WP6 Discourse Analysis of Politics

Cyprus Report

1. Introduction / Socio-Political Background

1.1. Migration

Migration to Cyprus is a relatively recent phenomenon, spanning back only as far back as the early 1990s, when a policy decision to grant temporary work permits to immigrants was made, marking a change of the immigration regime of restrictive policies followed until then and allowing more migrant workers into the country in order to meet labour shortages. This change of policy meant that Cyprus was almost overnight transformed, from a country that traditionally exported migrants to all corners of the earth, to a net recipient of migrants from all over the globe. At the time, the assumption underlying the policy change was that the stay of migrant workers was to be short-term, temporary and restricted to specific sectors and specific employers. However, the developments which followed changed this scenario.

The policy assumption of the early 1990s about the short-term and sector-specific nature of immigration produced a number of institutional devices, designed to meet the characteristics which the policy makers had envisaged. The most important of these are the following:
(a) Work permits are granted on the condition that migrant workers be attached to specific employer without the freedom to change jobs unless the original employer gives consent. Evidence of non-compliance by employers is abundant, whilst few initiatives have taken place to unionise migrant workers.
 (b) Work permits are granted on an annual basis and with a maximum ceiling of up to five years. This latter regulation is intended to exclude the possibility of granting citizenship to migrant workers, structurally producing and reproducing a framework of precariousness and exclusion. The new EU regulation concerning long-term migrants, which is due to be transposed into Cyprus law in early 2006, has resulted in various adjustments in the immigration policy and practice. A recent increase in the number of deportations of migrants, as well as the heavy-handedness with which the police handled some of these cases, received particular attention and criticism in the Cyprus Ombudsman's Annual Report for 2004 and were interpreted by critics as an effort on the part of the Cyprus police to "cleanse" the island from as many immigrants as possible before the new EU directive comes into force.

By the end of the 1990s, the 'temporary' immigrant workers had already transformed whole sectors of the economy into viable and growing ones and ha ve introduced a new ethnic dimension to the island. It is currently estimated that there are over 100,000 non-Cypriot residents in Cyprus, most of whom are migrants workers from 'third countries'. The transformation was accelerated by the opening up of the sealed cease-fire line in April 2003, which had until then divided the island between north and south. This has resulted in an estimated 7.000 – 10.000 Turkish-Cypriot workers crossing over from the north in order to work in the south where manual jobs are more readily available and the pay is better. In turn, this has led to increased insecurity on the part of migrant workers, who feel that they will no longer be able to secure jobs as easily as before, because most positions are gradually being taken up by Turkish-Cypriots who, being Cypriot nationals, must be given priority by the employers.

The process of accession to the EU has allegedly made Cyprus an attractive destination for migrants and asylum-seekers and the response of policy-makers was to keenly transform

themselves to 'border-guards of Europe'.[1] Cyprus is a prime instance of a southern European country which "functions as the 'entrance hall' to the EU, and often serves as a 'waiting room' for many migrants who have the Northern European countries as a destination" (Anthias and Lazaridis 1999: 3).[2] New migration has the conditions for the 'racialisation of migrant workers'[3] and the patterns of discrimination and ill treatment, particularly of migrants are well documented.[4]

As accession to the EU was approaching from the late 1990s to the actual accession day on Mayday 2005, the Cypriot 'debates' over immigration and the arguments for 'tighter control' appeared to become increasingly 'Europeanised'.[5] Debated issues appear to assume a more European twist and there are direct European 'imports' in the everyday political debates, particularly as regards racism, minority rights, anti-discrimination, immigration control, trafficking etc.

In order to gain a better insight into the issues to be addressed and the politics involved, Cyprus must be viewed within the southern European context, in the periphery of the EU, rather than within the EU itself.[6] The apparent deficit in the 'social modernisation', the failure to critically engage in rethinking of the social structure of Cypriot society[7] must be understood in this light. Migration policy is no peripheral matter; the need to modernise immigration policies and practices is acknowledged by the Cypriot authorities since 2000.[8] However, Cyprus seemed to have imported what one major thinker called the '*European apartheid*',[9] as *Europeanisation* appeared to be one-sided and lacks a proper *social dimension* so as to incorporate and develop those elements of European traditions that enhance tolerance, understanding and human solidarity.

1.2. Political Developments (mainstream parties, RRPs)

Cyprus is a tiny island, ethnically divided for several decades. Since independence from Britain in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus has had a troubled history. The two main communities of the island, the Greek-Cypriots (78%) and the Turkish-Cypriots (18%) have collided over governance and 'course' of the newly established republic: the Greek-Cypriot nationalist aspiration was to achieve union with Greece (*Enosis*) and the Turkish-Cypriot was to achieve partition (*Taksim*). Hence, in 1963-64 inter-communal strife followed a constitutional crisis and the bi-communal consociational young Republic was paralysed.[10]

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[1] During his address to the EU summit in Thessalonica, the President of Cyprus referred to the experience of Cyprus in dealing with migrants and asylum-seekers and offered to share 'expertise' with the European Community.

[2] Anthias, F. and Lazarides, G (eds), *Into the Margins: Exclusion and Migration in Southern Europe*, Ashgate Press, Avebury.

[3] Trimikliniotis, N. (1999) 'New Migration and Racism in Cyprus: The Racialisation of Migrant Workers', in: Anthias, F. and Lazarides, G (eds), *Into the Margins: Exclusion and Migration in Southern Europe*, Ashgate Press, Avebury.

[4] For instance, see ECRI (2001) *Second Report on Cyprus*, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 03.06.2001.

[5] See Trimikliniotis, 2001a

[6] See Trimikliniotis, 2001a

[7] Attalides (1994) located the distinct absence of critical thought in Cypriot society.

[8] ECRI (2001) *Second Report on Cyprus*, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 03.06.2001.

[9] Balibar, E. (2004).

[10] For a critical presentation of the conflict see Kyriakides 1968; Kershaw 1982; Hitchens 2000. For an examination of the conflict utilizing archival material see Sonyel 1997; Markides Weston 2001 and Droussiotis 2005.

Since 1964 and until today, the Greek-Cypriots control the Cypriot state, following the withdrawal from the government of all Turkish-Cypriots, in protest over the unilateral attempt by Greek-Cypriot President Makarios to amend the constitution in a manner that would adversely affect their rights as a community. Repeated efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem have so far failed. The latest of these failures was the UN initiative of 2003-4 which endeavoured to achieve a comprehensive solution on the eve of Cyprus' accession to the EU. The result of this effort was the 'Annan Plan' which was put to two simultaneous referenda in April 2004 and which was overwhelmingly accepted by the Turkish-Cypriots, but rejected by the Greek-Cypriots, also overwhelmingly. The resulting situation is a state of limbo, where several unregulated constitutional and social issues such as the right to property located on the "other" side, the right of Turkish Cypriots to vote and to be elected in the south, isolated instances of racial violence against Turkish Cypriots in the south, a pattern of discrimination against Turkish-Cypriots in the workplace, threaten to transform themselves into sources of further tension between the two communities.

The southern part of the island experienced a rapid economic growth in the decades that followed the 1974 war. By the 1980s the economy was orientated towards Europe, taking advantage of the cheap labour provided by the Greek-Cypriot displaced persons who were forced to flee the north during the 1974 events. Other regional and international factors also played a role in the 'miraculous recovery' of the Cyprus economy, such as the island's role as a bridge between the Middle East, northern Africa and Europe.[11] After Greece' European accession in 1980, Cyprus began to increasingly turn towards the then EEC and subsequently EU, as a means of resolving its political problem.[12]

Given the specific historico-political context of Cyprus and the protracted 'ethnic conflict' or 'national problem' that keeps this micro-state divided, coupled with the fact that immigration is a very recent phenomenon stretching only fifteen years back, the political divide over the policies towards migrants and immigration does not correspond to other European contexts. Whilst it can be safely assumed that forces on the traditional political Right generally tend to be more xenophobic, racist and anti-immigrant than those of the centre or left, on closer examination this general observation is not necessarily accurate in all cases.

