are “black” are also targeted as different by the rest of the society. We argue that **physical appearances and the ethnicisation of North African origin are challenging dimensions of cultural diversity in France.**

Even though the figure of 5 million Muslims in France is often presented in the media, we would like to take this figure with caution, as this number derives from the number of foreigners and French nationals of immigrant descent from North-Africa, Turkey and Africa. According to a 2006 survey only 59% of French people of immigrant descent identify themselves

According to a 2006 survey only 59% of French people of immigrant descent identify themselves as Muslims.

as Muslims. Moreover, the notion of “Muslim immigrants” is mainly in use in the English speaking world. This is also due to the fact that, in France, there is a low level of religious identification as political belonging.

Figure 7.3.1: Largest Immigrant groups in France in 2004 by country of origin (in thousands)



Source: National Census, INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies)

Understanding diversity in France

The formation of the French state is connected to the idea of national identity in a manner that emphasizes the notion of the individual over the group and leaves the belonging to minority group to the private sphere (should it be on the basis of religion or culture). It dates back to the French revolution of 1789 when the idea of the nation emerged from the unification of citizens as opposed to the addition of groups (which characterised the Ancient Regime). It is expressed in the French notion of citizenship which is civic and not ethnic, and encompasses all citizens regardless of their origin, race or religion. Immigrants have been able to become French citizens through an open code of nationality and the naturalisation process has been a pivot of their integration in France. The French strategy to guarantee equality among the citizens is to make difference invisible. **In the process of immigrants’ integration, their belonging to different cultural and religious groups has been kept in the private sphere.**

Two essential features can be highlighted to understand the understanding of cultural diversity in France: the scope of nationality and *laïcité*.

The questions of citizenship and naturalisation process have been settled at the core of the debates on diversity and integration for 30 years now. In response to the debate over immigration issues, the French

Two essential features can be highlighted to understand the understanding of cultural diversity in France: the scope of nationality and *laïcité*.

government modified the nationality code successively in 1986, 1993 and 1998.

- **1986:** the Chirac government (right-wing) introduced a new bill to put automatic naturalisation of second generation immigrants to a halt.
 - **1993:** the Pasqua laws were passed (right-wing government); they included that citizenship for second generation immigrants required that they actively declare their desire to be French.
- 1998:** the Guigou law (left-wing government) suppressed the necessity to make an express declaration that second generation desired to be French.

Figure 7.3.2: Dimensions of difference

Dimensions of difference	Citizenship	Racial	Ethnic	Religious	Cultural	Linguistic
Immigrants						
North Africans	X		X	X	X	
Sub-Saharan Africans	X	X	X		X	
Turkish	X		X	X	X	
Asian migrants (China, Cambodia)	X	X	X	X	X	
Native minorities						
Roma community			X		X	X
Regional identities *						
Occitan, Breton, Alsatian, Corsican						X
Visible minorities *						
French citizens of North African descent			X	X		
French blacks (French citizens of African descent or Caribbean ancestry)		X				

** These are subjective categories. They are identified for the purpose of the research only. They are not recorded as official categories in French statistics.*

In 2007, the government created a **Ministry of Immigration and National Identity** clearly articulating the link in between the two notions. The same year, it introduced a New Reception and Integration Contract for newly arrived migrants to follow (it consists in language learning and knowledge acquisition). In 2010, however, after the ministry launched a series of debates over national identity and having received many criticisms, it was dissolved and the administrative units to oversee the regulation of immigration flows were reassigned in the interior ministry.

Laïcité is the French understanding of secularism and it guarantees that religious beliefs are kept in the private sphere. It is embodied in the 1905 law of separation of church and state, and it states that the state will not fund any activity related to a religious community. It also rules out any official representation of religion in public spaces. It is an active principle to protect the right to belief and disbelief in the society.

Accommodating religious diversity in France

The reassessment of *laïcité* has been used to tackle the challenge of Islam since the first affair of the veil in 1989, when two girls in the suburbs of Paris (Creil) insisted on wearing an Islamic veil in class. The State Council then fostered a progressive understanding of the *laïcité* law and left it to the school supervisor to decide whether or not to leave pupils wearing religious symbols in the class room. In 2004, however, a law was passed issuing a more restrictive understanding of *laïcité* and banning the conspicuous display of religious signs in schools (including the Islamic veil, Jewish kippah and large Christian cross).

That *laïcité* has been presented as the main institutional arrangement to deal with the challenge of religious diversity in France will have to be analysed in a critical perspective. As a matter of fact, some analysts have argued that the debate on *laïcité* has fostered a sharp return of assimilationism and forms part of an increasing rise of “Islamophobia”.

Accommodating cultural diversity in France

Following the impetus of the EU, the French government established in 2004 a High authority to fight discrimination and promote equality (*Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l'égalité*, Halde). Despite a change in framing (from the promotion of equality to anti-discrimination), the High authority remains reluctant to adopt a strategy of acknowledging differences among individuals. Furthermore, the racial construction of visible minorities is hardly acknowledged in the sense that the category of race is banned from the scientific discourse on differences.

Some analysts have argued that the debate on *laïcité* has fostered a sharp return of assimilationism and forms part of an increasing rise of “Islamophobia”.

7.4 Country Profile: Germany

While Germany is not the only country to link ethnic origin to its understanding of nationality, some historians argue that this tie has been especially strong. Among the reasons given is the historical formation of Germany from very diverse principalities, which sustained strong power vis-à-vis the German emperor (Kaiser). This specific formation continues today, where the German federal states still have a strong position in relation to the national government. One example of this federative character is the educational system, which is in the hands of each respective federal state and thus in certain aspects varies significantly from region to region.

For some historians it is exactly the importance placed on local or regional identity over national German identity that has led to an even stronger emphasis on a constructed common German identity, almost overcompensating to keep the fragmented territory together and build one nation. In the process, other nations were constructed as inferior in relation to the German one and a specifically German idea of the Volk was developed, which lays particular emphasis on a common bloodline of all the members of the nation. This was far more ideological than the concept of ethnicity, and strongly linked ideology and (perceived) biological factors. Together with the devaluation of other nations and ethnic groups this concept of the Volk ultimately led to the National Socialists' idea of a superior German 'race', which had to govern all other 'races' and even extinguish other groups and nations.

Although the National Socialist regime and its ideas have long been overcome and certain thinkers, like Jürgen Habermas, have argued that the only possible patriotism in Germany today could be patriotism towards the constitution, the idea of the Volk has not been completely jettisoned. As a result, German citizenship has, until recently, been closely tied to ethnic origin.

The legal concept of *ius sanguinis*, which ties citizenship to bloodline and makes it impossible for a person with a different ethnic origin to become part of the nation, has, through the citizenship reform of 2000, been partially changed into *ius soli*, a doctrine that ties nationality to one's place of birth and thus enables immigrants and their descendants to become German citizens in certain circumstances.

The most important developments of the 1980s with respect to diversity were the debates about multiculturalism. Its supporters mainly sought to protect immigrants and minorities from any kind of forced assimilation or unfair treatment, especially in light of the country's history of mass killings of Jews, Roma and many others during the National Socialist regime. However, with the number of refugees from Turkey and other conflict areas, together with the unresolved issue of many former labour migrants not willing to return to their countries of origin, and the growing immigration of ethnic Germans mainly from the former Soviet Union, more and more political voices emerged calling for limiting immigration. The attitude towards immigrants and minorities constantly deteriorated.

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The most important event of the 1990s was the process of German reunification. After the official reunification of Eastern and Western Germany, immigration to the Western parts both from the former East and from the former Soviet Union increased rapidly. Together with incoming refugees from war-torn countries, this development was rather challenging and caused a deterioration of attitudes towards immigrants in general, which was often fuelled by political leaders who wanted to restrict immigration and asylum laws. One consequence of this was several incidents of group violence and even murder of immigrants and asylum seekers in the early 1990s.

While ethnic German immigrants were generally granted citizenship directly after entering the country, and even certain minority groups – among them German Roma - were acknowledged as national minorities by the end of the 1990s, former labour migrants, most of them Turkish nationals who had been working in the country for more than ten or twenty years, were not given similar rights and still had to struggle to be granted citizenship.

The years after 2000, and especially after 9/11, witnessed a heightened debate about Muslims and how and if they could be integrated into German society. Even Germans with a Turkish background, some of whom had been born as German citizens, were increasingly perceived as outsiders mainly because of their Muslim religion, whether or not they really adhered to it.

On the other hand, citizenship law was substantially reformed in the year 2000, which opened up the possibility for children of immigrants who were born in the Germany to acquire German citizenship. Not everyone welcomes the fact that German society is becoming culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse, and will continue to do so in the future. While the anti-immigrant and even racist rhetoric that is currently gaining more traction is not at all exclusively geared towards Muslims, still, resentment towards them – and everyone who is perceived as Muslim – is the most readily expressed and garners the strongest support in society.

Other groups, such as the Roma, are not as openly debated in public discussion, or are even, like certain Vietnamese immigrants, partially portrayed as 'positively integrating', but they often have to face rather restrictive immigration policies nonetheless.

While German Roma have been recognised as one of four national minority groups, guaranteeing them protection and support for their language and culture, Roma who are nationals of other EU countries, such as Romania or Bulgaria, or who came as refugees during the war in Kosovo and live and work in Germany, are not as welcome and are increasingly exposed to the risk of repatriation. The pleas of the Roma to the German government to grant a certain quota of Roma refugees permanent residence in Germany due to their having been victims of the Holocaust has not been answered favourably.

Citizenship law was substantially reformed in the year 2000 but not everyone welcomes the fact that German society is becoming culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse, and will continue to do so in the future.

While tolerance is generally understood as the opposite of discrimination and racism, it can be observed in current public discourses that the concept of tolerance is also increasingly used to draw borders between those who are to be tolerated and those who are not, while the non-tolerance towards a specific group or individual is often legitimised with its own (perceived) intolerance towards others. This idea can best be understood from the slogan “No tolerance for intolerance”, which is partly rooted in the historical narrative of a too tolerant Weimar Republic that gave way to the worst face of intolerance, the National Socialists. The slogan is widely used in political rhetoric today, often concerning religious Muslim groups. Whereas ‘Turks’ or ‘Muslims’ were largely perceived as the victims of intolerance during the violent attacks in the early 1990s, more and more, they have come to be portrayed as ‘intolerant’ themselves, whether towards Jews, homosexuals or liberal societies in general. By portraying – especially religious – Muslims in this way, they are labelled as foreigners with incompatible values and beliefs to whom too much tolerance would be a detrimental attitude.

Looking at tolerance not only as a normative value but also as a political discourse that marks insiders and outsiders of the society allows us to observe the unequal power relations between the subjects and objects of (in-) tolerance.

This kind of analysis also demonstrates how the heightened use of tolerance talk – especially in regard to certain groups - might be explained as an attempt to keep up perceived cultural homogeneity in a time of fundamental changes in German understandings of nationality. Similarly the concept of integration still mainly carries that implicit indictment that immigrants have to adapt to a culturally homogenous society, which is itself not to be changed by this process of integration.

Dealing with these issues in the near future will be decisive for the peaceful cohabitation of a diverse population and for developing a new and inclusive national identity. It will be interesting to further analyse normative as well as discursive aspects of tolerance in Germany and other related concepts.

Looking at tolerance not only as a normative value but also as a political discourse that marks insiders and outsiders of the society allows us to observe the unequal power relations between the subjects and objects of (in-) tolerance.

Table 7.4.1: Population with Immigration Background in the narrower sense 2009 concerning current or previous citizenship

Country/Region of origin	With immigration background (foreign-born parent or grandparent) numbers in thousands
EU-27	4,690
Greece	375
Italy	771
Poland	1,298
Rumania	435
Other Europe	5,598
Bosnia and Herzegovina	240
Croatia	367
Russian Federation	1,060
Serbia and Montenegro	297
Turkey	2,502
Ukraine	251
Europe in total	10,289
Africa	477
America	385
Asia, Australia and Oceania	2,060
Near und Middle East	1,271
Kazakhstan	656
South- and Southeast Asia	563
Not reported or inapplicable	2,493
People with migration background altogether	15,703

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland DESTATIS:

<http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Statistiken/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Migrationshintergrund/Tabellen/Content100/MigrationshintergrundStaatsangehoerigkeit,templateId=renderPrint.psml>

7.5 Country Profile: Greece

Until 20 years ago, Greece was considered largely a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural and mono-religious country, a true 'nation-state' where the dominant nation, notably people of ethnic Greek descent and Christian Orthodox religion, accounted for approximately 98% of the total population. The dominant definition of the nation was ethno-cultural and religious, while civic and territorial elements were of secondary importance in defining who is Greek. This view of the nation as a community of descent and culture was reflected in Greek citizenship law, which until recently was based almost exclusively on the *jus sanguinis* principle.

The Greek state formally recognises as a minority only a religious Muslim minority in western Thrace, which accounts for less than 0.2% of the total population of Greece. It also recognises even smaller and relatively invisible religious minorities of Greek Jews, Catholics and Protestants. During the 1990s, and following the dismantling of Yugoslavia, a Slavic speaking Macedonian minority has mobilised ethnically in northern Greece, but its claims have been ignored (and to a certain extent suppressed) by the Greek state and the local Greek speaking majority. Greece's native minorities also include a relatively large Roma population (300-350,000 people) that is often subject to racist and discriminatory behaviour.

During the last two decades Greece has become the host to more than a million returning co-ethnics, co-ethnic immigrants and foreigners – these groups accounting now for more than 10% of the total resident population. In particular in the late 1980s and during the 1990s Greece received approximately 150,000 Pontic Greeks (co-ethnic returnees from the former Soviet Union) and nearly 240,000 ethnic Greek Albanians from southern Albania (the so-called Voreioiportes). In addition during the 1990s and 2000s Greece experienced significant inflows of economic migrants from eastern European, Asian and African countries. The total legal immigrant population is currently estimated at just fewer than 700,000, the largest groups being Albanians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Georgians, Ukrainians, Pakistani, and Bangladeshis.

In order to understand better the kind of diversity challenges that the country has to deal with it is important to divide these groups into three categories: native minorities, co-ethnic migrants, and 'other' migrants.

With regard to **native minority groups**, the only officially recognised minority in Greece is a religious one: the Muslims of western Thrace (in the north-western border with Turkey), who are protected by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. In line with this treaty the Muslims of western Thrace enjoy a special set of cultural, religious and educational rights including the possibility of being judged under shari'a law, bilingual schools, and bilingualism in public administration. Comprising individuals of Turkish origin, Roma and Slav-speaking Pomaks, prior to World War II, the Muslims of Thrace coexisted largely as a religious community. Since the 1970s, the minority has mobilised to assert a common Turkish identity, thus stirring anxieties among Greek elites and public opinion. Although an initially repressive state policy in the 1970s and 1980s has been replaced since 1991 with a series of measures ensuring

During the last two decades Greece has become the host to more than a million co-ethnic immigrants and foreigners – these groups accounting now for more than 10% of the total resident population.

non-discrimination against minority members by the state and the full respect of their individual rights, the Greek state tenaciously refuses to recognise their existence as an ethnic (Turkish) community and is particularly sensitive to any assertions of collective ethnic rights on the part of the minority.

Apart from the officially recognised minority above, there is a Slav-speaking population of northwestern Greece, widely known along Greece as Slav-Macedonians. These latter had mobilised politically in the 1990s, raising claims of cultural and linguistic recognition. During the last decade however the issue has largely disappeared from public debate. In any case, the Greek state has so far refused to recognise this group officially as a minority and to satisfy any of the claims of the Slav-speaking activists mobilised.

A native minority group that is worth special mention is the Roma population of Greece, i.e. the Roma that are not part of the Muslim minority of Thrace and thus are neither officially recognised nor protected in any specific way. The Roma live scattered throughout mainland Greece and make a living through metal and other garbage recycling, petty trade and farm work. Their physical features and their particular life style (often nomadic and tent-dwelling, under age marriages, patriarchal extended families) set them apart from the majority population. Roma children are not welcome in mainstream schools and, although segregated schooling is ten or twenty years, were not given similar rights and still had to be forbidden, local authorities and parents' associations often try to separate Roma children from their children at schools. Having dwelled in Greece for several centuries, the Roma challenge from within the dominant view that Greeks have of themselves of a Christian Orthodox Greek- ten or twenty years, were not given similar rights and still had to speaking white and modern nation.

In contrast to the native minorities, co-ethnic migrant populations are considered an integral part of the nation and are seen as relatively easy to integrate into the mainstream national culture. **Co-ethnic migrants** include Pontic Greeks and ethnic Greek Albanians who have arrived in Greece mainly in the 1990s as a result of the 1989 debacle of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The former used to live in the Southern Republics of the former USSR (mainly along the Black Sea), while the latter were members of the recognised Greek minority in Southern Albania. Neither group poses any ethnic diversity challenges to the dominant Greek majority, since they are considered as co-ethnic or omogeneis in Greek (meaning of the same genos, i.e. of the same descent). Still, they certainly pose cultural and linguistic challenges even if overall they are well-accepted by and in Greek society mainly thanks to their Greek origin.

'Other' immigrant populations in Greece include Albanians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians and Georgians, who actually form the oldest and largest immigrant groups in Greece, and who challenge Greek society with their cultural or linguistic otherness, but not really religiously, as they are largely Christian (or non practicing Muslims). Romanians and

In contrast to the native minorities, co-ethnic migrant populations are considered an integral part of the nation and are seen as relatively easy to integrate into the mainstream national culture

Bulgarians technically are no longer considered migrants as they have become EU citizens. Some of the more recently arrived groups, notably Pakistani and Bangladeshi citizens, pose a great challenge to Greek society because of their different physical features and Muslim religion, even if numerically these communities are still relatively small.

In the face of a 10% immigrant population Greece is slowly, and to a certain extent reluctantly, adapting its education and citizenship policies. A first step in this direction has been the reform of the citizenship law, which took place only one year ago (in March 2010). This reform has provided for the nearly automatic naturalisation of children born in Greece of foreign parents provided their parents live legally in Greece. It has included provisions also for the naturalisation of children who have arrived in Greece at an early age and have attended a Greek school for six years or more. Last but not least, the law has also facilitated the naturalisation of foreigners who have lived for 7 years or more in Greece. In education there have been efforts to train teachers in intercultural pedagogy and reception classes are provided for non Greek speaking pupils, but overall there is no concerted effort to accommodate cultural and religious diversity in school life. Difference is mainly seen as a 'problem' of foreign children. The ideal outcome is their assimilation into the rest of the school population.

Indeed overall there is as yet no re-consideration of what it means to be Greek in the 21st century. The still dominant definition of national identity does not embrace minority and immigrant groups, who are widely considered to be (and indeed to a certain extent remain) outside Greek society. The recent citizenship law reform is actually seen with suspicion by many majority Greeks who disagree with the opening up of citizenship to people of non Greek descent.

In public and political discourses on minorities and immigrants, the tolerance of cultural diversity is understood in Greece as liberal tolerance, meaning that one refrains from interfering with practices, individuals or groups that one does not approve of. Unlike the on-going discourses in Northern and Western Europe, concepts and norms such as liberalism or pluralism are not used in Greece. Besides, while multiculturalism is gradually being accepted as a fact, multiculturalism is seen as a normative approach that predicates the co-existence of different communities. It is thus understood as a descriptive state of affairs signalling the parallel existence of several ethnic and cultural groups that are not integrated with one another into one whole. By contrast, Greek policy makers and scholars tend to favour intercultural dialogue, meant as the integration of individuals – and certainly not communities – into Greek society. Interculturalism is thus understood as a normative approach that allows for individuals of different cultures to enter into mutually respectful dialogue. In the public debate, the intercultural approach is seen as favourable to societal cohesion. In practice, however, there is little change in education, anti-discrimination or political participation policies towards this direction.

All in all, the main concept and perspective adopted in Greece to deal with cultural, ethnic and religious diversity is that of integration, while notions such as tolerance, acceptance, respect or recognition are more or less absent from

The tolerance of cultural diversity is understood in Greece as liberal tolerance, meaning that one refrains from interfering with practices, individuals or groups that one does not approve of.

the relevant debates. Yet, integration is used rather loosely to refer, more often than not, to **assimilation** and, much more rarely, to a mutual engagement of the different groups to form a cohesive society. Interestingly, the long-existing native minorities of the country are not seen as relevant to this debate as if the two types of diversity – the native and the immigrant – cannot be addressed with the same type of policies.

Table 7.5.1 Immigrant Stock in Greece, on 31 December 2009

	Size of immigrant stock	% of total resident population	Source of data
Legal immigrant population	636,258	5.86%	Stay permits valid at least for 1 day during 2009, Ministry of Interior
Co ethnics from Albania	197,814	1.82%	Data from Ministry of Interior, for 31 December 2009
Estimate of irregular immigrants	280,000	2.58%	Maroukis (2008), CLANDESTINO project ¹²
Total stock of foreigners	1,114,072	10.26%	
Total population of Greece	10,856,041	100%	LFS, 4th trimester 2009
Co-ethnics from the Soviet Union	154,000	1.42%	Secretariat of Greeks abroad, Special Census, 2000
Total stock of immigrants and naturalised co-ethnics	1,268,072	11.68%	

Source: Triandafyllidou and Marouf (2011) SOPEMI report for Greece for year 2010, delivered on 15 February 2011.

¹² The estimate of the illegally staying aliens offered by Maroukis (2008) is the most recent scientific estimate of its kind. For more information see: <http://clandestino.eliamep.gr>.

Table 7.5.2 National Composition of the Migration Stock in Greece, 2009

Country of Origin	LFS 4th Tri. 2009		Third Country Nationals (TCN) Valid Permits, December 2009		EU Citizens Valid Permits, December 2009		All foreigners (EU and non-EU)	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Albania	501,691	59.74%	414,445	70.65%			414,445 ¹³	56.64%
Bulgaria	54,492	6.48%			51,006	37.46%	55,909	7.64%
Georgia	33,870	4.03%	17,655	3.00%			17,655	2.41%
Romania	33,773	4.02%			38,388	28.19%	41,954	5.73%
Pakistan	22,965	2.73%	17,097	2.91%			17,097	2.33%
Russia	19,522	2.32%	13,512	2.30%			13,512	1.84%
Ukraine	13,748	1.63%	21,644	3.68%			21,644	2.95%
Bangladesh	12,533	1.49%	5,910	1.00%			5,910	0.80%
Syria	12,401	1.47%	7,962	1.35%			7,962	1.08%
Armenia	12,339	1.46%	6,277	1.07%			6,277	0.85%
Cyprus	11,773	1.40%			5,972	4.38%	5,972	0.81%
Poland	11,204	1.33%			10,876	7.98%	11,258	1.53%
Egypt	10,289	1.22%	14,732	2.51%			14,732	2.01%
Iraq	7,849	0.93%	1,183	0.20%			1,183	0.16%
India	7,654	0.91%	13,127	2.23%			13,127	1.79%
UK	7,539	0.89%			7,811	5.73%	7,811	1.06%
Germany	7,270	0.86%			5,914	4.34%	5,914	0.80%
Moldova	4,682	0.55%	12,217	2.08%			12,217	1.66%
Netherlands	3,548	0.42%			2,201	1.61%	2,201	0.30%
Philippines	3,302	0.39%	9,668	1.64%			9,668	1.32%
OTHER	47,262	5.62%	31,161	5.31%	13,983	10.27%	45,144	6.17%
TOTAL	839,706	100.00%	586,590	100.00%	136,151	100%	731,592	100%

Source: Triandafyllidou and Maroufof, 2010, SOPEMI report for Greece. Based on data from National Statistical Service of Greece, Labour Force Survey 4th trimester; Ministry of Interior Affairs, Valid Stay Permits on December 31st 2009; Ministry of Citizen Protection. Registered EU citizens on December 31st 2009.

¹³ This number referring to valid stay permits does not include ethnic Greek Albanians holding EDTO cards

Table 7.5.3: Native Minorities in Greece

	1961-1991* *	1999/today	1999/today
Native Minorities		Absolute numbers	% of the total population of Greece
Catholics, Protestants, Jews and new religious movements		150,000	1-1,5
<i>Jews</i>		5,000	
<i>Catholics</i>		50,000	
<i>Protestants</i>		25,000	
<i>Jehovah's Witnesses</i>		70,000	
Muslims of Western Thrace*:		80,000-120,000	0,5
<i>Turkish-speaking</i>		36,000-54,000***	
<i>Pomaks</i>		28,800-43,200***	
<i>Roma</i>		14,400-21,600***	
Roma (all over Greece)		300,000-350,000****	2-3
Arvanites/Arberor		200,000****	2
Macedonians (Slav-speaking Greeks)		10,000-30,000****	2
Vlachs/Aromanians		200,000****	2

Source: Compilation and treatment of data from different sources/estimations by Triandafyllidou and Kokkali for the ACCEPT report on Discourses of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Greece.

7.6 Country Profile: Hungary

Following the dramatic electoral changes in Hungary in 2010 that witnessed the strengthening of the centre- and far right parties and the demise of the left, an important shift in public discourses on tolerance and acceptance has occurred. The 'Nation' now occupies a central role in the governing Fidesz party's vision of legislative and constitutional reform for Hungary. Through its discourse and policies, Fidesz implicitly and explicitly identifies who belongs, and who, by extension, does not belong, to the 'Nation'. Ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary in the neighbouring countries are included in Fidesz's conception of the 'Hungarian Nation' (reflected most prominently in the extension to them of dual citizenship). Hungary's Roma minority, on the other hand, features increasingly prominently (particularly in far-right but also centre-right discourse) as the primary 'Other' against which the 'Nation' is constituted. Whilst the boundaries of national inclusion extended beyond the political borders of the country, boundaries of national difference were constructed within those same political borders. This was an ethnic (or ethnicised) vision of the nation: it included transborder Hungarians but excluded Roma.

These recent developments reflect only the latest chapter in Hungary's political history of national inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, the discourses circulating now enjoy political legitimacy in large part due to their resonance with earlier iterations of Hungarian nationalism. The 'Nation' has figured prominently in Hungarian political and social life over the last century and a half to describe and explain all sorts of social and economic phenomena.

In order to better understand the impact of this most recent resurgence in Hungarian nationalism on discourses and practices of tolerance, we explain how the question of Hungary's internal minorities (and the Roma in particular) has taken a backseat to the question of the transborder Hungarians. The result is that in certain respects the search for solutions to the Roma problem in Hungary is still in its infancy. For years, Hungary's policies toward its minorities were driven, at least in part, by concern for (and a preoccupation with) the transborder Hungarians: Hungary used its domestic policies in an attempt to set an example for neighbouring countries to adopt in their treatment of transborder Hungarians. The policies thus devised for Hungary's minorities and the Roma in particular did not always correspond to the needs or demands of these minorities. Legislative changes in education, the welfare system, and economic structures have often had the effect of further marginalising the Roma. This continued socio-economic marginalisation of the Roma has been further exacerbated by racialised understandings of difference (particularly evident vis-à-vis the Roma) that preclude possibilities for socio-cultural integration and/or accommodation. The major tolerance issues in Hungary today are overwhelmingly related to the situation of the Roma.

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Social scientific research shows that the Roma are the primary target of the most intense prejudice and racism in Hungary.

The History of Toleration and Exclusion in Hungary: The Roma, National Minorities, and Immigrants

Social scientific research shows that the Roma are the primary target of the most intense prejudice and racism in Hungary. The extreme right have recently turned their attention to the Roma not with the aim of ameliorating tensions but rather aggravating them by scapegoating the Roma. This has had the effect of legitimating the continued radicalisation of more mainstream discourses on the Roma. Anti-Roma prejudices can and also should be understood more generally as a 'cultural code' shared to varying degrees in all political discourse and indeed more generally at a societal level as well, regardless of ideological orientation. The Roma thus are understood across the political classes as being connected to, or indeed at the root of, a wide variety of social, political, and economic problems in Hungary.

Immigrants in Hungary, although very small in number, are also typically viewed with a combination of fear and distrust. The largest group of immigrants to Hungary are Hungarians from the neighbouring countries. Despite the fact that in political discourse these Hungarians constitute an important part of the national 'self', in and through the practices of immigration they have been constituted as, somewhat ironically, a national 'other'. Other immigrant groups in contrast have been less visible simply due to their small numbers. But when these groups do appear in the media, they too are often presented as either threatening (e.g. the Chinese mafia) or at the very least exotic.

The report elaborates on these two main types of groups: indigenous groups and immigrants. Indigenous groups include the country's national minorities, Jews and the Roma; immigrant groups include the transborder Hungarian immigrants and other (mostly non-European) immigrants. Individually and collectively these various groups constitute only a small portion of the Hungarian population. About 4% of the population belong to one of the officially recognised 12 national minority groups, though their numbers have been declining in recent years. At the same time the Roma minority has at least doubled over the last forty years to an estimated 400,000-800,000 at present. The national minorities and Roma enjoy official legal recognition. The Jewish population, in contrast, is estimated at around 80,000-200,000, and is not afforded official recognition as a minority group. The proportion of immigrants in Hungary is even lower and one of the lowest in Europe, at about 2% of the population, with about two-thirds of these immigrants being ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries.

The 1993 Minorities Law signalled a 'multicultural turn' in Hungary's relations with its minorities. The Law officially recognised (and institutionally accommodated) cultural and ethnic difference. The cultural autonomy the law afforded to Hungary's minorities, however, was in large part symbolic for most of the national minority groups, given their relatively small numbers and their strong assimilation tendencies. As for

the Roma, the law contributed little to resolving the harsh social, cultural and economic problems they experienced. Jewish activists for their part did not seek official recognition and therefore Jews were not named in the law. Nor did the law address immigrant groups, although another 1993 law, “The Act on Hungarian Citizenship”, decreed restrictive paths to naturalisation (with some benefits for ethnic Hungarians).

The most pressing issues surrounding tolerance in Hungary concern the Roma. Rates of Roma unemployment were above 75% in 2005; their poverty rate is five to ten times higher than that of the majority population, having doubled over the last ten years; and neighbourhood and school segregation further exacerbate their marginalisation. Discrimination against the Roma has been increasing in spheres of employment, healthcare, and law enforcement. Life expectancy for the Roma is seven years below the national average.

Roma political mobilisation and activism has been unable to reverse these trends. Roma minority self-government and political parties were formed after the 1993 law, but without significant power. The ‘Roma issue’ unquestionably remains the most serious diversity challenge facing Hungary today.

Other minorities in Hungary are not viewed as a challenge to the hegemony of the Hungarian nation. They therefore do not present similar problems related to toleration. In contrast, anti-Semitism has been (and continues to be) an essential and formative element of Hungarian national self-understandings, with ‘the Jew’ having fill the role of ‘internal other’ for centuries. “The Jewish question” has always been a crucial question in Hungary and continues to be connected to broader issues of tolerance. About 10% of the population hold radical anti-Semitic views (still well below rates of such views expressed in relation to the Roma).Immigrant groups are also viewed with distrust (despite their low numbers), but again not to the same degree as the Roma.