The particularity of the Cyprus context must also be borne in mind when examining the terms on which the political parties are classified, which are also diverse from other European countries. Being a small society divided by ethnic conflict and war, there are historical and structural reasons that have so far prevented the emergence of a political party based on anti-immigration. However, one may safely conclude that there is an emergence of *a new politics of anti-immigration*, primarily media-driven and stirred up by a handful of populist politicians and some right–wing trade unionists. Whether this would form the nucleus for a different political formation is yet to be seen; at this point it seems unlikely. The party systems in both sectors of the divided society, the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot, are still primarily organised around the Cyprus problem and local issues. Immigration is an issue at the level of discourse, but political parties do not have clearly defined policies that may point in a definitively way to a political cleavage. A new family of radical (or extreme) right-wing populist (RRP) parties based on anti-immigration has not yet made its appearance; there are no typical 'far right', xenophobic populist or 'neo-Nazi' parties focusing on anti-immigrant populism. Anti-immigrant rhetoric and racist discourse is articulated primarily by individual populist politicians.

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[11] Wilson, 1993.
[12] Trimikliniotis, 2001a and 2001b

There are far right parties in the south which are anti-Turkish and far right parties in the north which are anti-Greek At least in the south, there are hidden or indirect references to racist politics in the discourse of the smaller far right parties through a deep suspicion of anything that is Turkish, usually hidden in and intertwined with anti-occupation discourses and discourses relating to the rights of Greek-Cypriots displaced persons. Manifestations of this phenomenon may be found primarily, but not exclusively, in the discourse of right-wing and nationalist politicians.

Trade unions have indirect but close links with political parties: PEO is linked to AKEL; DEOK to EDEK; SEK to DESY and DEKO. Particularly in the years immediately following the change of policy in 1990, there was a 'defensive' and xenophobic response by many trade unionists. Trade unions gave their consent to the change of policy allowing migrant workers under certain conditions but they resented the regular violation of the agreed terms by employers.[13] The attitudes of the trade unions have changed over time and hard-line positions were softened, as they started recruiting members amongst the migrants themselves.[14] However, there seem to emerge two opposite trends/attitudes within the trade union movement as to the treatment of migrant workers and the gap between them seems to be increasingly widening over time: (a) those who see 'foreign' workers as a 'threat' to Cypriot workers, adopting the typical 'job stealing', 'causing unemployment' and 'welfare abusing' frames and a 'threat to national cohesion', such as the right-wing SEK and to a large extent the social-democratic DEOK[15] and (b) those who stress the need to integrate and involve the migrant workers within the trade unions such as Left-wing PEO, which has set up a 'Migrant Workers Bureau' elected from the first ever and only one so far trade union-organised 'Conference of Migrant Workers'.[16] It has to be noted that both the above contrasting views are on several occasions aired in all unions but a close examination of their discourse in their position papers and statements shows a clearly predominant opinion or dominant frame in each trade union.

The farmers' associations, whose members rely on cheap migrant labour, have repeatedly protested demanding exemption from their legal obligation to pay social security for their migrant staff on the ground that these employees are seasonal and they amounts of money paid by the employers towards their social insurance do not go to the employees anyway, as there are no bilateral government agreements between Cyprus and their countries. During the summer of 2004 a collective agreement was signed that is apparently discriminatory on the ground of race.[17] There is certainly a constituency amongst the Cyprus public that is anti-immigrant. When examining the party manifestos and the ideological programs of political parties there is no observable combination of xenophobic ethno-nationalism (based on the so-called ethno-pluralist doctrine) and anti-political establishment populism, although there is an emphasis on other socio-cultural issues, such as more 'law-and-order' and a call to strengthen 'traditional family norms'. Thus we cannot locate any political party that has *explicitly* based its vision on xenophobic anti-immigrant and racist discourse so as to fit the minimalist

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[13] see Trimikliniotis, 1999.
[14] Cyprus Labour Institute INEK-PEO (2004), Etisia Ekthesi gia tin Oikonomia kai tin Apascholisi 2003 (Annual Report for the Economy and Employment), Nicosia; Trimikliniotis, N. and Pantelides P, (2003) "Mapping Discriminatory Landscapes in the labour market", *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 15, spring 2033, N. 1.
[15] See the statement of DEOK in 2004 on the rise of unemployment.
[16] See PEO website http://www.peo.org.cy/greek ; and Trimikliniotis et. al (2005).
[17] There is a complaint pending before the Ombudsman, which is the national Equality Body with a mandate to examine complaints of racism and discrimination.

definition of a 'RRP party'. The conventional 'core characteristics' (ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-establishment populism) are not explicitly present in Cypriot political parties as their defining characteristics. 'Ethno-nationalism' is certainly in abundance across the political spectrum, with a significant degree of variation. However, ethno-nationalism takes a particular form, shaped by the Cyprus political history; *anti-establishment* populism is not apparent but populist politics is the norm. Xenophobia does not feature in *official* party documents, nonetheless it is in abundance in the media and it is regularly used by individual politicians, whose discourses many not necessarily reflect the party line or dominant discourse on the subject. When interviewing the various political actors, blatant racist and xenophobic discourses feature very strongly (see table 1c). The political leaders interviewed claim that their views are within the party line, even if the way they are articulated appears somewhat different in tone and volume.

The complexity and the unevenness of the phenomenon connected with the difficulty in defining the 'extreme Right' becomes even more acute when trying to fit in the Cyprus example. Disparate ideas and 'concerns' are all blended in the ideologies and discourses with various issues taking the lead depending on context, time and expediency. There is nevertheless some common thread somewhere: they seem to share 'concern', which in practice verges on obsession, on issues such as "immigration, national security, unemployment, culture, anti-communism, globalization, Europe, corruption, moral questions and identity".[18] Most of these elements are strongly present in the public discourses over migrants in Cyprus, but there is no party that has taken these elements to turn them into central discourses of their political programs.

There are *intra-party* differences of such a scale on the subject of immigration that one is able to observe *within the same political party* variations, from staunchly pro-immigrant rights and positively inclined to the immigrant contribution to economy, culture and society, to outright hostility and anti-immigrant sentiments. Generally speaking, the intellectual circles close to the Left, whose points of reference are the working class and internationalist solidarity, as well as some cosmopolitan and liberal circles of the centre Left, tend to be more sensitive towards immigrant rights. Tolerant sections, Centre-Right and Right-wing parties see them as 'necessary for the economy' reflecting more the employers' positions; however, the Left is divided as to the effect of immigration on welfare and employment rights of Cypriots, reflecting the trade unions' general reluctance over the presence of migrant workers as a source of cheap, docile and unorganised labour to be used by employers against the organised and class-conscious local working class. Nationalists and conservatives on the other hand are generally hostile to migrants, but the actual attitudes and frames with which they articulate tent to vary considerably depending on their constituency, their political leanings and reasons of expediency, as well as ideological grounds as to the 'ethnic cohesion, purity and quality' of 'the nation', 'the city' etc.

The political party system is sharply divided along the Left-Right ideological lines but there are matters that complicate and distort the traditional Left-Right divide in the context of Cyprus, in other words there are factors that seem to crosscut the divide. We ought to examine in some detail the different dimensions of the political divide between Greek-Cypriot political parties, if we are to understand the newly emerged 'politics of immigration'. We can see these as 'axes of the political divide' in Greek-Cypriot politics.

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[18] Hainsworth, 2000: 2-3.

A. One axis is **'radical' versus 'conservative' as regards the socio-economic order**. This more or less reflects the international divide between the ideologies of the Left (communism/socialism, social democracy, libertarianism, collective/class action), the Centre-Left (social democracy, Keynesianism/welfare state, liberalism, libertarianism), the Centre-Right (mixed economy, capitalism, Keynesianism/welfare state, with emphasis on private initiative and enterprise) and the Right (capitalism, mixed economy, private initiative, individualism and enterprise, privatisation, 'less state'). In practice, consensus politics meant that 95% of legislation is passed unanimously. Also the 'tripartite' system of industrial relations and advanced social dialogue between the social partners kept alive some of the rhetoric but not much of the actual conflict in terms of industrial disputes and direct action by workers.