The Roma minority therefore suffers from the greatest intolerance: 50-80% of the population (including those from both sides of the political spectrum) display negative attitudes towards the Roma. These negative tendencies have been exacerbated in recent years by the rise of the radical right. The exclusion of the Roma is deeply embedded both in institutional and everyday practices. Studies on discrimination against the Roma in the labour market, schools, law enforcement, and state welfare point to the failure of policy at both macro and micro levels. Many experts argue that an ethnicised Roma underclass has taken shape in recent years in Hungary. These experts acknowledge the importance of anti-discrimination and minority rights legislation in dealing with this problem, but at the same time they argue that the problems facing the Roma minority also should be addressed through the policies of social inclusion.

In conclusion, although rarely successful, Hungarian elites have made some significant efforts over the past three decades to adopt minority and human rights frameworks laid out by the European Union and other international organisations. Further changes have been brought about since Hungary’s formal accession to the European Union in 2004, contributing to the

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rise of a policy discourse on toleration/acceptance. These changes have also been accompanied importantly by the new availability of financial resources, part of which have reached the targeted minorities and contributed to the improvement of certain aspects of their lives (e.g., a slight decline in school segregation in some districts, and the improved treatment of immigrants and refugees). But while the EU has undoubtedly produced successes in these and other regards, the accession process has also somewhat paradoxically provided new opportunity structures for nationalists and right-wing radical groups to pursue discourses and policies of intolerance towards ethnic and religious groups. This is what is occurring now with the Roma in Hungary. The Roma will therefore be the main focus of our further research into issues of tolerance and acceptance in Hungary.

Table 7.6.1: National and ethnic minority groups, 1949-2001

Year	German	Slovak	Serb	Croat	Slovene	Romanian	Roma
1949	22 455	25 988	5 185	20 123	4 473	14 713	
1960	50 765	30 690	4 583	33 014		10 502	
1970	35 594	21 176	12 235	14 609	4 205	8 640	325 000
1980	31 231	16 054			20 030	7 139	380 000
1990	30 824	10 459	2 905	13 570	1 930	10 740	142 683
2001	62 233	17 692	3 816	15 620	3 040	7 995	190 046
Sociological estimations	200 000-220 000	100 000 - 110 000	5 000	80 000-90 000	5 000	25 000	400 000-800 000

Source: The national census of 2001. Estimations – as opposed to census data – began in the late 1980s and are done regularly by organisations and researchers. Source: Tilkovszky 1998. As to the data on the Roma population, the most important sources are: Kemény-Janky-Lengyel 2004; Kemény-Janky 2003; Ladányi-Szelényi 2002.

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Table 7.6.2 Immigrants in Hungary (foreign citizens with legal documents)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
EU15	17907	11723	12181	11629	12143	9714	18357	25394	25490
Romania	57343	41561	44977	47281	55676	67529	66183	66951	65836
Slovakia	1717	1576	2213	1536	2472	1225	3597	4276	4944
Ukraine	11016	8947	9835	9853	13096	13933	15337	15866	17289
Yugoslavia	15571	12664	11975	11693	12367	13643	12111	12638	17186
Other Europeans	22230	16726	16459	16238	15161	16217	14950	15702	15400
China	8861	5819	6840	6420	6790	6856	8584	8979	10218
Other Asian	10465	6784	7561	7060	7925	8265	9959	10754	12138
Others	8015	4228	4388	4178	4479	4771	5352	5470	6196
Total	153125	110028	116429	115888	130109	142153	154430	166030	174697

Table 7.6.3 Dimensions of difference of ethnic minority and immigrant groups in Hungary

Dimensions of difference	Citizenship	Racial	Ethnic	Religious	Cultural	Linguistic
Minority groups						
Ethnic Hungarian immigrants from neighbouring countries	X					
Other (mostly non-European) immigrants	X	X	X	X	X	X
National minorities (Germans, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Greek, Armenians, Poles, Bulgarians, Romanians)			X		X	X
Ethnic minority: Roma		X	X		X	X
Religious minority: Jews			X	X		

Note: The number of Jews in Hungary is estimated between 80,000 and 200,000. Jewishness is defined either as “religion” or “origin”.

7.7 Country Profile: Ireland

Historically, national identity in Ireland was significantly formed in contrast to England, and in terms of domination. Ireland was long perceived as a homogeneous country, characterised by a Catholic and Gaelic identity, and for much of the twentieth century this was expressed in constitutional and legislative provisions in the newly independent state. In recent years there has been greater acknowledgment of the presence of other traditions on the island.

The principal indigenous minorities for whom toleration has been an issue are, on the one hand, religious minorities: Protestants and Jews, and on the other hand, a socio-cultural minority: (Irish) Travellers. Toleration was traditionally not necessarily understood as a central value in the Irish context. In the mid-twentieth century the dominant national and religious settlement provided some institutional toleration of religious minorities; other institutional toleration, attitudes and practices of tolerance were until recently more limited; for Travellers there continue to be significant issues, including their recognition as an ethnic group.

A context and driver for the recent development of toleration and of the discourse of toleration in the Republic, and one whose importance it is hardly possible to overestimate, has been the evolution of the peace process between Protestants and Catholics on the island in general, and in Northern Ireland in particular, as well as between Northern Ireland and the Republic, and the Republic and the United Kingdom. A second context and driver has been the area of sexual morality, from the increasing acceptance of unmarried mothers, to the admission of divorce and the tolerance of lesbian and gay sexuality, up to the recognition of civil partnerships in 2011. Both of these spheres otherwise fall outside the remit of this project report, which is to deal specifically with religious and cultural diversity in the Republic of Ireland.

Immigration has led to increasing racial, religious and cultural diversity. In the context of our study, the importance of these developments was the late and rapid rate of immigration and the arrival of a multicultural population at a time when Ireland came to be classified as one of the most globalised countries in the world. As large-scale immigration into Ireland began later than many west European countries - taking place only in the last twenty years - immigrant cultural minorities represent a new phenomenon. In 1996 Ireland reached its migration 'turning point'; a decade later, in 2006, non-Irish nationals represented approximately 10% of the population, of which the largest groups were from the UK, followed by Poland, Lithuania, Nigeria, Latvia, USA and China. The most significant development in religious diversity is represented by the growth of Muslim and Orthodox communities. While these changes have already posed certain issues of integration and accommodation, many of the claims and challenges deriving from cultural diversity have yet to arise.

The pattern of diversity emerging in Ireland is distinctive in a number of ways. Its long history as a country of emigration and recent transformation into a destination of choice for immigrants distinguish it from most EU member states. Ireland has never been a colonial power; its migrants do not

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come from countries it had previously occupied, although some come from regions in which Irish missionaries were active, arguably participating in the western colonisation enterprise. Ireland did not have a guest worker programme in the 1950s and 60s, and therefore did not go through a process of coming to terms with the fact of a permanent migrant population that this entailed. As immigration is still a recent phenomenon in Ireland, the main focus is still on 'newcomers' or 'new communities' rather than second and third generations. The great bulk of migrants comes from within the European Union and includes a significant contingent of returning Irish migrants. The newcomers are predominantly of working age, and tend to be well educated and highly skilled.

Increased immigration coincided with a period of economic prosperity in Ireland.

It is also notable that increased immigration coincided with a period of economic prosperity, so that economic competition between the native population and migrants may have been less evident than under the conditions of recession that later came to prevail, and less liable to arouse fears of the potentially negative impact of the newcomers. These factors may account for the fact that Ireland has not seen the emergence of any real right wing, anti-immigrant party, or indeed any significant political campaign or protest against immigrants as a reaction to its recent large-scale immigration. This is not to discount the evidence for significant underlying levels of racial discrimination and harassment. Recent reports indicate that discrimination in work and other areas is experienced particularly by sub-Saharan Africans, and that immigrant children experience bullying at school.

It is further noteworthy that there has not been a strong emphasis on the 'security' issue connected with migration and diversity, unlike in other countries (UK and France for example), by either political parties or government. Nor has 'Muslim radicalisation' thus far come to the fore in Ireland. The Muslim community in Ireland is quite different in terms of its varied geographic origins and socio-demographic composition from that in other EU countries. This, and the fact that the Irish Government and institutions have sought to establish a dialogue with the Muslim community and have allowed for some accommodation of religious practices might be seen as the two main reasons for the absence of either major claims or problems with regard to Islam in Ireland. Some issues concerning the hijab in schools have arisen, but these have usually been locally accommodated.

Among the new religious minorities, Sikhs have encountered some difficulties and lack of understanding regarding the observance of their religious practices; this made the headlines in 2007 and 2008. On both occasions, the problems concerned the wearing of the turban – both gave rise to considerable debate, and neither was accommodated. But perhaps the most recurrent challenge to principles of toleration and acceptance arise with respect to Ireland's indigenous cultural minority, the Travellers, in connection with their status as an ethnic group, the issue of halting sites and educational provision.

Ireland has had to generate immigration and integration policies

against a background of rapid change, limited experience, and, until recently, a largely monocultural society. There was no official ‘planning process’ regarding immigration and it has been argued that, initially, and for a number of years, Ireland lacked a coherent integration policy.

The language of toleration has not been prominent in discussions of diversity. From a historical context in which the toleration of diversity as permission was seen as suspect, Ireland has evolved to a situation in which ‘mere’ tolerance as permission, or even respect, are seen as inadequate responses to diversity. Rather the official emphasis has been on integration of diverse religious and cultural communities now present in Ireland, framed in terms of ‘interculturalism’, defined in Ireland by the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (2006) as the ‘development of strategy, policy and practices that promote interaction, understanding, respect and integration between different cultures and ethnic groups on the basis that cultural diversity is a strength that can enrich society, without glossing over issues such as racism’ (NCCRI, 2006, p. 29). This emphasis on interculturalism as a strategy for integration and social cohesion again distinguishes Ireland from other EU countries whose focus has been on either assimilation or multiculturalism. Yet the development of institutional and practical toleration, as well as attitudes of toleration, has been mixed.

It may be speculated whether the late arrival of immigrant cultural diversity will or will not allow new approaches to tolerance, and lessons from other countries’ experience to be applied.

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Table 7.7.1 Usually resident population by nationality, 2002 and 2006

Nationality	2002		2006	
	Thousands	%	Thousands	%
Irish	3,585.0	92.8	3,706.7	88.9
UK	103.5	2.7	112.5	2.7
Other EU 25	38.4	1.0	163.2	3.9
Rest of Europe	14.7	0.4	24.4	0.6
Africa	21.0	0.5	35.3	0.8
Asia	21.8	0.6	47.0	1.1
USA	11.4	0.3	12.5	0.3
Other countries	11.2	0.3	22.4	0.5
Multiple nationality	2.3	0.1	2.4	0.1
No nationality	0.8	0.0	1.3	0.0
Not stated	48.4	1.3	44.3	1.1
Total	3,858.5	100.0	4,172.0	100.0

Source: Central Statistics Office (2007a)

Table 7.7.2: Population classified by religion, 2002 and 2006

Population	2002	2006	% 2006	Percentage change 2002 - 2006
	Thousands		%	%
Religion				
Roman Catholic	3,462.6	3,681.4	86.83	6.3
Church of Ireland (incl. 'Protestant')	115.6	125.6	2.96	8.6
Muslim (Islamic)	19.1	32.5	0.77	69.9
Other Christian religion	21.4	29.2	0.69	36.5
Presbyterian	20.6	23.5	0.55	14.4
Orthodox	10.4	20.8	0.49	99.3
Methodist	10.0	12.2	0.29	21.2
Apostolic or Pentecostal	3.1	8.1	0.19	157.5
Buddhist	3.9	6.5	0.15	67.3
Hindu	3.1	6.1	0.14	96.3
Lutheran	3.0	5.2	0.12	72.1
Evangelical	3.8	5.2	0.12	39.6
Jehovah's Witness	4.4	5.1	0.12	16.3
Baptist	2.2	3.3	0.08	47.4
Jewish	1.8	1.9	0.05	7.8
Pantheist	1.1	1.7	0.04	52.9
Agnostic	1.0	1.5	0.04	47.4
Latter Day Saints (Mormon)	0.8	1.2	0.03	48.5
Atheist	0.5	1.0	0.02	85.8
Quaker (Society of Friends)	0.8	0.9	0.02	2.7
Lapsed Roman Catholic	0.6	0.5	0.01	-8.5
Baha'i	0.5	0.5	0.01	2.9
Brethren	0.2	0.3	0.00	64.4
Other stated religions	8.9	8.6	0.21	-3.9
No religion	138.3	186.3	4.40	34.8
Not stated	79.1	70.3	1.66	-11.1
Total	3,917.2	4,239.8	100.00	8.2

Source: Central Statistics Office (2007)

7.8 Country profile: Italy

Italy took several decades to build up a united nation because of the previous political fragmentation. After a long process of unification, today the widely accepted representation is that of a relatively homogeneous ethnic, linguistic and religious population, despite some regional socio-economic diversities, especially between the North and the South of Italy.

Regarding the relations between the State and minority groups, the Constituent Assembly (created when Italy became a democratic republic, in 1946) formulated several principles to establish the equality of citizens and to protect minority rights. Despite the formal recognition of minorities' rights, the Constitution's articles were not applied immediately, and it was only later that some laws and agreements were formulated to implement the Constitution's articles regarding minority rights. We are referring specifically to two types of minorities: linguistic and religious. As regards the third group, i.e. the immigrant groups, when the Constitution was drawn up there was no reference to them. In fact immigration became a central issue in the political debate only in the 1980s.

Native minorities are national and territorially concentrated minorities, which are mainly situated in the border regions and are linguistically different from the majority. The regions where these minorities live obtained a "special statute", which guarantees them greater autonomy and privileged economic treatment. In 1999 the process of recognition was completed by law 482, that recognised and protected 12 historical linguistic minorities in the Italian territory.

The second set of minority groups are religious, also protected by the articles of the Constitution. But the agreements with various religions were signed only after the 1980s revision of the Lateran Treaty between the State and the Catholic Church in 1929 to regularize their relations. Although in the last 20 years many agreements have been signed with various religious groups, the procedures for signing them are very complex and long, and concrete enforcement does not always occur. It could be said that there are two kinds of problems regarding the relations with other religions. Firstly, Italian society has historically been shaped by Catholicism, and so awareness of religious differences has remained low; consequently, non-Catholic religious organisations have difficulty obtaining recognition from institutions and society. Secondly, it is always questionable where the balance lies between the recognition of differences and guaranteeing equality of treatment. These problems emerge particularly with Islam, which is perceived as very different from the Christian tradition. In fact an agreement with Muslims has not been signed yet.

Finally, the third set of minority groups are immigrant ones. As we know, Italy went from being an emigration to an immigration country rapidly, and consequently it was not ready to manage the arrival and settlement of foreign people. If we look at the Italian Constitution, there

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is no reference to immigrants and immigration, in contrast to the references regarding the protection of native minority groups. In Italy immigration was mainly a spontaneous change, unforeseen and largely unregulated: it grew from the bottom of the labour market and in local social contexts; afterwards, it was recognised by public institutions and regulated juridically. The first immigration law was drawn up only in 1986, then came the Martelli law (1990), the Turco-Napolitano law (1998), and finally the Bossi-Fini law (2002) was passed. Apart from the laws, the approach of Italian institutions and society at the beginning was to consider immigration as a “pathological” phenomenon, a social emergency that had to be resolved quickly.

The economic role of immigrants was barely recognised. Afterwards, despite increased awareness of the importance of immigrants for many sectors of the labour market, a pathological representation always prevailed. It was linked to anxiety about public security, employment, access to the welfare state and the cultural identity of the nation. Some political forces have exploited these worries, using them as central themes of their latest electoral campaigns and of the current government’s political agenda.

Despite the impassioned speeches and the use of measures with great media impact such as the security package or refusing boat access, the principal political instrument used to deal with migration was a policy of amnesties: 6 in 22 years, the most recent was in September 2009. Italy has regularised the largest number of foreign immigrants among all the European countries in the last twenty years.