B. **The Cyprus issue dimension**.   One would assume that, generally speaking, Left-wing inclined parties, due to their internationalist ideology or at least their proclaimed internationalism, would be more conciliatory towards the Turkish-Cypriots and willing to live in peace with them. Historically, this was generally the case: Left and liberals tended to be pro peace, compromise and reconciliation. Matters however, are distorted as the question of nationalism cuts across the ideological and party cleavages: Apart from the nationalist extreme right, there has always been a social democratic and centrist hard line of nationalism attached to the Greek Cypriot controlled state. It is well-known from other contexts that Nationalism is a complex phenomenon and takes different forms, affecting even those who are on the Left of the political spectrum, particularly in anti-colonial and post-colonial contexts where national liberation and patriotism are motivating forces.[19] Furthermore, strands of the Left, who are anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist, often see nationalism as a 'tactical ally' to achieve their goal and may even adopt nationalism as part of their program of 'self-determination of the nation' and 'national liberation'. Matters have become even more complicated since 1990 with the collapse of the USSR, as some pro-Soviet Left wing parties took up nationalism in replacement of their dogmatic ideology. In any case the relationship between socialism and nationalism has never been easy or straight forward.[20]

Three sub-categories or sub-issues can be identified as follows:
The position taken in the past over the major turning points in history that have defined modern Cyprus still operates as an important point of reference. This position includes: the approach towards the anti-colonial struggle; the political divide amongst the Greek-Cypriots during 1960-1974 between the '*pro-Makarios versus the anti-Makarios forces*'; the handling by the political forces of the 1974 coup carried out by the Greek junta in Cyprus). This divide appears to be fading away now as current politics on the Cyprus problem are becoming crucial for the for the immediate political future of the island, particularly after the 2004 referendum on the UN peace plan (the 'Annan Plan') and Cyprus' accession to the EU.

The model employed by some researchers is that of dividing Greek Cypriot political actors into '*Cypro-centrists' v 'Helleno-centrists*',[21] with the two axes as the two extremes represented by the two main political parties, AKEL and DESY respectively, and others taking intermediary position. Although these models explain some variations in the behaviour of parties in the past, such binary logics fail to capture the more sophisticated positionality shifts and changes on the ideological level. The model proposed by Stavrinides[22] has a '*Helleno-centric Versus Cypro-centric*' axis and a '*moderate v maximalist*' axis which locates

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[19] see Balibar, 1991.
[20] Davies, 1978; Nairn, 1979; Hobsbawm, 1989: 119-143; Anderson, 1991: 1-4; Nimni 1991.
[21] Papadakis, 1993; Peristianis, 1995; Mavratsas, 1998.
[22] 1999: 76

the parties along this line accordingly. However, this model simplifies complex political positions and logics; it is not dynamic, tends to ignores the time factor and does not take into account where each party is ideologically coming from. In any case the location of specific political parties in this map is debatable.

The distinction between the '*pro-federation / pro- solution' position versus anti-federation*' is important in assessing 'the vision for the nation' as it materialises in the solution of the Cyprus problem: irredentist nationalists are 'anti-federation', whilst accommodating/conciliatory and pragmatists, both nationalists and anti-nationalists, are 'pro-federation'. Both camps could be either 'Helleno-centric' or 'Cypro-centric' as the cultural identity is *not automatically translated* into a *direct political position*; after all, both the so-called 'mother countries' (Greece and Turkey) gave their blessing to the Annan plan. Old 'nationalists' and 'anti-nationalists' found their place in both camps, even if the referendum result was a hegemonic *No* based on nationalist rhetoric and discourse. At the referendum of 24.10.2004, AKEL historically the most consistent anti-nationalist, Cypro-centric and moderate party[23] eventually sided with the *No* camp alleging 'procedural grounds' and reasons of 'security'. With the position on the Annan plan as a criterion, however, we can go a step further: it is possible to distinguish between those who want *minimal changes* that would not alter the philosophy of the bargain proposed by the Annan Plan and those who are essentially opposed to a federal solution effectively rejecting the political equality of the two communities in Cyprus.

C. **Social issues**: On these issues, the distinction is between 'conservative' versus 'liberal/libertarian'. Cypriot society is generally conservative; thus on issues such as homosexuality,[24] abortion, freedom of religion etc. the divide is not strictly running along the Left-Right lines.

D. The **immigration** issue becomes an additional factor that is connected to the nation formation, social and economic issues. Moreover it is many times located within the context of the accession to the EU, as well as the perception of a prolonged state of 'national emergency' due to the 'intractable' Cyprus problem. However, this is not yet a 'party issue' as most MPs interviewed stated that the issue has not been the subject of a party debate.

Amongst the most nationalists are politicians drawn from the political parties whose ideological points of reference vary considerably (the centre-right and power-orientated DEKO, the social democratic EDEK and the far right segments of the traditional Right-wing DESY). Paradoxically, some political actors who are openly anti-Turkish or who in a way are opposed to any reconciliation with 'the Turks' on the grounds that 'Ankara cannot be trusted' and see the Turkish-Cypriots as mere 'extensions' of Ankara', may appear not to be particularly 'anti-migrant'. Individual politicians from other parties such the vice president of DEKO, Mr. Nicos Pittokopitis, a former SEK trade unionist from Pafos, is amongst the most vocal anti-immigrant populists in Cyprus. Established political groups, which are considered to be ideologically located within the far right, such as *Neoi Orizontes* [NEO] and *Europaiki Democratia* [EvroDe] are more careful and reserved when making comments on immigrants, although one can clearly locate a 'hidden racism'. The recently formulated party *Europaiki Democratia*, which split away from the broad party of the traditional Right DESY, following the decision of the latter's leadership to support the UN plan to resolve the Cyprus problem in

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[23] see Attalides 1979; Papadakis 1993.

[24] During the debate over the decriminalising of homosexuality the archbishop threatened all politicians in favour of decriminalisation with ex-communication.

the referendum of 24.04.2004 has apparently not yet formulated a policy on the subject of immigration. In fact, these parties appear to be more focused on the Cyprus problem, voicing opposition to a federation-based settlement; their rhetoric has strong anti-Turkish undertones. Very recently, the small parties of the far right, namely *Neoi Orizontes* [NEO] and *Europaiki Democratia,* have merged into one under the name *Europaiko Komma* (European Party); however, differences over who will preside over the new party have caused one fraction to split from this new structure, although its politics move along similar lines.

1.3. Migration in/and Politics

(a). The Gulf war, successive crises in the Gulf region and unrest in Israel/Palestine has caused the inflow into Cyprus of both economic migrants as well as refugees from the affected regions. In the early to mid 1980s many affluent Arabs (Lebanese, Palestinians etc) came to Cyprus following the collapse of Beirut. These were not migrant workers, but business and other affluent people, utilizing infrastructural, tax and offshore incentives which Cyprus had to offer. More people from the Gulf area came to Cyprus during the Gulf war, most of whom left Cyprus for Arab countries (Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) as soon as stability in these countries was restored.

The affluent Arab community stayed in Cyprus for the largest part of the eighties and many, if not the vast majority, purchased or rented properties in the tourist section of Limassol, Cyprus' second large and most commercial city. Their presence in Cyprus saw a big boom in the construction industry, as luxury lodgings were being built to be offered to them for sale at high prices, as well as in the offshore company industry. However, their degree of integration was rather low, partly because of their Muslim faith, their different dressing code and of their regional concentration in a specific part of the city, which many locals considered 'inaccessible'. Despite the economic growth brought to Cyprus by this migration flow, there was a constant feeling of uneasiness and unrest among Cypriots who considered these people as 'uncivilised nouveau riche'. At the time, concerns were raised about Limassol being 'flooded with Arabs'. Following an incident of alleged sexual violence from a group of Arab youth against a Cypriot male, widespread violence broke out in the tourist area of Limassol one Sunday afternoon:[25] a group of youth blocked one of the main road arteries of Limassol, where there was a large Arab concentration, stopped every car and where the passengers looked rather dark,[26] they were forced to get off the car and were beaten up.

This incident was unique in the 1980s, where locals were not often confronted with the presence of non-Cypriots and xenophobia was not on the agenda but we can view this as an early precursor of what was to follow.

(b). The increased demand for labour, resulting from local and regional economic developments including the world wide growth in tourism, led to the change in the official immigration policy applied until the early 1990s. In the 1980s and 1990s, Cyprus saw a dramatic economic growth, often referred as 'the economic miracle of Cyprus'.[27] This was structured by a number of 'external' factors such as the Turkish occupation of the north since

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[25] Efforts were made to locate press cuttings or other information about the events but it was impossible to secure any further information. The writer's recollections locate this event between 1983-1986.

[26] A number of Cypriots were also beaten up, having been perceived by the attackers as Arabs.

[27] See Christodoulou, Demetris 1992: Inside the Economic Miracle. The Labours of an Embattled Economy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

1974 which by default, created the preconditions for rapid modernization in the south.[28] This situation, combined with the concerted efforts of the Cyprus Government, all political parties and trade unions, created the conditions for the rapid expansion of the model known as 'mass tourism' leading to a more or less permanent shortage of labour in tourism-related sectors.[29]

The change in the immigration policy in 1990 meant that migrant workers started to come to Cyprus for the first time in large numbers. The mono-cultural landscape of the island begun to be gradually transformed, as large numbers of Cypriot households employed foreign domestic in-living helpers, mainly from south-east Asia, and a number of sectors begun to be staffed by foreign manual workers.

(c). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern European regimes resulted in migration flows from Eastern Europe to Cyprus. These were both business people as well as temporary workers, mostly from Russia, Yugoslavia (primarily Serbs), Bulgaria and Romania. Russians and Serbs were to a significant extent seen by Cypriots as a "brother nation" because they practiced the same religion (Christian Orthodox). The war in Yugoslavia in 1999 increased further the migration flow from Serbia to Cyprus. A number of the Eastern Europeans residing in Cyprus are affluent businessmen or highly educated persons filling up managerial positions in the offshore industry, residing under a temporary residence regime, but the majority work as medium-skilled labour in the service sector and particularly the hotel and restaurant industry. Prior to its accession to the EU, Cyprus was the only country to allow Russian nationals to enter the Republic without visas, in an effort to attract businessmen, holiday makers and capital. This policy has resulted in several thousands of affluent Russians migrating to Cyprus and establishing offshore businesses, Russian schools and Russian churches. Since its EU accession, Cyprus was forced to adopt a more restrictive policy in granting entry rights to Russian visitors. However, many of the people who came to Cyprus in the 1990s have settled here on a temporary residence visa which is renewed annually so long as they operate a business in Cyprus or hold a position in a business enterprise in Cyprus.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern European regimes also brought to Cyprus a large number of an ethnic group known as 'Pontians'. These are persons of Greek origin residing until 1990s in the Caucasus region and mostly Georgia, who were granted Greek nationality by the Greek government in the 1990s and were thus able to travel to Greece and from there to Cyprus without too may formalities. Today, there is a big Pontian community residing in Cyprus. Even though they are Greek speakers and many are educated, they generally perform low-skill jobs and their degree of integration into Cypriot society is rather low. There is social tension between them and the Cypriots (mainly the police), occasionally leading to outbursts of violence. There are several reports issued by the Ombudsman, Cyprus' Equality Body, pursuant to complaints submitted to this authority, confirming discrimination against Pontians in the public and in the private sector, often fuelled by racist remarks made by police officers to the press.

(d). Prior to 2000, Cyprus did not have a legal regime for asylum. Under the Refugee Act of Cyprus enacted in January 2000[30], the Cyprus government assumed for the first time full

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[28] This, despite the severe drop in GDP during 1973-75 and the sharp rise in unemployment and mass poverty which ensued after the war in 1974. Cheap labour was provided by the 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, who were forcibly expelled from the northern part and lived in refugee camps.

[29] Anthias and Ayres 1983; Christodoulou 1992; Panayiotopoulos 1995; 1996

[30] further amended on several occasions (June 2003, February 2004 and 5 December 2004 and most probably in 2006, as discussions are already under way in order to introduce regulations to transpose

responsibility for refugee related matters, including refugee status determination procedures, as of 1 January 2002. Prior to that date, the relatively small number of asylum applications received were processed by UNHCR who followed a policy of, wherever possible, diverting asylum seekers to other countries in view of the absence of a refugee regime in Cyprus. Since 2002, the numbers of asylum seekers started multiplying very quickly; current figures place Cyprus first amongst all EU countries in terms of numbers of asylum, with a staggering 13.1 asylum seekers per thousand of local population. There are multiple problems arising from the sudden increase in numbers, including access to housing, to the labour market, to health care and state benefits, a slow and rather hostile asylum process, marked by widespread imprisonment of asylum seekers often leading to deportations under circumstances of questionable legality.

In 2000 two incidents marked the beginning of the discourse on asylum in Cyprus: a group of asylum seekers arrived from different African countries and were temporarily housed in the small and cheap 'Pefkos' hotel of Limassol, pending examination of their asylum application, under conditions similar to prison, a situation criticized by Amnesty International. After some months of being detained in the hotel, the asylum seekers rebelled and staged protests from inside the hotel, by hanging banners from their windows. An intervention by the police led to violent clashes which were also joined by locals from the neighbourhood, who spontaneously appeared on the scene to assist the police with the beating of the asylum seekers. The events were given extensive media coverage, in most cases characterised by racist comments against the asylum seekers, often bordering on hysteria.

The second event involved the arrival of a ship in the Limassol harbour in September 2000, carrying migrants who were saved from another sinking ship. The ship was 'arrested' in the port and its passengers were forced to stay on it with only basic supplies of food water under very high temperatures and inhuman conditions. The authorities refused to allow the passengers to come ashore lest they seek asylum, a practice criticized by legal practitioners at the time. Once again, the media expressed a strong anti-immigrant feeling, recording the public sentiment over the issue.

(e). Rioting and racial violence
     (i). In August 1996 two Greek-Cypriots were killed by Turkish soldiers in demonstrations against the Turkish army occupation of the north of the island. Following these events, a group of Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers in the same area were badly beaten up by a group of local youth, who also told their victims that the reason for this attack was because they were Muslims, like the Turks who had killed their co-villagers a few weeks earlier.
     (ii). A number of violent incidents against Pontians took place both in Limassol as well as in Paphos, where there are large concentrations of Pontians, mostly residing within urban ghettos. These incidents would involve clashes of Pontian youth with the police and the use of excessive force by the police, as well as attacks by local youths against Pontians.
     (iii). In September 1994 a young Danish woman working in Cyprus was brutally gang raped and beaten to death by a group of British solders working at the British bases in Cyprus, as revenge for having left her British soldier boyfriend for a Cypriot. Following this, there were a number of attacks against British soldiers found in public areas outside the British Bases.

Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers).

(f). The September 11 attack on World Trade Centre in 2001 did not lead to any outbreak of violence or other backlash against Muslim communities; however, it definitely marked the increase of public sentiment of racism and xenophobia towards Muslims, manifesting itself more as discriminatory behaviour rather than violence.

(g). Enlargement of EU in 2004 in the context of Cyprus meant accession to the EU. This has led to migration flows from the other newly acceding countries, with frequent reports of complaints of discrimination in the workplace against them by their employers.