If we look at the challenges that these three minority groups posed, we could distinguish between the first two and the third. As regards the first two groups, they posed linguistic (by native minorities) and cultural (by religious) challenges to the majority, but without destabilising the common representation of Italy as a relatively homogeneous ethnic, linguistic and religious population. These minorities were gradually being integrated into Italian society, including institutional recognition. By contrast, in terms of the immigrant groups, the difficulties in accepting them are linked to their cultural and religious diversity. In contrast with the labour market, where immigrants are accepted and economically integrated – albeit in “subordinate integration” - cultural and religious integration is a theme that is rarely discussed and is never considered carefully. Indeed Italy is experiencing a profound contradiction: while society is becoming more and more multi-ethnic, in terms of immigrant residents, their rates of employment, autonomous jobs and pupils of foreign origin, in its cultural self-representation it tends to reject religious and cultural plurality. Migrants are accepted as silent workers, with a specific and well defined position in the labour market, when they are useful but they do not demand rights or social benefits. By contrast, if they become a visible community and demand public and institutional recognition, the opposition to them increases. The opposition to, and the refusal of, immigrants are justified by public and political discourses on the necessity to defend social order and Italian cultural identity.

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At the core of these issues there are some minority groups that are tolerated less easily than others, for different reasons, but all linked to their diversity, e.g. the Muslims, the Chinese and the Roma. As regards Muslims, their religious diversity is considered difficult to accept, especially when they become visible in urban areas, or when they make requests for the construction of Mosques or Arabic schools, the recognition of festivals or of prayer during work time, or requests to wear particular clothes (i.e. the veil). These requests are seen by Italian institutions and society as ways Muslims use to increase their power and visibility and in extreme cases as situations or places where it is possible to recruit terrorists. The Italian state does not respond to the Muslims' claims in a structured way, but on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with relations between the local institutions and Muslims. In fact the State does not have a clear and defined political approach to address the presence and the claims of Muslims, who undermine the traditional notion of identity and citizenship that are bound to the nation state, and its unity of language, religion, and culture. The way the Italian State addresses the issue of the building of Mosques is an example of its difficulty in managing diversity, and in particular some kinds of religious diversity (such as Muslims).

Secondly, the Chinese are often subjected to prejudice: there are various social representations of them which circulate throughout the mass media and public opinion. The most common representation is that of unfair competitors in the labour market. Their firms are accused of tax dodging and overworking their employees, of exploiting their fellow countrymen and paying them salaries that were below the going rate. The hostility towards them translates into a policy of control and restrictive local ordinances whose aim is to damage their economic activities. There are also other prejudices about them, i.e. they are members of the Mafia, they hide the bodies of the dead in order to recycle their documents and resident permits, etc., but these are all social representations. It is thought that all these beliefs depend on China's growing economic power, their industriousness and ability to compete with Italian firms, the difficulties in communicating with them, the closed nature of Chinese communities. All these factors lead to the construction of negative stereotypes.

Finally, the third immigrant group which is not tolerated are Roma. This group is subjected to intolerance in many European countries, but in Italy the opposition to them has provoked violent reactions in local communities, including the burning of some Roma camps. Concerns are often centred around public security and social order: the Roma's way of life is seen as deviant and their camps are seen as places characterised by urban decay and crime. The solution adopted by some Italian municipalities is to destroy their illegal camps instead of proposing solutions, such as the implementation of housing policies, the construction of regular camps or the improvement of living conditions in the camps. So, even if the evictions of Roma camps are used by municipalities to demonstrate their interest in resolving the problem and in guaranteeing safety for their citizens, they are not a definitive solution: Roma move to other camps and the problem is not resolved.

Immigration is accepted to some extent in the labour market, forms of interaction among immigrants and Italians occur daily, and society becomes more and more diversified. Nevertheless, the issue of cultural and religious pluralism has rarely been considered in political terms.

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In conclusion, immigration is accepted to some extent in the labour market, forms of interaction among immigrants and Italians occur daily, and society becomes more and more diversified. Nevertheless, the issue of cultural and religious pluralism has rarely been discussed and considered in political terms.

The “problem” of linguistic minorities was relegated to just a few areas near some national borders, whereas the issue of historically settled religious minorities (Jews and Protestants, especially Waldesians) was included in the historical dispute about the Catholic Church’s public role in Italy. Finally, the “problem” of immigrant minorities was emphasised by a political climax characterised by the necessity to defend the citizens’ security and national identity. The political party, the Northern League contributed to creating this climax, through a political programme based on hostility towards immigrants, which is manifested in the proposal to limit immigrants’ rights granted through their resident permits and to impose cultural assimilation on legally resident immigrants. The increasing power of the Northern League, in terms of visibility and electoral consensus, contributed to the development of an intolerant attitude towards migrants. So, in Italy the current pattern seems to be characterised by a decrease in tolerance, by non-acceptance of religious and cultural pluralism, in contrast with an increase in the diversity which is transforming Italian society.

Table 7.8.1 Migrant population stock in Italy by country of origin, 2010

Country of origin	Absolute numbers	% of the total resident immigrants	% of Italian population
Romania	887.763	21%	1,47%
Albania	466.684	11,02%	0,77%
Morocco	431.529	10,19%	0,72%
China	188.352	4,45%	0,31%
Ukraine	174.129	4,11%	0,29%
Philippines	123.584	2,92%	0,20%
India	105.863	2,50%	0,18%
Poland	105.608	2,49%	0,18%
Moldova	105.600	2,49%	0,18%
Tunisia	103.678	2,45%	0,17%
Macedonia,ex Rep.Jugos.	92.847	2,19%	0,15%
Peru	87.747	2,07%	0,15%
Ecuador	85.940	2,03%	0,14%
Egypt	82.064	1,94%	0,14%
Sri Lanka	75.343	1,78%	0,12%
Bangladesh	73.965	1,75%	0,12%
Total 16 countries	3.190.696	75,34%	5,29%
TOTAL	4.235.059	100,00%	7,02%
Total Dossier Caritas/Migrantes*	4.919.000	64,86%	8,15%

Source: Dossier statistico Caritas Migrantes/ Istat Data - 1st January 2010

*These data count all the legal immigrants, not only the resident ones.

Table 7.8.2: Population resident in Italy, by religion

	Absolute numbers	% of the total resident immigrants	Absolute numbers	% of Italian population
Christians	2.109.481	49,81%	59.353.790	99,55%
Orthodox	1.221.915	28,85%	57.500	0,10%
Catholic	700.777	16,55%	58.461.290	98,06%
Protestants	137.430	3,25%	409.000	0,69%
Other Christians	49.532	1,17%	426.000	0,71%
Muslims	1.354.901	31,99%	43.000	0,07%
Jews	6.809	0,16%	29.000	0,05%
Hindu	111.871	2,64%	18.000	0,03%
Buddhists	120.062	2,83%	107.000	0,18%
Others	48.535	1,15%	68.500	0,11%
Non-believers/non registered	483.400	11,41%	-	-
TOTAL	4.235.059	4.235.059	59.619.290	59.619.290

Sources: Data regarding migrant resident population come from Dossier statistico Caritas Migrantes/Minister of Interior data (31 December 2009). Data regarding Italians come from Centre of Studies on New Religions (31 December 2008).

Table 7.8.3: Main Minority Groups in Italy and their Dimensions of Difference

Dimensions of difference	Citizenship	Racial	Ethnic	Religious	Cultural	Linguistic
Minority groups						
Muslims	X		X	X	X	
Chinese	X	X	X		X	X
Roma	X		X		X	

7.9 Country profile: Netherlands

Until about a decade ago the Netherlands was usually portrayed as a country playing a leading role in Europe concerning the development of ideas and practices of tolerance. This reputation was based on both its more remote past, when the Netherlands was a safe haven for the religiously persecuted from all over Europe, and its recent past, when the Netherlands pursued multicultural policies to deal with cultural and religious pluralism. This reputation has been shattered in the last decade as the result of significant changes in political discourse. This change in discourse is related to various tumultuous political events, most notably the assassinations of outspoken critics of Islam (Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004) and the rise of populism building on popular discontent with migration (most recently in the form of Geert Wilders). The significant change of discourse is reflected in u-turns in immigration and immigrant integration policies.

Immigration

We can discern three dominant types of immigration after World War II that have caused the Netherlands to become an ethnically diverse society. The first type of immigration stems from former Dutch colonies: the former Netherlands Indies (Indonesia), Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. Post-colonial migration after the independence of the Netherlands Indies in 1948 included a large group of people of mixed Indonesian-Dutch descent. This group of immigrants managed to integrate rapidly into Dutch society because of a number of factors, including their relatively high level of education and familiarity with the Dutch language and culture. Their successful integration is usually contrasted to the painful incorporation of Moluccans into Dutch society. In 1951 around 12,500 inhabitants of the Moluccan Islands, a part of the Indonesian Archipelago, migrated to the Netherlands. Both the Dutch government and the Moluccans, mostly soldiers who had fought in the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and their families, believed their stay in the Netherlands would be temporary. Therefore the Dutch government's policy towards the Moluccans was aimed at isolating them from wider society. It is estimated that in 2000 there were almost 40,000 Moluccans in the Netherlands. Resulting from their initial isolation from wider Dutch society, homogeneous Moluccan neighbourhoods still exist today. The Netherlands' other colonies, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, remained part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands after the Second World War. In the 1970s the Netherlands proposed independence to both former colonies, which Surinam accepted but the Netherlands Antilles rejected. At present about 40 per cent of all Surinamese people live in the Netherlands, a total of 329,279 people in 2010. Only recently, on October 10 2010, have the Netherlands Antilles been dissolved with some islands becoming independent nations within the Kingdom, and the others becoming municipalities of the Netherlands. In 2010 there were 138,420 Antilleans living in the Netherlands.

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The second type of immigration concerns labour immigration whereby we distinguish immigration stemming from labour recruitment programs in the 1960s and 1970s and accompanying family reunification migration, and immigration stemming from the Netherlands opening its labour market to citizens from new EU member states. The so called 'guest workers' from Turkey and Northern Africa did not return to their country of origin, as was anticipated by the Dutch government, but instead became permanent residents. In 2010 there were 383,957 Turks and 349,005 Moroccans in the Netherlands. Turks in the Netherlands form tight-knit communities wherein traditional norms and values are upheld. However the adherence to traditional values forms an impediment for Turkish youths to fully participate in Dutch society and climb the social ladder. The role of teenage Moroccan men often dominates the debate on integration in the Netherlands, more so than Turks and other ethnic minorities. Even though in public perception the situation of Moroccan migrants is worse than that of Turkish migrants, they are nowadays often subsumed under the category of 'Muslims'. By consequence their religious identity is often seen as a major factor hindering their integration into Dutch society. In May 2007 the Netherlands opened its labour market to citizens from new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). By far the most labour immigrants from these CEE countries come from Poland. In 2010 there were 40,083 Poles, 12,340 Bulgarians and 7,118 Romanians in the Netherlands, although their actual numbers will be higher because migrants do not always report their presence to the authorities. It is estimated that in 2008 there were at least 100,000 nationals from CEE countries working on a temporary or permanent basis in the Netherlands. Most of them found work in agriculture and horticulture.

The third type of immigration concerns asylum seekers whose number has risen considerably since the mid-1980s. In the 1990s the Netherlands experienced an influx of asylum seekers from the war-torn former Yugoslavia and from Somalia. In 1994 a record number of 53,000 asylum seekers entered the Netherlands. Governmental policy towards asylum seekers is increasingly directed on the European level

Diversity challenges

Over the last fifteen years cultural diversity challenges in the Netherlands have increasingly become focused on religion. Especially different Orthodox Christian groups and Muslims play a central role in these diversity challenges, as opposed to, for instance, regional and national minorities such as the Frisians and the Limburgers. The latter both live in their respective provinces and have their own distinct languages. Although certain claims concerning the distinct place of Frisians and Limburgers within the national context do exist, they rarely lead to outspoken controversies.

Native religious groups include orthodox Protestants, Catholics and orthodox Jews. The Netherlands has its own 'Bible Belt' of orthodox Reformed Calvinists and pietistic Dutch Calvinists which is formed from the South West province of Zeeland to the North East part of the country. These groups adhere to a strong version of neo-Calvinism and are characterised by conservative teachings, opposition to abortion, euthanasia and work on Sundays and rejection of modern amenities such as television or cinema: a set of values and

Over the last fifteen years cultural diversity challenges in the Netherlands have increasingly become focused on religion.

practices that differs strongly from the dominant secular norm.

There is also an almost continuous debate on Islam. It is estimated that in 2009 there were 907,000 Muslims in the Netherlands, which is about 5.5% of the population. Of all Muslims in the Netherlands 73% are of Turkish or Moroccan decent. Only small minorities of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, 3% and 5%, see themselves as non-religious. Public debate is concentrated around three major issues. The first issue concerns the degree of collective autonomy given to Muslim communities and Islamic organisations. Second there is concern about the dangers of radicalisation of young Muslims, especially after the murder of Van Gogh, and the question as to whether or not certain forms of religiously motivated behaviour should be tolerated or not. Finally, there is the question of whether or not Muslims are sufficiently 'integrated' into Dutch society. Overall the present debate on Muslims in the Netherlands is more focused on defining the boundaries between what behaviour is tolerable and intolerable, than on moving from tolerance to genuine recognition and equality.

There is concern about the dangers of radicalisation of young Muslims.

Values and practices adhered to by native religious groups and Muslims, are usually contrasted to the dominant secular norm from which they deviate. Especially around issues related to gender equality and equality of sexual orientation, many believe that principles such as non-discrimination, that have already been established legally, should also function as shared values across Dutch society. It is reasoned that this means that exceptions to the rule should no longer be accepted. The focus on Muslims and orthodox Christians also results in the fact that other minority groups, both native and non-native, are far less exposed and criticised. For example, there is hardly any debate on the position of the Surinamese in the Netherlands.

Governance of diversity

Dutch institutional arrangements for the governance of diversity have been strongly shaped by the process of state formation and the accompanying institutional design of the relations between organised religions and the state. During the period of pillarisation, from approximately the 1900s until the 1960s, religious and other groupings – Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals – lived 'parallel lives' within their own separate institutions and organisations. Elite agreement and avoidance of sensitive topics in public and political debate ensured societal stability between the different pillars. Allegiance to the nation was based upon group membership to a distinct pillar. The trends of secularisation and individualisation since the 1960s have undermined this model. Yet, pillarisation shaped institutional arrangements for the handling of diversity, notably in the domain of education where confessional and denominational schools became entitled to equal state financing. This institutional legacy is still in place causing the state to recognise, finance and accommodate a plurality of associations and organisations based on religious, philosophical or cultural underpinnings, for example in the domains of education, social services, media and health care.

The earliest immigrant integration policies in the 1980s were designed along these lines. These policies were driven by the twin ideals of equal

opportunities and respect for cultural difference. The process of integration of immigrant newcomers was presented under the slogan 'integration with retention of cultural identity' and was thought to benefit from encouragement of in-group bonding and collective emancipation through participation in ethnic organisations. Emerging ethnic elites enthusiastically endorsed this policy slogan to argue that successful integration did not require cultural assimilation and to justify their attempts to create community based institutions.

Towards the end of the 1990s, public discourse on multiculturalism became more critical. Multiculturalism was criticised for leading to a 'multicultural tragedy'. National and international events like September 11th 2001, the murder of anti-establishment parliamentary candidate Pim Fortuyn, allegedly for his firm stance on multiculturalism, and the slaying of Theo van Gogh, contributed to a more critical public and political stance towards the integration of 'Muslim-ethnic' minorities in Dutch society. In this changed context, the institutional legacy stemming from the period of pillarisation is increasingly seen as an impediment to, rather than as a facilitator of immigrant integration.