2. Empirical Data

2.1 Description of Sources

2.2 Description of Data: Speeches and Statements

2.2.1 Speech/Statement 1

This section refers to a newspaper interview with the Paphos Regional secretary of the right-wing trade union SEK (Confederation of Labour of Cyprus), Nicos Pittokopitis, published on 4th October 1989, which is the first public attack on the importing migrant workers based on ethno-cultural racist grounds. It marks the beginning of both a trade union campaign, primarily led by, but not exclusive to, SEK as well the rise in the political career of Nicos Pittokopitis, who became an MP for Paphos and is currently the vice-president of the third largest political party, the Democratic Party (DEKO), since 2003 the ruling party. As stressed in the introductory sector and in WP5, the concern with migrants and migration has not become a party issue; Pittokopitis's anti-immigrant politics seem to be his own personal route to populist politics and are not necessarily reflected as party politics but are opposed and shared accordingly across political party lines. The interview was published in the SEK weekly newspaper *Ergatiki Foni* (*Εργατική Φωνή*), which has since featured anti-immigrant views and reports on a regular basis.[31] Pittokopitis belongs to the mainstream of political parties and, at that time, he was the regional Secretary of the mainstream trade union in the small town of Paphos, which was to host, in the years to come, a very large number of migrant workers, some estimate this to be up to 30% of all the labour force.[32]

In the interview, Pittokopitis sets out to lay down the grounds he is opposed to migrant workers, grounds that he would regularly repeat and elaborate on every available opportunity. The title of the interview is indicative: "There is no such shortage of labour to justify the import of foreigners". He considers that instead of resolving problems, the presence of foreign labour will create more serious problems as regards 'the customs, culture, religion, bad habits and habitudes' («ήθη, έθιμα, θρησκεία, κακές συνήθειες και έξεις»). He went as far as claiming that

> "I honestly believe that we will destroy the Greek Cypriot society and this is totally unacceptable since on the one hand we struggle for national survival in

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[31] For WP5 eleven items were collected from this paper (under Frame 1 the paper is classified four times negatively, under Frame 2 six times negatively as well and under Frame 4 once in a negative manner). From the beginning the paper used a harsh language, words like 'cancer' and 'gangrene' were many times recorded. SEK and *Ergatiki Foni* not only used economic arguments (Frame 2), but many of their statements and opinions expressed were classified under Frame 1, arguing that migrants are a threat to locals national collective identity.

[32] See Paphos Section Activity Report for the 23rd Regional Congers of PEO Paphos, 6 April 2005.

this country, standing by our roots, ethics and traditions and on the other hand we allow the entry of foreigners. We will mine-lay our society which will result in our eventual extinction." (*Ergatiki Foni*, 04.10.1989).

2.2.2 Speech/Statement 2

In an interview to the right-wing newspaper *Agon* (*Αγών*) on 17.02.1997, the Deputy General Secretary of SEK called for a reviewing of the policy of employing foreign workers. The interview was repeated and featured in the SEK *newspaper Ergatiki Foni*, 19.02.1997. His main arguments are that migrant workers have a negative effect on employment (and 'illegal foreign workers' cause unemployment) and that they are a threat to the welfare system. Moreover he claims that 'the struggle for national survival' requires a strong economy based on Greek-Cypriots. He proposes that a restrictive policy is followed that migrant worker numbers be reduced. At the time the rise in unemployment was marginal, from 2.7% to 3%.

2.2.3 Speech/Statement 3

On the eve of accession to the EU there were concerns raised by SEK about the inflow of migrant workers from the EU, particularly from eastern European countries also acceding at the same time. Enlargement became an issue, particularly as regards the fact that unlike most other EU countries, the Republic of Cyprus had not requested and hence was not granted any derogations or transitional arrangements on the free movement of labour. The editor of *Ergatiki Foni*, the SEK newspaper Xenis Xenophontos wrote on 25.04.2004 an editorial with the heading 'Urgent Measures are required for the protection of Cypriot workers in the light of accession'. He said that

> "…small Cyprus is flooded by 40.000 foreign workers, mainly Asians and other 40.000 illegal workers who constitute a social gangrene."

He then proposes two measures:
(a) To locate the exact number of foreign workers in each sector of the economy so that only certain sectors are given work permits. These should be sectors where Europeans are unwilling to work (pig farms, agriculture and farming).
(b) To render the basic terms of collective agreements legally binding so as to avoid unfair competition.

2.3 Description of Data: Party Programmes / Programmatic Documents

2.3.2 Party Programme / Programmatic Document 1: AKEL18th Congress [1995]

The *18ᵗʰ Congress of AKEL, Materials and Other Documents*, 16-19 November 1995, contains the program of the largest and oldest political party in the country. The Congress is the highest decision-making body of the party. The 18th Congress pledges that it "will work so that foreign workers employed in Cyprus get the same treatment as their Cypriot colleagues and will decisively fight against possible phenomena of racism and xenophobia" (AKEL, 1995: 40). AKEL explicitly pledges to fight racism; however the reference to 'possible phenomena' and not 'actual phenomena' implies a conviction that racism and xenophobia are phenomena to guard against in some distant future, and not that they are already present. Also AKEL does not refer to the ways in which it will combat racism. Furthermore, 'illegal foreign workers' are referred to in the program as 'a problem' and AKEL calls upon the Government to take "drastic measures to put an end to the illegal

employment of foreign workers" (AKEL, 1995: 40).[33] The phrase 'drastic measures' may well in practice mean violation of the fundamental human rights of undocumented workers, as well as other migrant workers, who may come under any heavy handed police action. However, some initiatives taken by AKEL MPs illustrate that AKEL is taking up the issue of racism more seriously primarily based on *humanitarian grounds*. On the question of immigration, AKEL takes a rather 'cautious' approach, reflecting the position of its allied trade union PEO. It must be noted that, at that time, PEO's official line was more defensive against migrant workers and made reference to *'social problems'* that allegedly derive from the arrival *of 'alien cultures'*: Under the heading *'The Problem of Foreign workers'* the Report by the outgoing General Council of PEO suggests that 'the foreign workers are importing new customs (ήθη και έθιμα) and social problems' (PEO, 1995: 64). The PEO report went as far as stating that,

> "…the alien workers are carriers of different attitudes, principles and values, who have the potential to affect social institutions. Furthermore, problems are created either as a result of extra-marital relations or when the upbringing of children is given to foreign domestic helpers" (PEO, 1995: 64).

If we compare the 18th AKEL Congress decision to that of the 17th AKEL Congress (3-7 October 1990), it can be observed that during the 17th Congress some concerns were raised about the new migration policy, but this was put in vague and general terms pledging the party's support to the position of PEO.[34] In subsequent years, the issue of migration gradually became more important for the party, as the numbers of migrants multiplied.

2.3.3 Programmatic Document 3: PEO Congress Decision 2004

The PEO Congress of 2004 is a significant programmatic document in that it becomes the basis for the formulation of AKEL's position on the subject and marks a decisive shift in policy towards a more pro-migrant position (but not necessarily less restrictive). The shift of PEO becomes more apparent when one examines more closely the wording of the Congress decision as regards migrant workers. After referring to the need to ensure that all workers enjoy the same rights so that neither migrants nor any other vulnerable group are used as 'cheap labour', the Congress decision refers to the presence of third country nationals and states that "the regime of a controlled system of granting of work permits on the basis of strict criteria must continue." The document states that the basic criteria for granting entry and work permit to migrant workers, such as "the shortage of supply of labour by Cypriots, the compliance by the employers with labour law and collective agreements" ought to remain in place.[35] In its reference to the need to properly evaluate the experience of the last decade or so, the Congress Report makes its strongest case ever for protecting migrant workers from

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[33] PEO also called upon the government to take all necessary measures to put an end to "illegal employment of aliens" (PEO 1995: 64, 66).

[34] At that time AKEL and PEO had other priorities related to the internal conflict within the Cyprus Left, which eventually led to a split of a small but influential group of high ranking AKEL and PEO leaders, who formed a new party named ADESOK. The party remained very small and eventually merged with another small party, that of the 'Free Democrats' to form the party of the 'United Democrats'.

[35] The relevant section reads as follows: «Όσον αφορά την έλευση μεταναστών εργαζομένων από χώρες εκτός της Ε.Ε., το καθεστώς της ελεγχόμενης χορήγησης αδειών εργοδότησης στην βάση αυστηρών κριτηρίων θα πρέπει να συνεχιστεί. Βασικά κριτήρια θα πρέπει να παραμείνουν η έλλειψη προσφοράς εργασίας από Κύπριους και η τήρηση από μέρους των εργοδοτών της εργατικής νομοθεσίας και των συλλογικών συμβάσεων.»

exploitation and racism and 'fighting against the use of migrant workers as a source of cheap labour power that undermines the terms of the collective agreements."[36]

PEO still does not see the connection between the calling for 'harsher measures' against undocumented migrant workers on the one hand and repression on the other, which may violate the rights of all migrant workers. However, PEO seems aware of the fact that repression does not actually work in reducing the numbers (see INEK, 2004), but considers that it should not argue for an amnesty and legalisation.

3. Analysis I ('Parallel Analysis')

3.1 Discourse Topics

3.1.1. Speeches/Statements

3.1.1.1 Discourse Topics of Speech/Statement 1

Macro-topic

The macro-topic deals with the broader context in which immigration to Cyprus occurs, such as 'the struggle for national survival' following 'the invasion and occupation of the northern part', the impact on 'culture and customs', as well as the economic considerations which make the presence of 'foreign' labour 'unnecessary'.

Micro-topics

We find reference to various sub-topics such as (a) the need to protect national heritage and culture, (b) rational economic development and (c) local tourist development that does not require migrant workers.

3.1.1.2 Discourse Topics of Speech/Statement 2

Macro-topic

The key position is that the presence of 'foreign' workers has a negative effect on employment and that they are a threat to the welfare system. It is a typical economic anti-immigrant argument.

> "When the criteria on the employment of foreign workers were discussed there was a shortage of labour in all sectors…Today in all sectors we have the opposite. In all sectors of the economic activity there are unemployed Cypriots. It is incomprehensible to have unemployment and follow the same policy that was followed when we had a shortage of labour."

Micro-topics

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[36] «Η προστασία των μεταναστών εργαζομένων από την εκμετάλλευση και η καταπολέμηση κάθε προσπάθειας για χρησιμοποίηση τους ως φτηνής εργατικής δύναμης, ανταγωνιστικά προς τις πρόνοιες των όρων απασχόλησης που περιλαμβάνουν οι συλλογικές συμβάσεις, αποτελεί καθήκον πρώτης γραμμής για την ΠΕΟ και το Συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα ευρύτερα.
Το Συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα έχει επίσης το ταξικό καθήκον να καταπολεμήσει τα φαινόμενα ρατσισμού και ξενοφοβίας.»

Sub-topics are: (a) employers prefer foreign workers because they can exploit them more easily; (b) 'illegal foreign workers' cause unemployment; (c) those involved in private economic activities can be replaced by unemployed Cypriots; (d) 'the struggle for national survival' requires a strong economy based on Greek-Cypriots; (e) if unemployment continues, then Greek-Cypriots will be forced to emigrate abroad and with the rise of settlers in the occupied north there will be devastating effects for 'the national issue'.

> "Unemployment has reached levels that cause concern; immediate measures must be taken to get rid of alien workers, with the exception of those sectors for which there are no Cypriots available."

3.1.1.3 Discourse Topics of Speech/Statement 3

Macro-topic

The macro-topic deals with the immediate need to take measure to protect the employment of Cypriots in the light of accession to the EU from the 'invasion from eastern Europeans'.

Micro-topic

Sub-topics are: (a) Cyprus employs thousands of migrant workers who cause 'social problems'; (b) Cyprus had not requested any derogations or transitional arrangements on the free movement of labour; (c) he proposes to determine the exact number of foreign workers in each sector and (d) to give legally binding force to the basic terms of collective agreements, in to avoid unfair competition.

> "…Small Cyprus is flooded by 40.000 foreign workers, mainly Asians and other 40.000 illegal workers who constitute a social gangrene."

3.1.2. Party Programmes / Programmatic Documents

3.1.2.1 Discourse Topics of Party Programme /Programmatic Document 1

NONE.

3.1.2.2 Discourse Topics of Party Programme /Programmatic Document 2 - 18th AKEL Congress

Macro-topic

The macro-topic deals with the need to protect migrant workers from exploitation, whilst at the same time to combat illegal immigration.

Micro-topic

Sub-topics are:
(a) AKEL pledges to work so that foreign workers employed in Cyprus get the same treatment as their Cypriot colleagues.
(b) AKEL will decisively fight against possible phenomena of racism and xenophobia.
(c) AKEL supports the trade union demands to halt the issuing of any new work permits for foreign workers.
(d) AKEL strongly supports the employment of Turkish-Cypriot workers.
(e) AKEL calls upon the Government to take "drastic measures to put an end to the illegal employment of foreign workers".

3.1.2.3 Discourse Topics of /Programmatic Document 3: PEO Congress Decision 2004

Macro-topic

The macro-topic deals with the need to protect labour rights for all workers and to defend the criteria for the employment of migrant workers and collective agreements.

Micro-topic

Sub-topics are:

(a) All workers must enjoy the same rights so that migrants or any other vulnerable groups are not used as 'cheap labour'.

(b) The regime of controlled system of granting of work permits on the basis of strict criteria must continue.

(c) Shortage of labour supply by Cypriots must be met. However, this has to be done in a manner which ensures full compliance by the employers with labour law and collective agreements.

(d) Foreign workers must be protected from exploitation and racism.

(e) PEO will fight against the use of migrant workers as cheap labour power that undermines the terms of the collective agreements.

3.2 Discursive Strategies

3.2.1. Speeches/Statements

3.2.1.1 Discursive Strategies in Speech/Statement 1

Actors:

The Paphians [I Paphites / Οι Παφίτες].

The poor people of Laona [I ftohi anthropi tis Laonas / Οι φτωχοί άνθρωποι της Λαόνας].

Regional branch the trade union SEK [Eparhiako tmima tis syntehnias SEK / Επαρχιακό Τμήμα της Συντεχνίας ΣΕΚ].

Employers [ergodotes / εργοδότες].

Capital and other interests [kefalaio kai alla symferonta / κεφάλαιο και άλλα συμφέροντα].

Governmental officers [kyvernitiki aksiomatouhoi / κυβερνητικοί αξιωματούχοι].

'foreigners', 'foreign workers' and 'foreign working hands' ['kseni', 'ksenoi ergates' kai 'ksena ergatika heria'].

When examining the reference / nomination and representation of the social actors used by Mr. Pittocopitis one is able to observe: The 'Us'/ 'We' category is shifting interchangeably between the 'people of the region of Paphos', i.e. the Paphians, and the Paphos branch the trade union SEK, whose regional secretary is Mr. Pittokopitis himself. The impression he gives by this is that he speaks *for* the Paphians. The Paphians are presented as hard-working family-orientated people, who are forced to migrate all over Cyprus to seek employment; he also specifically refers to the village community of Laona as 'the poor people of Laona'. Generally, the language he uses depicts the Paphians as a 'community' which is *collectively victimised by outside forces* (i.e. outside the region of Paphos), but then when he shifts to the other 'Us'/'We', i.e. the Paphos regional branch of SEK, he depicts it as having a role of 'defender' or 'protector' of the region and its people, a force of 'resistance'. Hence, he speaks in terms of 'we will not accept' or 'we will not show inertia' in the attempts to 'impose foreigners on us' etc.

The 'Other' category is vague, usually alluding to some forces somehow distanced from Paphos. There are however, specific references to 'employers', 'capital and other interests', 'Governmental officers', as well as the category 'foreigners', 'foreign workers' and 'foreign working hands'. There is a f*oregrounding* of employers who are in the driver's seat and are managing through a collusion with all the other 'Others' to impose *their* terms, for *their*

benefits and *at the expense of the Paphians* (and Paphos): he depicts the policy of importing 'foreign' workers as driven by employers and the then government.

There is a *backgrounding of migrant workers* i.e. their role as humans is de-emphasised, pushed into the background. There is *suppression* and *omission* of the actual *migration* experience and *migrant* workers are never called such; instead they are always referred to with the adjective 'foreign' (ξένος), which in Greek is a noun, as well as an adjective. Deliberately or not, the term *migrant* or *immigrant* is never mentioned, perhaps because it may remind or refer to the fact that between one third to half of the Cypriot population have been migrants themselves or that dozens of popular Greek and Cyprus songs, poems and folk stories refer to the painful process of emigration abroad and the difficulties encountered by 'Us' or the 'We' category.

'Foreign' workers are *aggregated* as a homogeneous group who are carriers of 'alien cultures and traditions'. They are *functionalised* purely by their work they will perform; they are *impersonalised,* and even *dehumanised* as shown in the reference to 'working hands', as if the 'hands' can be detached from the bodies, minds, hearts and the holistic human presence. In short migrant workers are devoid of their *sociality* and *specificity* as they remain nameless, anonymous and indeterminate.

The use of metaphors and allegories is more related to the use of terminology concerning to physical survival in the context of 'national survival'. The 'cultural, religious and customary traditions' are referred to as 'roots' that will somehow be 'polluted' or 'destroyed' via the presence of migrant workers. Hence, he uses the term 'national extermination/ annihilation' [*ethnikos afanismos - εθνικός αφανισμός*].