Also, the dominant notion of the Netherlands as a progressive 'guiding nation' is used to challenge religious minorities, native and Muslim. In this public view of the nation, the Netherlands is perceived as an exemplary nation for other nations concerning liberal legislation in domains such as gender relations, equality of sexual orientation or medical ethics (euthanasia, abortion). Coupled with this scepticism concerning an institutional design wherein minority groups are encouraged to culturally distinguish themselves, immigrant integration has come to focus on adherence to 'non-negotiable Dutch values'. A policy memorandum of 2003 entitled *Integration Policy New Style* intended to develop more assimilatory immigrant integration policies. The leading concepts became 'citizenship' and 'individual responsibility' and emphasis was put on cultural adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society. The current government too seeks to restrict immigration to the Netherlands and intensify requirements for obtaining Dutch citizenship and integrating into Dutch society.

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Current events

Whereas in some other European countries 'diversity challenges' can be neatly related to distinct minority groups, in the Netherlands it makes more sense to focus on clusters of events around which forms of ethnic, cultural or religious difference are challenged and which bring different groups into the picture. There are three different clusters of events related to (1) the existence of special institutions catering to different ethnic and religious groups; (2) gender equality and equality of sexual orientation; and (3) free speech and its limits.

(1) The changed attitude towards an institutional design wherein the state recognises, finances and accommodates a plurality of associations and organisations based on religious, philosophical or cultural underpinnings, has been alluded to above. A result hereof is the increasing debate on the structure of the Dutch educational system in relation to diversity challenges. There is a discussion on secularism and whether or not the state should finance faith-based schools and there are discussions about the degrees of associational autonomy of faith-based schools, for example with regard to curriculum, the hiring and instruction of teachers and the right to refuse pupils who do not support the school's ideological profile. Especially the will to see immigrant Muslim minorities assimilate into Dutch society has led to questions on the desirability of state funded confessional education. Instead of benefiting integration, Islamic schools are seen as instruments of segregation.

(2) Different incidents have occurred in the last decade wherein religious and immigrant minorities conflicted with dominant societal norms of gender equality and equality of sexual orientation. In these debates the focus is often on distinguishing between what is tolerable and what is intolerable. In 2003 the Clara Wichmann Institute and other advocacy groups for women's rights, filed a court case against the state for subsidising the Political Reformed Party. In the Netherlands all political parties elected to parliament receive state subsidy. According to the Clara Wichmann Institute the Political Reformed Party discriminates against women because its statutes prohibit women from becoming members of the party, a practice which the state should not allow let alone subsidise. In 2010 the Supreme Council (*Hoge Raad*) ruled that the state should take appropriate action to ensure that female members of the Reformed Party can also be elected.

Another major issue concerns principles such as equal treatment and equal respect for people with a different sexual orientation. Intolerant behaviour and violence against homosexuals continues to be a problem in the Netherlands. Reports of violence against homosexuals had risen by a quarter in 2009 when compared to 2008, meaning that such incidents occur on a daily basis. In April 2001 the Netherlands was the first nation to allow same-sex marriage. However, there has been debate on whether or not civil servants can refuse to bind a gay marriage on religious grounds. In May 2001 Moroccan born Imam Khalil El-Moumni condemned homosexuality and labelled it as a contagious disease which threatens Dutch society. In relation to Islam, the political presence of Pim Fortuyn fuelled the debates around gay rights and homophobia. Pim Fortuyn fiercely opposed Islam for its rejection of homosexuality.

(3) Over the past decade 'free speech' has become a key issue in debates on cultural diversity in the Netherlands. Whereas in the 1980s and 1990s the focus was on the need to prohibit discriminatory and racist speech, in recent years the main thrust of discussions is that freedom of speech should not be curtailed, especially not out of the will to protect the 'sensibilities' of religious or immigrant groups. One of the most prominent figures in the debates on free speech is the late Pim Fortuyn who was assassinated in 2002. In that year he had remarked in an interview that Islam is a 'backward culture' and that there is no shame in showing pride and preference for 'our Western culture'. With his motto 'I say what I think and I do what I say', Fortuyn claimed to say what

Over the past decade 'free speech' has become a key issue in debates on cultural diversity in the Netherlands.

many people, including politicians, thought, but did not dare to say. Another illustration is the trial of Geert Wilders. In 2008 Wilders made the anti-Quran movie *Fitna* and he has made numerous other controversial statements on Islam and Muslims. In January 2009 the court of Amsterdam demanded the National Prosecution follow up on charges made against Wilders by several anti-racist organisations. The court is of the opinion that Wilders is prosecutable because of the content of his utterances and his presentation style. Wilders is now prosecuted for articles 137d for inciting hatred and discrimination and 137c for his comparisons of Islam to Nazism. According to Wilders freedom of speech itself is on trial.

Discourses of tolerance

The Dutch public debate on issues of diversity and tolerance demonstrates a simultaneous presence of five distinct traditions. A first tradition of 'toleration of minorities' stems from the period of the Dutch Republic and is based upon the view that for pragmatic reasons minorities should not be actively persecuted. A second tradition of 'principled acceptance' was profoundly influenced by the ideas of the orthodox Protestant leader Abraham Kuyper and the practice of pillarisation. A third tradition is more quintessentially Dutch and is known as justifying or 'condoning' deviant practices whereby moral and even legal norms are transgressed. A fourth tradition revolves around the need for 'multicultural recognition' wherein tolerance is framed as the acceptance of cultural differences as a way of combating racism and ethnocentrism.

Whereas these four traditions are commonly associated with 'Dutch tolerance', they have increasingly come under criticism in public and political discourse. A new discourse has grown in popularity that argues that true tolerance can only be achieved when it is very clear where the boundaries between the tolerable and intolerable lie. Toleration cannot merely mean 'avoidance' of sensitive issues, but it requires engagement, open confrontation and disagreement. In a more positive evaluation this way of thinking about tolerance entails the opportunity of maintaining a free society in which liberal rights and individual opportunities are guaranteed. To some it also means that there should be a willingness to challenge conservative groups, especially if they violate the rights of vulnerable minorities. To others it means the need to maintain a threshold of cultural norms that are recognisably Dutch. The latter argue, for example, that 'Dutch values' should be taught in schools by creating a canon of Dutch history and citizenship education classes. More critical perspectives entail, first, that despite the fact that this is presented as a conceptualisation of tolerance, the main thrust of the discussion is to point out what is *not* to be tolerated and to ban specific practices or limit associational freedoms. Secondly, the process of exposing differences in order to discuss them through a 'healthy confrontation' is usually dominated by gross stereotypes, especially when the focus is on Islam. Some argue therefore that the alarming tone of public outcries about, for instance, ritually prepared food, lawyers who do not stand up in court or imams who refuse to shake hands, hinders rather than facilitates societal cohesion and peace.

A new discourse has grown in popularity that argues that true tolerance can only be achieved when it is very clear where the boundaries between the tolerable and intolerable lie.

Table 7.9.1: Religious Minorities in the Netherlands in % of the population

	1990	2000	2009
None	38	40	44
Roman-Catholic	33	32	28
Dutch Reformed	17	14	9
Orthodox Reformed	8	7	3
Protestant Church Netherlands	n/a	n/a	6
Other religious (including Islam)	5	8	10

Source: Statline - Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS 2010)

Table 7.9.2: Native Regional-Linguistic Minorities in the Netherlands

	2006	2009
Inhabitants of the province Friesland	642,230	644,811
Inhabitants of the province Limburg	1,131,938	1,122,604

Source: Statline - Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS 2010)

Table 7.9.3: Dutch population and main post-war immigration minorities

	1996	2000	2005	2010	
Total	15,493,889	15,863,950	16,305,526	16,574,989	
Autochthonous	12,995,174	13,088,648	13,182,809	13,215,294	
Allochthonous	2,498,715	2,775,302	3,122,717	3,359,603	
Western Allochthonous	1,327,602	1,366,535	1,423,675	1,501,309	
Non-Western Allochthonous	1,171,113	1,408,767	1,699,042	1,858,294	
Main post-war immigration groups	Indonesian	411,622	405,155	396,080	382,411
	Moluccan	n/a	40,000*	n/a	n/a
	Surinamese	280,615	302,514	329,430	342,279
	Antillean and Aruban	86,824	107,197	130,538	138,420
	Turkish	271,514	308,890	358,846	383,957
	Moroccan	225,088	262,221	315,821	349,005
Immigrants from CEE countries	Polish	5,910	5,645	10,968	43,083
	Bulgarian	550	713	1,924	12,340
	Romanian	1,466	1,397	3,020	7,118
	Hungarian	1,133	1,385	2,029	5,294
	Slovakian	205	579	1,239	2,844
	Czech	350	887	1,707	2,602
	Lithuanian	127	338	970	2,126
	Latvian	63	146	361	1,143
Main asylum seekers	Former Soviet Union	13,485	22,625	44,419	55,896
	Former Yugoslavian	56,220	66,947	76,301	70,119
	Somali	20,060	28,780	21,733	27,011
	Sudanese	943	3,919	7,285	6,329
	Iraqi	11,278	33,449	43,708	52,102
	Afghanistani	4,916	21,468	37,021	38,664

Source: CBS Statline 2010,

*estimate, see Smeets and Veenman 2000: 41

Table 7.9.4: Main minority and immigrant groups in the Netherlands and their dimensions of difference

Dimensions of difference	Citizenship	Racial	Ethnic	Religious	Cultural	Linguistic
<i>Native religious</i>						
Catholics				X		
Orthodox Protestants				X		
Jews			X	X		
<i>Native linguistic</i>						
Frisians			X			X
Limburg						X
<i>Immigrant colonial</i>						
Indonesians		X	X	X	X	
Moluccans		X	X	X	X	
Surinamese		X	X	X	X	
Antilleans		X	X	X	X	
<i>Immigrant labour</i>						
Turks	X	X	X	X	X	X
Moroccans	X	X	X	X	X	X

7.10 Country profile: Poland

The Polish understanding of multiculturalism differs significantly from that in other European countries, as it is mainly based on historical memory, referring to the period of the Nobles' democracy and the political practice of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania in 16th-17th century. Actions supporting cultural diversity in society which is recognised as one of the most ethnically homogeneous in the world, are based mainly on the popularisation of folk performances and celebration of the exotic cultural attractions, with virtually no discussion on changes in the ethnic composition of Polish society (arising with the waves of incoming immigrants, especially from the East) and the marginalisation of ethnic/cultural minorities' presence in public space and social awareness. The growing standard of living and Polish membership in the EU makes Poland more attractive for immigrants from the so called Third Countries, which does not affect the real situation of immigrants' functioning within the Polish state, even though there are many efforts made by various authorities towards legislative changes in the spirit of the guidelines imposed on Poland by the European Union.

The country, reborn after partitions and WWI, already professed an ethnic concept of nationalism. WWII strengthened the images of unavoidable ethnic conflict and communist Poland was created as a mono-ethnic society. Intricate post-war history was marked by homogenising attempts accepted by the majority of the dominant population. The democratic changes which took place after 1989 made the country tolerant in the form we call 'constitutional nationalism'. It entails the acceptance of others, provided that the titular nation sets the rules of this coexistence. The acceptance of democratic principles demanded by international institution, means that legally all standards of liberal societies are met, but it does not mean that the practice is acceptable.

Political liberalisation has prompted the 'coming out' of minorities. Before the National Census of 2002, experts estimated the total number of indigenous ethnic minorities in Poland as between 2 and 4% of the total population. The Census showed that only 471,500 (1.23%) of respondents declared an ethnicity other than Polish. The low numbers are interpreted as a heritage of the reluctance of people to show their ethnic identity in the mono-ethnic state and to reinforce a sense of marginality of all matters relating to the functioning of minorities in society shared by the majority of Poles.

According to the definition introduced in the *Act of 2005*, there are nine national minorities recognised in Poland: Belarussians (48,000), Czechs (386), Lithuanians (5,846), Germans (152,897), Armenians (1,082), Russians (6,103), Slovaks (2,001), Ukrainians (30,957) and Jews (1,133). Polish law also acknowledges four ethnic minorities substantiated historically: Roma (12,855), Tatars (495), Lemkos (5,863) and Karaims (43). A special category of 'regional languages' was added and one such linguistic minority is recognised, i.e. Kashubians (5,063). Paradoxically, so far Silesians have not been recognised by the Polish state as an ethnic minority, while being the biggest subjectively chosen identity (173,153 people).

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The estimated number of immigrants in Poland constitutes less than 1% of the total population (app. 380,000 people). The issue of immigrants is a relatively new and complex problem in Poland. From the early 1990s Poland, which was a traditional 'migrant sending' country for several generations, became a destination and transit country. The presence of foreigners, the majority of whom come from the former Soviet Union, constitutes a new challenge, but also a complex dilemma for Polish policy and Poles' attitudes towards migration. Foreigners mostly choose big cities for their place of residence, especially the capital. The percentage of permanent immigrants is still low, and the legal status of immigrant is relatively difficult to achieve. Illegal migrants have problems with their integration in many spheres of life, including the job market, education and health systems.

The two groups that can be described as dramatically different in Polish cultural conditions are the Muslims and the Roma. The second, perceived as stereotypical social outcasts, have been discriminated against for ages, the first have re-appeared in social consciousness under a new guise of an Islamic threat, abstract in the Polish context. These cases vividly illustrate the key features of the discourse on cultural diversity and the practices designed to cope with the diversity that has re-appeared in Poland after fifty years of absence.

Roma are a recognised ethnic minority, which had experienced violent assimilationist activities of the communist state in the post-war period and which remains the most socially marginalised minority group in Poland, despite the attempts aimed at their integration into Polish society, especially when it comes to the education of Romani children and fighting negative images of the group. However, conflicts occurring in local communities inhabited by Roma show the low effectiveness of integration policies, and the attitude (based on perceived cultural strangeness) of Poles towards the Roma constantly remains largely negative.

Another example of a diversity challenge is the Muslim community in Poland. Muslims face discrimination on the grounds of xenophobia, which may be called 'phantom islamophobia'. This phenomenon derives from the same source in which some Polish contemporary anti-Semitic resentments are rooted. In Poland, both Jews and Muslims/Arabs are very few in number, yet they function as 'imagined communities' that threaten national and religious interests or the nation's integrity. Despite a very small population (app. 30,000 people), Muslims serve as an example of a group raising high social fear and concern, endowed with a strong negative stereotype comparable to the prejudices against Roma, arising from assumed unbridgeable differences in religion, basic values and lifestyle, perceived also as insurmountable obstacles in the way of integration. Muslims coming to Poland in the last three decades are contrasted with Tatars – a Muslim community living in Polish territory for centuries – a group considered familiar because of common cultural practices shared with the Polish majority, an exemplary case that illustrates the way in which acceptance can be gained, i.e. based on partial assimilation and modesty in declarations or practices, as well as "refraining from radical otherness" in the public sphere.

In 1989, the new authorities declared the will to break with the

Roma are a recognised ethnic minority, but remain the most socially marginalised minority group in Poland.

communist assimilationist policy and grant every citizen civic rights secured by international conventions. They also wanted to change Polish attitudes towards minorities and to redefine state – minority relations, aiming both at their integration and active participation in public life. In everyday practice, though, state legislation is not always efficiently implemented at the local level, and raises conflicts over the allocation of public funds. Official statements clash with popular images and social awareness of minorities' presence and rights.

The discourse on tolerance in a modern sense of the word is relatively recent in Poland. As such, it is absent in mainstream education, and seen as redundant from the point of view of the majority. One can associate its potential growth of importance for the ordinary people and for policy makers only in relation to the growing immigration and expanding activism of other social minorities, such as sexual minorities or physically challenged people. Cultural/ethnic minority rights in the fields of education and the cultivation of culture do not raise objections. In this respect attitudes are fully tolerant and can probably be connected to the long-lasting 'folklorisation' of diversity, and be partly congruent with multiculturalist ideas. Actual problems appear when state or EU funding for cultural activities come into play and when the issues of bilingualism in regions populated by minorities (e.g. street names), political representation and commemorations of historical events in the public are considered. Poles eagerly accept 'strangeness' and 'otherness', provided that it is practiced in the private sphere or as an exotic custom, i.e. it implies activities that do not interfere with their image of the world and do not jeopardise the idea of a homogenous community and a sense of security based on cultural familiarity.

The level of respect for the rights of minorities is improving; legal standards are increasingly congruent with both the social reality and international instruments for equality and anti-discrimination. Despite these improvements, data on insufficient state action in many areas concerning support granted to culturally distinct groups appear repeatedly, particularly in relation to immigrants. Public opinion polls indicate that the reluctance of Poles towards people of different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds residing in Poland is slowly decreasing, which can be treated as one of the premises indicating that the tolerance of cultural diversity in Poland is growing. This is of great importance in the face of the influx of immigrants, from Asia to Eastern Europe, among others.

The contemporary debate on tolerance in Poland refers constantly to the mythical tolerance of the Nobles' Republic, resulting in little social consciousness of the real problems of minority groups and in a reluctance to revise traditional views. This situation is reinforced by the relatively low numbers of minority and immigrant populations, together with the still overriding importance of the ethnic and cultural component in the common representation of the nation/community. As the number of culturally distinct citizens within Polish society increases, it can be expected that changes in attitudes towards every-day contact with different cultural practices will evolve, thus changes in educational programs and public education campaigns are necessary in order to alter the social disposition towards cultural diversity.

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Table 7.10.1: Main national and ethnic minorities in Poland and immigrant populations

Minority	Number (declared during Census of 2002)	% of the total population	% of the non-Polish population	Status
Silesian	173 153	0,45 %	37 %	Minority not recognised by the state
German	152 897	0,39 %	32 %	National minority
Belarussian	48 737	0,13 %	10 %	National minority
Ukrainian	30 957	0,08 %	6,5 %	National minority
Roma	12 855	0,03 %	2,7 %	Ethnic minority
Russian	6 103	0,016 %	1,3 %	National minority
Lemko	5 863	0,015 %	1,2 %	Ethnic minority
Lithuanian	5 846	0,015 %	1,2 %	National minority
Kashubian	5 062	0,013 %	1 %	Group using regional language, not recognised by the state as a distinct minority
Slovak	2 001	0,005 %	0,4 %	National minority
Vietnamese	1 808	0,004 %	0,3 %	Migrant population
French	1 633	0,004 %	0,3 %	Migrant population
American	1 541	0,004 %	0,3 %	Migrant population
Greek	1 404	0,003 %	0,2 %	Migrant population
Italian	1 367	0,003 %	0,2 %	Migrant population
Jewish	1 133	0,002 %	0,2 %	National minority
Bulgarian	1 112	0,002 %	0,2 %	Migrant population
Armenian	1 082	0,002 %	0,2 %	National minority
Czech	831	0,002 %	0,1 %	National minority
English	800	0,002 %	0,1 %	Migrant population
Hungarian	579	0,001 %	0,1 %	Migrant population
Dutch	540	0,001 %	0,1 %	Migrant population
Canadian	513	0,001 %	0,1 %	Migrant population
Tartar	495	0,001 %	0,1 %	Ethnic minority
Arab	459	0,001 %	0,1 %	Migrant population
Serbian	442	0,001 %	0,09 %	Migrant population
Austrian	346	0,0009 %	0,07 %	Migrant population
Croat	336	0,0008 %	0,07 %	Migrant population
Romanian	328	0,0008 %	0,06 %	Migrant population
Syrian	312	0,0008 %	0,06 %	Migrant population
Macedonian	286	0,0007 %	0,06 %	Migrant population
Karaim	45	0,0001 %	0,009 %	Ethnic minority

Source: GUS 2002

Table 7.10.2: Minority groups and Diversity Dimensions in Poland

Dimensions of difference	Racial	Ethnic	Religious	Cultural	Linguistic
ETHNIC MINORITIES					
Roma		X		X	X
Lemko		X	X		X
Tartar		X	X		
Karaim		X	X		
NATIVE MINORITIES					
German		X			X
Belarussian		X	X		X
Ukrainian		X	X		X
Russian		X	X		X
Lithuanian		X			X
Slovak		X			X
Jewish		X	X		X
Armenian		X			X
Czech		X	X		X
Other					
Silesians					X
Kashubians					X
IMMIGRANTS					
Vietnamese	X	X	X	X	X
Greek		X	X	X	
Arab	X	X	X	X	X
Macedonian		X	X	X	

7.11 Country Profile: Romania

Romanian national identity has three defining characteristics.

Romania is not Western. The mid-19th century political discourse of Romanian elites, which rejected the idea of transplanting Western forms of development onto profoundly Oriental societies such as those in the Romanian kingdoms, marked the Romanian national discourse for the next 150 years. In fact, the idea of “modernisation as rape” resurfaced in the interwar and post – 1990 national discourses. Moreover, the Oriental was exceptionally defined by the religious legacy of the Byzantine Empire that made Christian Orthodoxy deeply embedded in the idea of “being Romanian”. This is deemed to create a series of challenges to the creation of a plural post-communist Romanian society, especially in relation to the state’s separation from church in the past 20 years.

Romania is European. Like in all countries in Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin wall was seen as Romania’s long awaited opportunity to return to Europe. The alleged mismatch between the expectations that new EU member states had from Europe and those that the EU had from them, which caused nationalist backlashes in some of the Central European countries, was felt only in very small circles of the Romanian elites. In fact, the promise of the European Union influenced public discourse to such extent that no anti-European political discourse would find its place in the national public debate.

Orthodoxy as the foundation of Romanian identity, deeply embedded in the nationalist thought, was associated to a great extent with the fight against communism, being thus prone to resurface again and again after 1989, when indeed a sort of religious revival took over Romanian intellectual life. The communist regime was tolerant, and to some extent even supportive of the Orthodox Church, but the fundamentalist Orthodox tradition was censored due both to its doctrine of the prevalence of spiritual over material life, and its historical association with the Iron Guard. After 1989 intellectuals rediscovered Orthodox fundamentalism.

According to the latest Romanian Census (2002), 86.7% of the Romanian population defines itself as Orthodox. This percentage is followed at a great distance by other Christian confessions, among which Catholic (4.7%) and Reformed (3.2%). The Romanian Orthodox Church has currently under its supervision a total number of 15,218 churches, which makes for an average of one church per 1,500 inhabitants who declared themselves orthodox. The issue of separation between State and Church has reached the Romanian public agenda on various occasions in the past decade. One of the latest debates concerns Church financing. Since financing religious activities out of public money is equivalent to sponsoring the Romanian Orthodox Church, more and more voices are calling not only for financial self-sustainability for Churches, but also for taxations of their activity.

The main challenges to cultural diversity relevant for the current situation in Romania concern historical minorities. The Hungarian and the Roma minorities stand out, representing significant proportions of the Romanian population, and having brought their issues to the public agenda in the past 20 years in comparison to other minority groups.

The main challenges to cultural diversity relevant for the current situation in Romania concern historical minorities. The Hungarian and the Roma minorities stand out.

The Hungarian minority. Beyond any doubt, the Hungarian minority, currently representing 6.6% of Romanian nationals (Census 2002), was the main target of post-communist nationalism. The report analyses the power struggles within the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) – the main party representing this minority – and the way that they were reflected in the public position adopted by the Alliance on certain government policies. Nationalist outbursts on both sides – Romanian and Hungarian - are reviewed. The report finds that three main categories of nationalists can be encountered in both groups – professional nationalists, crusaders and conformists. The DAHR itself did not express a single common position on whether the Hungarian minority should be treated as an ethnic or a national one. Two views stood out on this matter: the first promoted the rights of the Hungarian minority as an ethnic one (the moderates' view), while the second, promoted by the radical wing of Hungarian nationalists, advocated that the Hungarians in Romania should be treated as a national minority, the rights and liberties of which would be regulated by a Personal Autonomy Statute. Even though the conflict between Romanians and Hungarians was not a violent one, the controversy created by nationalist views within the two ethnic groups lead us to believe that, at least through the '90s, Transylvania was the scene of an ethnic conflict. However, a previous study suggests that, while 75% of the Hungarian population thought the conflict was real, only 45% of Romanians would have supported the statement. The report gives two possible reasons for this discrepancy. By looking at the way that the demand for rights worked in the case of the Hungarian minority, the report stresses the importance that consociational governance, with the participation of the members of DAHR in virtually all governments after 1996, had in keeping the inter-ethnic conflict non-violent.

The old news of poor access to services of the Roma living in segregated communities is finally coming out in Romania, creating a chain of reactions from Western European governments.

The Roma. Having escaped the wave of nationalistic backlashes that most of the other new EU member states had experienced in 2005/2006, with a nationalistic party that did not make it to the Parliament in 2008, Romania found its new national enemy in the Roma as the shame inflicting non-Romanian ethnic group that jeopardizes the legitimacy of its newly gained European status. In fact, increased freedom of movement seems to have placed Romanian authorities in the uncomfortable position of not being able to 'sweep the dirt under the carpet' anymore. The old news of poor access to services of the Roma living in segregated communities is finally coming out, creating a chain of reactions from Western European governments. The report discusses the challenges imposed by the tendency to build the current Romanian national discourse on the "Romanians are not Roma" statement, which seems to be the prevalent position among Romanian public officials. The analysis discusses three main views of this discourse: (1) the rejection of Roma cultural heritage, (2) the attempt to deny the self-identification of the Roma as Roma (as opposed to Gypsy) as a form of aggression against this minority group, and (3) the non-exclusive character of Roma issues, which released the government from responsibility to take targeted actions in order to solve them.

The tolerance discourse concerning minorities in Romania has a

pronounced political dimension. This **political dimension**, which is best illustrated by the fight of the Hungarian minority to gain collective rights, is debated with regard to access to education in the minority language and the right to representation. Even though some advance in granting representation rights had been made through the Public Administration Law, the debates on education exposed the deep cleavage in the battle over using the maternal language in school. Romanians were not prepared to accept Hungarian as a second official language. This possible source of tension lost momentum for almost 10 years, until an initiative to allow students in Hungarian to choose whether they wanted to study Romanian in school or not, reached the current debate agenda. The arguments around which the discourse was constructed tend to indicate that tensions still exist, betraying thus (in)tolerance of self determination rights.

(In)tolerance towards the non-orthodox, was reflected in the works of interwar intellectual elites and revived in the post-1989 period. The debate whether Western modernisation is a model of development that fits Romania, transgressed on the debate revolving around European Union membership. In the light of regional integration, the discourse of tolerance now seems now to be overshadowed by the rights of Romanian migrants in Western Europe, while diversity at home still seems difficult to accept.

During the 1990s the National Minorities' Bill spurred intense debates each time it reached the government's agenda. **Policy wise**, a lot has changed in the past 10 years alone, even though it is still not enough to put in question the need for an official minority statute. Romania is the only country in Eastern Europe to give the constitutional right to organised and recognised ethnic minorities (currently 18 besides Roma and Hungarian). They each occupy one seat in the lower chamber of the Parliament, regardless of the voter turnout.

Despite considerable developments, institutionally, the protection of ethnical minorities tends to remain rather obscure. The National Council for Combating Discrimination (CNCD), setup in 2000, is in charge of overseeing regulation on discrimination against minorities, including ethnic ones. In charge of promoting ethnic diversity is another state institution which only few people have heard of – the Department for Interethnic Relations of the Romanian Government. Its main task is to coordinate the Council for National Minorities, which brings together representatives of all ethnic minority groups in Romania. In recognition to the challenges posed by the large size of the Roma community in Romania, the Government setup in 2004 the National Roma Agency (ANR). The Agency's mandate is stated to be that of "representation of the Roma minority in Romania".

The **economics of tolerance** strongly influences the public discourse as well. Three main issues need to be taken into account here: (1) the discriminatory policy of property restitution, (2) local self-government and unequal distribution of resources across geographical areas with clear cut and compact ethnic majorities and (3) the special case of the ethnically Roma Romanian.

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In conclusion, while the public discourse cannot be so easily changed, policy efforts should lead in addressing the issues of the Hungarian and Roma minorities, as well as state separation from the Church. Racist remarks by Romanian public officials are not acceptable, and nor is their lack of accountability for taking public positions as such. The search for grand explanations for Romanian exceptionalism, rather than for ways to comparatively analyze it and deconstruct it, must end. Moreover, this is an effort that needs to be made from the top down, in order to avoid the gloomy bottom-up option.

Table 7.11.1: Main Ethnic Minorities in Romania, 2002

	Number	Percentage of total
<i>Population total</i>	<i>21698181</i>	<i>100</i>
Romanian	19409400	89,5
Hungarian	1434377	6,6
Roma	535250	2,5
Germans	60088	0,3
Ukrainians	61091	0,3
Russian	36397	0,2
Turkish	32596	0,2
Tatar	24137	0,1
Serbian	22518	0,1
Slovak	17199	0,1
Bulgarians	8092	<0,1
Croats	6786	<0,1
Greek	6513	<0,1
Jewish	5870	<0,1
Czech	3938	<0,1
Polish	3671	<0,1
Italian	3331	<0,1
Chinese	2249	<0,1
Armenian	1780	<0,1
Macedonian	731	<0,1
Albanian	520	<0,1
Slovenian	175	<0,1
Other	15537	<0,1
Undeclared	5935	<0,1

Source: Romanian National Census, 2002.

7.12 Country profile: Spain

Spain is often characterised as one of Europe's countries of new immigration and one of the countries representing the so-called Mediterranean model. Although there is no consensus on the exact meaning of this label, Spain shares a number of trends with other Southern European countries such as Italy, Greece and Portugal. First, all these countries have changed from being regions of emigration to receiving significant migration flows and having a percentage of immigrants in relation to their total population comparable to those of Northern European countries. Second, in most Southern European countries huge foreign labour demands in the last twenty years have been combined with rather restrictive or non-working admission policies, which led to a model of irregular migration with frequent regularisation programmes.

Despite all these similarities, there are also significant differences. The first relevant difference is in terms of national identity. As we will see, the multi-national character of the Spanish state influences how national identity is conceptualised and how immigration is perceived and accommodated. Another relevant difference concerns the discourses on immigration. In general terms, public perceptions of immigration are much more positive in Spain than in Italy or Greece. This has been accompanied by a policy discourse that enhances cultural difference and presents integration as a bi-directional process rather than as a unidirectional path towards assimilation into the dominant culture.

This report focuses on three main issues. First, we examine the main factors that have determined the development of the predominant conception of Spanish identity and its impact on the accommodation of diversity. Second, we outline the main immigrant minority groups and briefly identify the main diversity challenges. Finally, we consider how tolerance has been thematised in the Spanish case. We aim to understand which diversity-related conflicts have been understood in terms of 'tolerance' and which ones as issues of equality, respect, recognition or accommodation.

National identity and state formation

Language (Spanish) and religion (Catholicism) have often been presented as the main pillars of Spanish identity or *Spanishness*. This discourse of identity has created a strong narrative of similarity and difference: similarity in terms of those who speak Spanish and profess Catholicism, originally meaning Castilians and subsequently Latin Americans and Spaniards in general; and difference regarding those who either do not speak Spanish or profess other religions.

Despite this discourse on Spanish identity or *Spanishness*, Spain has to a great extent remained a multinational country composed of at least three major historical minority nations with their own languages: Galician, Basque and Catalan. It is in this context that immigration has often been perceived as a challenge to linguistic and cultural diversity.

Spain is a multinational country composed of at least three major historical minority nations with their own languages: Galician, Basque and Catalan. It is in this context that immigration has often been perceived as a challenge to linguistic and cultural diversity.