Note: the terms upon which Pittokopitis articulates were to become powerful and extended to other trade unions, particularly up to the mid-1990s. Since then there has been a gradual shift away from such terminology towards more economic argumentation and metaphors.

3.2.1.2 Discursive Strategies in Speech/Statement 2

Kittenis *continues* the argument of Pittocopitis albeit in a little more sophisticated way: the number of actors is broader, there is reference to 'neutral' or more 'authoritative' reference and the binary *Us/We* versus the *Them/Other* dichotomy takes different forms, concentrating first on socio-economic arguments and finishing off with the 'national problem'; however, even there, the 'national' issue is tied to the 'economic' argument.

We can locate a *number of act*ors, who perform various roles:
- The *Ministry of Labour* and the *Planning Bureau* are depicted as 'neutral and 'authoritative' bodies which provide information and prediction on the rate of unemployment.
- The *Unemployment Fund* is depicted as a social good (presumably for *Cypriot* workers).
- The *Minister of Labour* is depicted as, or at least implied to be a credible government figure and the *social partners* and *employers* are other bodies, who are referred to in passing, primarily to boost the role SEK.
- The *politicians* and *those involved with the national issue* are references to the party leaders, the national leadership of the Greek-Cypriots, who are invoked as a 'responsible group' in the context of 'national unity' in the face of the 'common enemy'.

- *SEK* is the prime subject or *prima donna*, which is described as 'a trade union movement' that is 'responsible' and 'caring' by citing the folk proverb 'the children of the wise one cook before they are hungry', in an effort to convey the message that immigration must be controlled and restricted before problems arise. To illustrate this he analyses the issue of the rise of unemployment and the effects on the economy, society and the national issue.
- *The Cypriot unemployed* are typically depicted as victims of the collapse of the industry.
- *Migrant workers* are never referred to as 'migrants' but as '*alien workers'* (*allodapos – αλλοδαπός*) or 'foreigners' (*xenos – ξένος*). Another category of migrant workers is the undocumented workers who are referred to as '*the illegal(s)'* (*i paranomi – οι παράνομοι*).
- '*Our enemy'* specifically refers to Turkey and is depicted as deliberately trying to destabilise the country by 'causing an artificial crisis'.

The primary goal is to connect the rise of unemployment to the economic, social and political consequences of the presence of migrant workers and question the latter's presence. The main discursive strategies employed illustrate some degree of sophistication.

There is a practice of *foregrounding* of monthly rises in unemployment, which is presented as a major reason for concern. Interestingly, there is an exaggerated connection between these figures with the political climate at the time, when there was a 'crisis' as a result of the decision of the Greek-Cypriot Government to import to Cyprus the Russian made missile system S-300. Kittenis describes the reasons for the rise in unemployment as 'exogenous' and 'uncontrolled factors' and mentions as examples (a) the 'artificial crisis of S-3000' that was created by 'our enemy', following Turkey's threat to attack if they were to be bought by the Republic of Cyprus and (b) the cold weather. In this way, the backgrounding, i.e a de-emphasising, of the *active role of the Cyprus Government* at the time, which was developing a military discourse based on what it referred to as 'the double pressure' on Turkey, which consisted of 'the unitary defence pact with Greece' (*enieo amindiko dogma – ενιαίο αμυντικό δόγμα*) on the one hand and the process of Cyprus' accession to the EU on the other. The S-300 became a massive election issue for the 1998 elections; this created a kind of 'siege mentality' of 'national emergency' amongst the people. The discursive strategy therefore aimed at entering indirectly into the 'discourses of national emergency', primarily employing socio-economic points of reference, i.e. using unemployment.

In the process, Kittenis employs various other discursive strategies such as *aggregating* and *assimilating* the Cypriot unemployed as a unified category, indirectly and subliminally connecting the unemployment figure of 10.000 to the 10.000, who lost their jobs in the collapsing garment and shoe industry over the previous years, an arbitrary connection that bears no relevance to reality. He also makes an arbitrary indirect differentiation with another group he aggregates into a unitary category, that of the "21.000-22.000 foreigners, over and above the 'illegals', who are employed in Cyprus". The reference is obvious and his call is explicit: Get rid of foreigners, employ unemployed Cypriots instead. A strategy of *indetermination* is primarily directed at migrant workers, who are *functionalised* and *impersonalised* as some nameless and anonymous group who perform 'necessary' and 'unwanted' jobs, and who can thus be disposed of, if they are to be replaced by Greek-Cypriot unemployed persons.

Of course, Kittenis also attempts to differentiate between those sectors of the economy where the employment of migrant workers is necessary, such as agriculture and the other sectors, for which he calls on the Government to stop the issuing of permits.

Finally, Kittenis turns the economic arguments into national argument to round of his case.

Metaphors:

The reference to 'keeping our doors open' is an important metaphor of the country resembling a home, where doors can be 'open or shut' according to our wish; however, if we keep our doors wide open there are dangers involved:

> "Just because we have a need in agriculture it does not mean that we should keep our doors open as we had done before."

References to the 'struggle for national survival' are made three times in the text.

3.2.1.3 Discursive Strategies in Speech/Statement 3

The argumentation for this text is limited to the question of the imminent accession to the EU and the need to protect Cypriot workers from 'a possible invasion of eastern European workers'. The actors are the following:

- Countries/ states: Cyprus, UK, Ireland.
- Foreign workers, that can be subdivided into (a) 'mostly Asians', (b) 'llegals' and (c) eastern European workers.
- Cypriot workers
- European citizens
- SEK

Other European countries and in particular the UK and Ireland are depicted as wise and prudent in seeking 7 year derogation in the freedom of movement to protect their labour from eastern European workers, whilst Cyprus is depicted as irresponsible (although the above terms are never explicitly used, preferring instead to imply this from the conclusions). The newspaper editor however is less subtle, when it comes to migrant workers: eastern European workers are depicted as a potentially *active* invading force; existing migrant workers are 'foreign workers' depicted as typically *Asians* and *illegal* [foreign workers] are connected to a spreading disease gangrene that requires amputation to save the limb infected. Also, foreign workers are 'exploited as cheap labour'. Cypriot workers are implicitly the victims and 'the European citizen' is resented in rather neutral terms as a carrier of 'the right to settle and work without barriers'.

SEK is depicted as a responsible organization with foresight, which has for years 'rang the bells of danger'.

There is a *backgrounding* of employers, who do not appear at all in the article and a *foregrounding* of the Cyprus authorities who have failed to protect and must do something to 'protect Cypriot workers'. The process of *activisation, aggregated* and *homogenization* of eastern European workers is apparent when they are depicted as possible invading forces immanently anticipating entering Cyprus, whilst Cypriot workers are *differentiated* and *passivised* as victims of the situation. The numbers game is in operation and the aggregation /assimilation of the '40.000 foreign workers' and the '40.000 illegals'. There is an aggregation of European citizens via the number of '500 million' who are Europeans with the right of freedom of movement'

Metaphors:

> 'Barricades' to halt invading eastern European workers
> SEK has rang the bells of danger and required measures to avoid social upheavals
> Small Cyprus is flooded 40000 foreign workers
> …the other40.000 illegal [foreign workers] are a social gangrene

3.2.2. Party Programmes / Programmatic Document

3.2.2.1 Discursive Strategies   in Party Programme /Programmatic Document 1 N/A

3.2.2.2 Discursive Strategies in Party Programme 2: AKEL 18th Congress 1995

We can locate the following *number of act*ors, who perform various roles.
- *the trade union movement* [sindikalistiko kinima / συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα]
- *AKEL*
- *foreign workers* [xeni ergates /ξένοι εργάτες]; foreigners [xeni/ ξένοι]
- *illegal workers* [paranomi ergates /παράνομοι εργάτες]
- *working hands* [egratika heria /εργατικά χέρια]
- *Turkish-Cypriots workers* [Turkokiprii ergates / Τουρκοκύπριοι εργάτες]
- *underutilised Cyprus labour force* [adranes Kipriako ergatiko dinamiko –αδρανές Κυπριακό εργατικό δυναμικό]
- *Cypriot working people* [Kiprii ergazomeni – Κύπριοι εργαζόμενοι]
- *Cypriot colleagues* of 'foreign workers' [Kiprii sinadelfi / Κύπριοι συνάδελφοι]

The terminology used to describe 'migrant workers' always that of 'foreign workers' [xeni ergates /ξένοι εργάτες] and 'foreigners' [xeni/ ξένοι]. In the 'Political Decision', which is the summary of the Positions or 'Theses' of the Central Committee to the 18th Congress, there is no reference to 'illegal workers' [paranomi ergates /παράνομοι εργάτες], as there is in the 'Theses', but this is implicit the call of the part for 'measures to combat the illegal employment of foreign workers'. Cypriot workers are referred to as or included in the wider and more 'sympathetic' category of 'Cypriot working people' [Kiprii ergazomeni – Κύπριοι εργαζόμενοι], where as this term is never used for 'migrant workers'.