The conceptualisation of immigration as a threat to minority nations started at the beginning of the twentieth century, when regions such as Catalonia or the Basque Country witnessed significant flows of immigration from elsewhere in Spain. Though Spaniards, these migrants were perceived as foreigners in linguistic and cultural terms. As a consequence, their arrival generated a major social, political and ideological debate on its impact on national identity and the difficulties arising from their integration. Indeed, a similar debate emerged in the 1990s and 2000s, when on this occasion, the arrival of international migrants was seen as a challenge to linguistic and cultural diversity.

These debates on immigration have also acted as a battlefield for the continuous redefinition of the contours of national identities. As analysed by Gil Araújo (2009: 234-240), the immigration of the 1950s and 1960s led to a redefinition of the meaning of 'being Catalan' as 'living and working in Catalonia' or 'wanting to be Catalan'. With the end of the Franco dictatorship and the democratisation process, language became the main marker of Catalan identity. This is clearly illustrated by the Catalan Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2005-2008) and the National Pact on Immigration (2009): while citizenship rights are linked to local residence (registration on the municipal census or *el padrón*), integration is now more than ever associated with speaking Catalan.

Diversity challenges

There were 4,744,169 foreign residents in Spain in June 2010, accounting for more than 10 per cent of the Spanish population. Most foreign residents come from other EU countries (39%), Iberoamerica (29.9%), Africa (20%), Asia (6%), non-EU European countries (3%) and North America (0.4%). The largest national immigrant groups are Romanians, Moroccans, Ecuadorians, Colombians, British, Italians, Bulgarians, Chinese, Peruvians and Portuguese (Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2010).

Particular conflicts have arisen around particular groups. For instance, in February 2000, there was a three-day campaign of violence against Moroccan immigrants in El Ejido (a market-gardening town in south-eastern Spain); in September 2004, around 500 people demonstrated in Elche (a town near Valencia) to protest against the presence of Chinese businessmen in the area; or in April 2010 the right-wing party Partido Popular (PP) in Badalona (a town near Barcelona) published a pamphlet against Romanians and referred to Romanian Gypsies as a 'plague', associating them with 'insecurity', 'dirt' and 'criminality'. These conflicts, however, should be understood in socio-economic terms rather than as culturally driven. If we focus exclusively on diversity challenges, then the focus should be on categories (religion and language) rather than on groups.

With regard to religion, we identify three types of challenges. First, we should refer to conflicts around mosques, oratories and cemeteries. These include the opposition by both citizens and government to the building of mosques and/or opening of religious centres or oratories, the discussion on the access of women to mosques and oratories or on the foreign funding of mosques; and the criticism of radical imams leading mosques. Second, there have also been conflicts around religious education, for instance over the

There have also been conflicts around religious education, for instance over the right of religious education in both public and private schools, or the recently introduced course on 'Education for Citizenship and Human Rights'.

predominance of Catholic education in schools, the right of religious education in both public and private schools, or the recently introduced course on 'Education for Citizenship and Human Rights'. Third, conflicts have also arisen around the dress code, in particular regarding the use of headscarves in schools and burqas and niqabs in public spaces.

With regard to language, conflicts have taken place mainly in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where the presence of Latin American immigrants reinforces the weight of Castilian Spanish and is therefore often perceived as a threat to the situation of minority languages. In this context, debates have arisen around two main questions: which language should have preference in schools and which should be the basic public language in administration, media and for the reception of immigrants.

Definitions of tolerance

After having described the key features of Spanish national identity and having mapped the main conflicts based around diversity in Spain, it remains to be seen under what terms these tensions have been perceived. This will allow us to understand which diversity-related conflicts have been understood in terms of 'tolerance' and which ones as issues of equality, respect, recognition or accommodation.

A review of parliamentary discussions and electoral programmes from the main political parties (the Partido Socialista Obrero Español and the Partido Popular) since the 1980s shows that the term tolerance is seldom used by Spanish politicians and, when referred to, it is exclusively in terms of value, habit/attitude/disposition or virtue. A look at integration plans at both national and regional level leads to the same conclusion: the term tolerance is used only as a synonym of respect for difference. We can therefore conclude that the term tolerance is rarely used and when it is, it refers to liberal respect, meaning the need for democratic citizens to respect each other as legal and political equals, according to a logic of emancipation rather than toleration.

Despite this reluctance to use the word tolerance in senses other than that of respect and recognition, there seems to be a general consensus that basic values such as human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy and equality should be respected. In practice, even when not formulated in this way, these values define the limits of what can and cannot be tolerated. In this respect, it can be said that the *notion* of 'tolerance' does exist but that the *concept* does not. In other words, while the meanings and practices of tolerance are known and used, there is no term to cover them. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss in which context, regarding what, and by whom, the limits of what is tolerable and what is not have been imposed.

Regarding *the context*, it is possible to say that the 'tolerance' boundary is commonly referred to when cultural diversity is perceived as being contradictory to human rights, freedom and individual autonomy/dignity. Regarding the *what*, we can conclude that the 'tolerance' boundary has mainly been drawn with regard to Islam. Once again, on the basis of articles published in *El País*, most debates on the opposition between cultural diversity on the one hand, and human rights and freedom on the other have been based around issues such as headscarves in schools, burqas in public spaces and, more generally, male/female relations. In these debates, there is a tendency to

There seems to be a general consensus that basic values such as human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy and equality should be respected.

Regarding the *who*, i.e. who has the power to tolerate or otherwise, most cases involve either local administrations or practitioners, including social workers and educators.

indulge in generalisations, i.e. discussions do not focus only on particular practices by particular people but tend to attribute particular practices to the whole group (Muslims) and religion (Islam). This leads us to conclude that, when looking at media debates, there is a common (and dangerous) shift from targeting particular practices to targeting groups and ‘cultures’ as a whole.

Finally, regarding the *who*, i.e. who has the power to tolerate or otherwise, most cases involve either local administrations or practitioners, including social workers and educators. This leads us to two main conclusions. First, local authorities and practitioners (within the state apparatus or otherwise) seem to be the main actors playing the role of ‘tolerators’. In this regard, although further research is needed, our hypothesis is that toleration is exercised particularly among the actors most deeply involved in the formulation and implementation of integration policies. Second, we can also conclude that, when looking at conflicts based around diversity and analysing the limits of what is considered as tolerable or not, we should take into account not only the central government but also a wider range of actors, including other administrative levels such as regional and local governments; other institutions, agencies and practitioners within the state apparatus; and other relevant actors, such as politicians, NGOs and private institutions.

Table 7.12.1: Largest national immigrant groups (absolute numbers and percentages) (6/2010)

Country of origin	Absolute numbers	Percentage
Romania	793,205	16.72
Morocco	758,900	16
Ecuador	382,129	8.06
Colombia	264,075	5.57
United Kingdom	225,391	4.75
Italy	163,763	3.45
Bulgaria	154,353	3.25
China	152,853	3.22
Peru	138,478	3.12
Portugal	129,756	2.92
Bolivia	116,178	2.45
Germany	113,570	2.39
France	89,410	1.89
Argentina	89,201	1.88
Dominican Republic	85,831	1.81
Other countries	1,086,050	22.90

Source: Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 2/2010

7.13 Country profile: Sweden

The Swedish state was formed rather early, in the 11th century, but remained a rather loosely organised formation until the 16th century, when the state was consolidated. During the wars of the 17th century, a highly centralised state was developed, showing a relatively early example of a rigorously organised state power. Since then, centralisation has been one of the defining features in the execution of official power, increasingly shaping the relation between the state and the citizens. Later on, this specific tradition of centralisation has also shaped the ways in which multicultural policies have been articulated and – above all - executed in Sweden.

In Sweden, the ideological heritage from romantic, idealistic nationalism, which flourished during the 19th century, has – as in most other European countries – shaped the prevalent different conceptions of national identity. Still, some local particularities may also be noted. From the establishment of the centralised Swedish state and until the 19th century a “nationalism” with a sharp focus upon religion dominated the public discourse, a nationalism which allowed for a rather generous form of cultural diversity as long as the people expressed their belonging to the Lutheran church. Later on, the discourse on national identity was under strong influence from racist and “scientific” (i.e. predominantly medical) discourses. Thus, during the end of 19th and until the middle of the 20th century, a racial and Social Darwinist form of nationalism dominated public discourse and state policies.

During the decades following the end of the Second World War, a Swedish national identity was developed, which was articulated in tandem with the ideological underpinnings of the Scandinavian welfare state model – and the relative success this model had shown in comparison with several other European countries. Swedes developed an understanding of themselves as a progressive and modern group of citizens. According to their political inclination, people emphasised either economic and technological improvement or engineering skills as the key features of Swedish society and/or the success of the welfare state and the progressive, democratic and humanistic values that accompanied that political project. Following certain demographic changes (above all, increased immigration), the decline of the Scandinavian model of the welfare state, and the relative success of neoliberal political models, the discursive prerequisites for the articulation of a national identity have changed. It could be said that present-day constituents of Swedish identity are, on the one hand, shaped in line with the above-mentioned propensity to regard *Swedishness* as progressive, modern and democratic, and, on the other, directly worked out in relation to - and dissociation from - the migrant population and non-European ethnic groups.

The modern era of immigration to Sweden can be divided roughly into four stages, each stage representing different types of immigrants and immigration: 1) refugees from neighbouring countries, 2) labour immigration from Finland and southern Europe, 3) family reunification and refugees from developing countries, and 4) asylum seekers from south-eastern and Eastern Europe, and the Middle east, and the free movement of EU citizens within the European Union. With the reception of migration, it is evident that Sweden’s

Swedes developed an understanding of themselves as a progressive and modern group of citizens.

demographic structure has changed, and over 10% of the population was born outside Sweden or has parents born outside Sweden. Still, with the exception of Finns, most migrant groups have been relatively small in number throughout history.

The diversity of national minorities and the indigenous population the Saamis has been recognised through Sweden's decision to ratify the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Still, this special recognition of national minorities constitutes a break with earlier political traditions. Sweden's official multicultural policy earlier had a more integrated or uniform stance towards national minorities and immigrant communities. Since the middle of the 1970s has Sweden officially adopted multiculturalism as a guiding policy with respect to immigrants and national minorities (even though the official rhetoric of multiculturalism has been downgraded in recent years). The needs and the interests of national minorities were more recognised in the light of the political attention directed towards immigrants. The basis for the policy was summarised through the concept "equality, freedom of choice, and cooperation". In the Swedish Instrument of Government it is also emphasised that various groups defined through language, ethnicity and religion should be supported in order to maintain their cultural heritage and identities. Following recently conducted research; we claim that four minority groups in Sweden face particular opposition in their claims for tolerance and/or respect: Saami, Roma, Muslims and Sub-Saharan Africans.

A far-reaching program of tolerance and recognition was never fully implemented in Sweden in spite of the widespread rhetoric of diversity and multiculturalism

The multicultural policy that was officially adopted in 1975 was characterised by an endeavour to provide recognition of minority rights, but it could be defined as an extrapolation of the Swedish welfare model; the goals of equality was enlarged with the goal of "freedom of choice", by assuring the members of ethnic and linguistic minorities a genuine choice between retaining and developing their cultural identity and assuming a Swedish cultural identity. Still, the policy was influenced also by a liberal, individualistic political philosophy, with its focus on individuals and individual rights and scepticism towards group-orientated rights, such as collective self-determination, land-rights and cultural autonomy. Less than a decade after its implementation, an official discourse was articulated which stressed the limits of multiculturalism. The multicultural policy was circumscribed by a perceived need to clarify what was inherently Swedish culture, and a need to clarify which norms and values are obligatory and unconditional in Swedish society - and mandatory for migrants to conform to. Thus, we argue that a far-reaching program of tolerance and recognition was never fully implemented in Sweden in spite of the widespread rhetoric of diversity and multiculturalism.

A distinctive shift in Swedish multiculturalism policy took place in the mid-1990s. The issue of inclusion of migrants in society was by and large transformed into a matter of inclusion of migrants in the labour market, and integration policy consisted mainly of measures promoting employability - although the legal rights of the minorities were left unchanged. From the vantage point of labour market conditions, the new policy lays emphasis on the responsibilities and rights of the individual -

not his or her affiliations. From now on, the political rhetoric in Sweden's integration and minority politics focused more on the "same rights and responsibilities" and the "same possibilities". Hence, the ideal of recognition was downgraded and the emphasis was placed upon notions such as identical formal rights and responsibilities and non-discrimination, especially in the labour market.

Lastly, it must be noted that a significant gulf between theory and practice haunts the political philosophy of multiculturalism, in Sweden as well as elsewhere. Partly in opposition to the relativist and pluralist core of the rhetoric of multiculturalism and diversity, practitioners of the welfare state repeatedly express a plea for conformity to perceived Swedish norms and standards. In official bodies we find an attitude of non-tolerance vis-à-vis those norms and customs of minority groups that are perceived to be not in tune with the basic norms of the majority culture.

It must be noted that a significant gulf between theory and practice haunts the political philosophy of multiculturalism, in Sweden as well as elsewhere.

Table 1: Main Minority Groups in Sweden and their Dimensions of Difference

Dimensions of difference	Number (thousands)	Citizenship	Racialised	Religious	Linguistic	Perceived "cultural distance"
National minorities						
Swedish Finns (born in Sweden) (born in Finland)	675 (500) (175)	X			(X)	1-2
Meänkieli *	40-70	X			(X)	-
Roma **	30-65	X	X			5-6
Jews **	25	X	(X)	X		4
Saami **	17	X	X		X	-
Immigrant minorities (country of origin)						
Iraq	118	X	X	X	X	5-6
former Yugoslavia	71	X	(X)		X	4-5*)
Poland	68	X			X	3-4
Iran	60	X	X	X	X	5-6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	56	X	X	X	X	4-5
Germany	48	X			X	2-3
Denmark	46	X				-
Norway	44	X				1-2
Turkey	41	X	X	(X)	X	5
Somalia	32	X	X	X	X	5-6
Thailand	29	X	X	X	X	4-5
Chile	28	X	X		X	4-5
Lebanon	24	X	X	X	X	-
China	21	X	X	X	X	5-6
United Kingdom	20	X			(X)	2-3
Syria	20	X	X	(X)	X	-
Other forms of categories						
Muslims ***	100-250	X	X	X	X	-
Sub-Saharan Africans	80	X	X	X	X	-

Sources: SCB (Statistiska centralbyrån), except where indicated: * Sveriges Radio, ** Nationalencyklopedin, *** Stenberg (2002). Perceived "cultural distance" is a measure utilised by Mella & Palm (2009:46). *) The number comes from the categories "croatians" and "serbs".

7.14 Country Profile: Turkey

The term ‘**minority**’ is a very polemical concept in Turkey, and has a negative connotation in popular imagery, as it is often recalled as the main source of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The popular assumption of Turkish nationalist myth-making is that it is the non-Muslim minorities collaborating with the colonial European powers who contributed to the death of the Ottoman Empire through the syndrome of ‘the enemy within’. The report deploys the term not only in its legal definition but also its sociological/anthropological connotations.

The definition of **tolerance** is confined to the acceptance of Sunni Muslims and their secular counterparts under the banner of the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish nation. However, it does not mean embracing all different kinds of ethno-cultural and religious minorities. **Toleration** in the Ottoman context as well as in other imperial contexts refers to the “absence of persecution of people but not their acceptance into society as full and welcomed members of community”. This report argues that **toleration** is actually nothing but a form of governmentality, designed to maintain peace and order in multi-ethnic and multi-denominational contexts. The Ottoman imperial experience and Turkish national experience confirm that the Turkish nation tolerates those non-Muslims, non-Sunni-Muslims and non-Turks as long as they do not disturb or go against the Sunni-Islam-Turkish order. When ethno-cultural and religious minorities did transgress, their recognition could easily turn into suppression and persecution.

The concept of **tolerance** has a very long history in the Turkish context, tracing back to the Ottoman Empire. It also has a very common usage in everyday life. Turks are usually proud to refer to the Millet System of the Ottoman Empire, which is often portrayed in popular imagery as the guarantor of **tolerance**, respecting the boundaries between religious communities. Such an official discourse is still vibrant in contemporary Turkey. However, this report tries to argue that tolerance is nothing but a myth in Turkey. The myth of **tolerance** has functioned to conceal the mistreatment of ethno-cultural and religious minorities other than the majority of Sunni-Muslim-Turks in Turkey. Those remaining outside the boundaries of the holy trinity of Sunni-Muslim-Turks are bound to be subject to the patronizing and tolerant gaze of the majority nation.

It may be argued that there is no problem of (in-)tolerance in Turkey as long as those non-Sunni, non-Muslim, and/or non-Turkish minorities accept being second-class citizens. The celebration of the Armenian millet in the Ottoman Empire as the “millet-i sadika” (loyal nation) is actually a confirmation of the fact that loyalty to the Empire paves the way for to toleration the non-Muslim minorities. On the other hand, those non-Turks (Kurds, Circassians, Laz etc.) and non-Sunnis (Alevi), who claim to be the constitutive elements of the modern nation in Turkey, are not in search of tolerance from the majority nation. The Turkish nation-building process, based on the collective acts of various constitutive elements (mainly Muslims) vis-a-vis Christians (mainly Greeks and Armenians) and their European allies in the course of the Independence War in the early 1920s, became more exclusionary in the course of time, and it excluded Kurds,

The concept of tolerance has a very long history in the Turkish context, tracing back to the Ottoman Empire.

Ethnification of the nation since the early 1930s is a common practice in Turkey, alienating the non-Turkish and non-Sunni groups of Muslim background, who are engaged in the discourse of 'constitutive element of the nation' and who do not want to be considered 'second class citizens'.

Circassians, Alevis, Arabs, Laz and several other Muslim origin minorities in a way that ethnicised the nation. Ethnification of the nation since the early 1930s is a common practice in Turkey, alienating the non-Turkish and non-Sunni groups of Muslim background, who are engaged in the discourse of 'constitutive element of the nation' and who do not want to be considered 'second class citizens'. This is still an unresolved issue.

Table 7.14.1: The Main Minority Groups in Turkey and their Dimensions of Difference

Dimensions Of Difference	Indigenous people of Anatolia	Ethnically Different from Turks	Religiously Different from Sunni Muslims	Linguistically Different from Turkish
Non-Muslim Minorities				
Armenians	√	√	√ (Gregorian Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant)	√
Jewish		√ (the Sefarad Jews)	√	√ (Ladino)
Greek	√	√	√ (Greek Orthodox)	√
Assyrians	√	√	√ (Syriac Christians)	√
Protestants	diverse	diverse	√	diverse
Muslim Minorities and Immigrants				
Arabs				
Sunni Arabs	√	√		√
Alevi Arabs (the same minority as Arabic speaking Alevis)	√	√	√	√
Alevis				
Azerbaijani speaking	√		√ (similar to Shia)	√(Azerbaijani dialect of Turkish)
Arabic speaking (the same minority as Alevi Arabs)	√	√	√ (the Alevi belief of the Syrian Nusayri community)	√ (Arabic)
Turkmen Alevis (Turkish speaking)	√		√	
Zazas (Zaza and Kurdish speaking)	√	√	√	√ (Zaza or Kurdish)
Kurds				
Zaza Kurds (the same minority as Zaza Alevis)	√	√	√ (Alevi)	√ (Zaza and Kurdish speaking)
Kurds speaking Kurmanci	√	√		√ (Kurmanci dialect of Kurdish)
Balkan Immigrants				
Bosnians		√ (Slavic)		Bosniac-Turkish
Pomaks		√ (Slavic)		Bulgarian-Turkish
Torbes		√ (Slavic)		Turkish
Albanians		√ (Slavic)		Albanian-Turkish
Roma community		√	Diverse	Roma-Turkish
Caucasian Immigrants				
Circassians		√		Adigey, Abkaz
Georgians		√		Georgian
Laz	√	√		Laz

7.15 Country Profile: United Kingdom

Comprising England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom's multi-national composition has meant that national identity and cultural diversity have been matters of considerable historical concern. With devolution for Scotland and Wales, a process has been set in motion to accommodate claims to political and cultural self-determination among the British constituent nations. Another significant set of 'diversity challenges' can be traced to the beginnings of labour migration, notably after the Second World War from the Caribbean and South Asia. More recently, the arrival of immigrants from Eastern Europe has been perceived as both challenging and economically advantageous.

The long-term settlement of groups of immigrant and their descendants marks a salient area of diversity challenges. Public debates have emerged. The discussion of what types of difference can be accommodated, and how, occurs both nationally, in response to contested issues and events, and locally, where schools, councils and non-governmental actors seek to respond to the ethnic, cultural and religious mix in the British population. Regarding the national debate, cultural diversity is frequently considered to be problematic in relation to cultural identity, social order and integration. Locally, claims for non-discrimination in housing, education and public life as well as for respectful treatment, in relation to ethno-cultural and, in particular, religious claims have been put forward. Yet at both levels, some accommodation has taken place within an evolving and strengthened framework of legally enforced anti-discrimination.

The multicultural reality of contemporary Britain has been increasingly taken for granted and the presence of post-immigration groups considered a welcome addition to British life. The concern is with making Britain a place that acknowledges and celebrates diversity in its population and that reconsiders its 'national story' to take account of its multicultural reality. Non-discrimination, equality, respect and recognition in relation to various dimensions of difference have been turned, albeit slowly and not unequivocally, into political commitments. Recent years saw such commitments coincide with new attempts to conceptualize an idea of *Britishness* that identifies a set of shared values while acknowledging the diverse make-up of the British population. In line with such concerns and driven by palpable anxieties with issues of social disintegration, recent public policies have been designed to provide for a sense of 'community cohesion'.

Against this broad background of practices, political commitments and beliefs, this report examines the historical and contemporary dynamic of debates on cultural diversity as causing problems but also as a fact that is both irrevocable and positive. It surveys the development of claims and grievances, responses from majority society and the mobilisation and political activism of post-immigration groups with particular emphasis on the South Asian and Black Caribbean experience. The report outlines the historical formation of British minorities as well as contemporary

The multicultural reality of contemporary Britain has been increasingly taken for granted and the presence of post-immigration groups considered a welcome addition to British life.

challenges. What is considered to be a 'challenge' does not remain constant and thus this report is particularly interested in how the presence of post-immigration groups in British society has been considered problematic. For this purpose it retraces public debates on cultural difference, contested events, such as the 'Brixton riots' of 1981, and contestations, such as the mobilisation of British Muslims around the publication of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* in 1988/9. It reviews the scholarly literature on British race relations and gives a historical overview of the development of public policy measures. It then identifies, drawing on this historical background picture and on contemporary patterns, practices, ideas and institutional arrangements of accommodation, tolerance and respect that respond to the various diversity challenges that this report identifies.

The formation of British post-immigration groups, their particular experiences and the development of public policies responding to their presence, can be considered in three broad steps.

- 1) The decades after the arrival of immigrants in the 1950s and 60s was marked by the recognition of pervasive structures of discrimination and attitudes of racism. 'Race Relations' legislation, starting in the mid-1960s, expanded the concern with equality and non-discrimination. The recognition of wide-spread disadvantage suffered by minorities, however, occurred slowly and incrementally. Particularly salient issues in this process were the way in which minority populations experienced discrimination in housing and employment and how communities were subjected to discriminatory practices by the police. Stop and search (so called 'sus') laws and procedures meant that in particular black communities were disproportionately targeted and often universally suspected. While the rhetoric of equality and fairness was easily adopted, deep-seated structures of inequality, such as the institutional practices underpinning 'sus', were more reluctantly addressed.

The mobilisation against 'sus' in the 1980s is marked by various outbreaks of urban unrest. The murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence, and the inadequate police response to the crime, further brought the experience of continued discrimination to the attention of a wider public. Racism, in coded and institutionally entrenched forms, continued to prevent public authorities from delivering an equal service to the members of post-immigration communities. The legislative response to the findings of the inquiry into the murder of Lawrence, the Macpherson report of 1999, was welcomed not least as it engaged with the deeper structures of British racism that had previously been left undisturbed.

- 2) While the history of British race relations up to the late 1980s was characterised by the idea of 'political blackness', a shared sense of identity based on colour among the various post-immigration groups, events in the 1980s put this notion into question. The demand for a kind of equality and public consideration that would take notice of significant differences among post-immigration groups was not only put forward but also recognised in various flashpoint events. One such flashpoint was the public contestation over Salman Rushdie's book *The Satanic*

“Race Relations” legislation, starting in the mid-1960s, expanded the concern with equality and non-discrimination. The recognition of wide-spread disadvantage suffered by minorities, however, occurred slowly and incrementally.

Verses, when the political claims of (some) British Muslims for respect and recognition on the grounds of their religious beliefs were first acknowledged and debated. On the Muslim side it generated an impassioned activism and mobilisation on a scale greater than any previous national campaign against racism. Many 'lapsed' or 'passive' Muslims, for whom hitherto their Muslim background was not particularly important, (re)discovered a new community solidarity and public identity. Political blackness—seen up to then as the key formation in the politics of post-immigration ethnicity—was seen as irrelevant to an issue which many Muslims insisted was fundamental to defining the kind of 'respect' appropriate to a peaceful multicultural society, that is to say, to the political constitution of 'difference' in Britain. To some extent this division has since become a defining feature of the politics of British multiculturalism.

- 3) More recent times continue to be characterised by the remnants of this new constellation. The events of 9/11 and the suicide attacks of 2005 on London transport have made the presence of British Muslims, and the claims for respect that began to be voiced in the 1980s, appear increasingly problematic. While significant measures have been designed to counter the 'radicalisation' among this group, the purview of measures designed to further equality and respect has equally been increased, though not unambiguously and not without resistance. We note in particular different trajectories charted in the legal system between those characterised as racial minorities and those conceived in religious terms. This is something that has potentially left Muslims vulnerable because, while discrimination against, for example, yarmulke-wearing Jews and turban-wearing Sikhs was deemed to be unlawful racial discrimination, Muslims, unlike these other faith communities, are not deemed to be a racial or ethnic grouping. Equality in terms of the accommodation of religious beliefs and protection against discrimination on grounds of religion is an area where minority grievances – after long debates and in a process of tough lobbying – have been heard and codified such as, most recently, in the Equality Act 2010.

One of the fields in which the “problematic” presence of post-immigration groups has been thematised, is the issue of ‘racial mixing’.

As one of the fields in which the 'problematic' presence of post-immigration groups has been thematised, the report considers the issue of 'racial mixing'. Historically, mixing had been captured with the biologist notion of miscegenation and had been a hotspot for the racist imagination. In stark contrast, it has become common for policy-makers to celebrate the cultural diversity represented by the fact of inter-ethnic partnering and the presence of 'mixed race' children. Positive reference to Britain as a 'mongrel nation' mirrors the way in which some of the negative characterisations of the past have been embraced in everyday rhetoric. This does not mean, as we illustrate in the report, that the position of 'mixed heritage' people in Britain has become unproblematic.

Following the decline of 'political blackness' since the 1980s, there are broadly two ways of considering the presence of British post-immigration groups, their claims and politics: multicultural and multiculturalism. The former emphasizes processes of cultural mixing

and hybridisation. The latter considers in particular claims for recognition and respect, such as for the accommodation of religion in the public sphere. Multiculturalism, as concerned with the place and claims of ethno-religious groups, and multicultural, accounting for life, social practices and cultural production in urban diasporas, fit loosely and imperfectly to the experiences of South Asian and Black Caribbean post-immigration groups. Multiculture envisages the re-modelling of majority society's standards of acceptance in a way that inscribes aspects of minority identity into majority culture. Multiculturalism is concerned with the reappraisal of difference as a positive fact instead of an unwelcome aberration. Its concern is with equal respect and with the need for Britain to adapt its regimes of citizenship, policies and laws to recognize cultural pluralism. Its concern is with making Britain hospitable to the practices and claims of ethno-religious groups. Multiculture, by contrast, is concerned with fashioning a form of equality that affords minority groups a place in the cultural representations of the nation. One achievement that has been captured with this paradigm of cultural diversity is the abolition of the stigma that was historically directed at 'mixed race' individuals not merely for their imagined inferiority or 'problematic' identities but for how they constituted a challenge to classificatory regimes of national belonging.

As was the case with the relative waning of colour racism, historical analysis suggests that prejudice, even when it is deeply entrenched, is not beyond change. Such change may be driven by the liberalisation of new generations' attitudes. It may also be prompted by new visibilities of cultural or religious groups and an appreciation of their place in the broader cultural, social and political context of the nation, its narratives and representations. While some of the examples highlighted in this report offer considerable hope, the contemporary situation is aggravated by the amalgamation of global anxieties with local concerns. National debates continue to be at risk of being taken hostage by the 'clash of civilisation' thesis and security concerns continue to be unhelpfully combined with questions of cultural pluralism.

Summarising the way contemporary diversity challenges are perceived socially and dealt with politically, we can suggest that contravening tendencies are at play and that progress in one domain may well coincide with regressive trends in another. Moreover, achievements, such as in response to the Macpherson Inquiry, are not irreversible. An increasingly entrenched animosity against Islam mobilizes not only fringe groups but animates significant numbers within majority society. As illustrated by the changing discourses on 'racial mixing', the perception of 'challenges' has not remained constant. Where, historically, racism on grounds of colour has characterised and to some extent continues to characterise the British minority experience, new forms of discrimination draw negatively on culture and religion. The political responses that are required for making Britain a tolerant and accommodating society, this report suggests, need to take account of a moving picture. Recent responses, such as the Equality Act of 2010, go some way towards addressing new situations of discrimination. Public perceptions of Islam, however, will remain a concern and will continue to be an obstacle in the way towards the fair and decent treatment of British Muslims.

The political responses that are required for making Britain a tolerant and accommodating society need to take account of a moving picture.

Table 7.15.1: British population by ethnicity

Ethnicity	Number	Born Overseas	% of total population	% of all ethnic minorities
Total Population	58.789.194	4.900.000	100	
White	54.153.898		92.4	
Irish	691.000		1.0	
All ethnic minorities	4.635.296		7.9	
<i>Mixed</i>	677.117		1.15	11.0
<i>All black</i>	1.148.738		1.95	
Black Caribbean	565.876	238.000	1.0	13.6
Black African	485.277	322.000	0.9	12.9
Black Other	97.585		0.1	1.5
<i>All Asian</i>	2.331.423		3.97	
Indian	1.053.411	570.000	1.7	21.7
Pakistani	747.285	336.000	1.3	16.7
Bangladeshi	283.063	152.000	0.5	6.1
Chinese	247.403	176.000	0.42	4.2
<i>Other Asian</i>	247.664		0.4	4.7
<i>Other Ethnic</i>	230.615		0.39	7.4

Source: Census 2001

Table 7.15.2: Main Minority and Immigrant Groups in Britain and their Dimensions of Difference

Dimensions of difference	Citizenship	Racial	Ethnic	Religious	Cultural	Linguistic
Native minorities						
Welsh						X
Scots						
Irish						
Immigrants						
Bangladeshis		X	X	X	X	X
Indians		X	X	X	X	X
Pakistanis		X	X	X	X	X
Black Caribbeans		X	X		X	
Africans	X	X	X	X	X	
'A8' Countries	X				X	X
Roma	X	X	X	X	X	X

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