'The trade union movement' [sindikalistiko kinima / συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα] is a reference primarily to PEO (the left-wing union), which is sometimes referred to also as the 'class-based trade union movement' (taksiko sindikalistiko kinima / ταξικό συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα). AKEL, which is the 'subject', is therefore in solidarity and will 'support the demand of the trade union movement for termination of the issuing of arrival permits of foreign workers except for excellent special cases'. As for Turkish-Cypriots workers [Turkokiprii ergates / Τουρκοκύπριοι εργάτες], they are presented as a category of workers that may act as an alternative source of labour to migrant labour; the same applies to inactive Cypriot population. Moreover, the employment of Turkish-Cypriots is presented as serving the political goal of 'rapprochement'.

Cypriot workers are the primary target audience and are addressed in sensitive manner.

It is also interesting to note that the relevant section that deals with migrant workers in both the *Theses* as well as the *Political Decision* follows all the 'negative' developments that the party is targeting to put a halt such as privatisations, poverty, criminality, drugs etc; immediately before there is a strong critique of the 'invasion' of 'products of subcultures' and 'values' that 'corrupt' and 'decay' Cypriot society.

There is a practice of *foregrounding* of the numbers of migrant workers and need to take immediate action, hence the extreme language of 'terminating arrival permits' and the minimising of any possible exceptions to 'excellent special cases'. The ambivalence of AKEL is expressed with the way in which it the need to protect migrant workers from exploitation and the way it rounds off this section pledging to ensure equal treatment and in 'combating possible phenomena of racism and xenophobia'. There is an implicit reference to a 'class solidarity' by referring to ensuring equal treatment with the 'Cypriot colleagues' rather than juxtaposing them as *competitors*.

Assimilation

Migrant workers are at times aggregated and collectivised as a more o less unitary category 'foreign' workers. However, there is also recognition of a variation within the category when referring to 'illegal workers'. There is of *functionalisation* and *impesonalisation* when referring to 'working hands', rather than the traditional Marxist discourse of 'labour power'. 'Cypriot working people' are also assimilated as if there are no differentiations or fragmentations of labour.

Metaphors of war/fight:

The only reference is that 'invasion of subcultures' in the *Theses.*

3.3.2.3 Discursive Strategies Programmatic Document 2: PEO 24th Congress 2004

We can locate the following *number of act*ors, who perform various roles.

- The trade union movement
- PEO
- President of the Cyprus Republic
- National Committee on Employment
- 'Other Trade unions', SEK, PASYDY
- 'Alien workers' [allodapi ergates /αλλοδαποί εγργάτες]; aliens/ foreigners [allodapi/ αλλοδαποί]; 'migrant workers' [metanastes ergazomenoi /μετανάστες εργαζόμενοι]
- Local working people [ntopii ergazomenoi / ντόπιοι εργαζόμενοι], local working force' [ntopio Ergatiko dinamiko / ντόπιο εργατικό δυναμικό]
- Working people in farming and agriculture [ergazomeni stin georgia kai ktinotrofia / εργαζόμενοι στη γεωργία και κτηνοτροφία]
- [female] Domestic helpers [ikiakes voithi / οικιακές βοηθοί]

The terminology used to describe migrant workers seems to shift between the more formal and legalistic 'alien /foreign workers' to a more sympathetic 'migrant working persons' but there is no consistent language on the subject. The emphasis is clearly on the need to protect migrant worker rights, ensure equal treatment and participation without discrimination, equal access to social and labour rights and combating any kind of 'competition' between 'local working people' and 'migrant workers'.

Interestingly 'local workers' are always referred to as *local working people [ntopii ergazomenoi]* or local working force' *[ntopio Ergatiko dinamiko]* which is a broader or 'softer', less class-laden or hard-left term, whilst this term is only once used migrant workers.

There is clearly a practice of *foregrounding* of the complementary nature of the employment of migrant workers and the need to protect migrant workers from exploitation in order to lower production cost, the enhancement of the institutional framework of labour regulation and the need to unite for the common labour struggle. In the text there no mention of undocumented workers of undeclared or informal work; neither is there any mention of employers, whose role is suppressed but is apparent behind exploitation'. Moreover, the term 'restriction' of the numbers is not mentioned in the section on migrant workers: at another section dealing with unemployment the Congress decision empowers the Central Council to demand 'the restriction of employment of aliens at the necessary levels'.

Assimilation

Migrant workers are at times aggregated and collectivised as 'alien' or 'foreign' workers. This is particularly the case when the text is referring to the interaction between 'migrant workers' and 'locals', in which case the aggregation is accepted without differentiation. However, there is also a recognition of the variations within the category 'migrant workers', hence the specific reference to the most vulnerable categories of domestic workers and agricultural workers. There is some degree of *functionalisation* and *impesonalisation* in the unemployment section, as migrant workers there become mere 'aliens' employed that can be 'restricted'.

No metaphors are used.

3.3 Argumentation (Topoi)

3.3.1. Speeches/Statements

3.3.1.1 Topoi in Speech/Statement 1

A close analysis of the basis for argumentation is revealing of the discourses as to various heading or themes around which the articulation of anti-immigrant perceptions by Pittokopitis. The *topos of disadvantage* for Paphians is quite strong: if migrant workers are introduced, then Paphos will suffer. Moreover, as is the *topos of usefulness* takes the form of questioning the very basis of introducing migrant workers: 'if it is not really necessary as there are young Cypriots, who want to attend the technical school, then why is the measure introduce? He asks. He then proceeds to explain in terms of the advantage / usefulness of 'importing' of migrant workers, not of Paphians but for employers.

The *topos of definition and name-interpretation* makes use the term 'foreign'/ 'xenos' with the implication of being 'temporary', which suggests that they are here for a specific purpose and limited period of time and shall leave when they are no longer 'useful'. Pittokopitis questions the very basis of ever being 'useful' at all, thus rendering questionable the change of policy and allowing migrant workers at all.

The *topos of danger and threat* is connected to the *topos of culture* given the specificity of Cyprus. Cultural/ religious/ ethnic 'purity' is assumed to be the basis for 'national survival' and the 'struggle for realising the national goals and justice' (i.e. resolving 'the Cyprus problem' in a way that appears just and fair to the Greek-Cypriots): in this light the presence of migrant workers is weakening the homogeneity of the Greek-Cypriots, a necessary ingredient for the 'national struggle for survival', therefore they should be allowed into the country.

The *topos of disadvantage/uselessness* refers to usefulness of migrant workers to Greek-Cypriots and is used to argue that migrant workers are not necessary.

3.3.1.2 Topoi in Speech/Statement 2

The basis for argumentation of Kittenis is more varied; after all there has been a 'debate' on the subject for over 8 years, he is a 'national' and not a 'local'/'regional' trade unionist of Right-wing leanings and the setting is much clearer. The various heading or themes around which the articulation of anti-immigrant discourses are as follows:

The *topos of disadvantage/uselessness* refers to Greek-Cypriots, and Greek-Cypriot workers in particular and it takes primarily a socio-economic argument that is 'fitted in' or 'adjusted' to the 'national struggles' and 'national priorities'. The syllogism takes the form of the following: 'foreign workers were introduced to meet the shortage of labour, but now that unemployment is on the rise it is thus no longer necessary to have foreign workers; indeed,

they ought to be replaced by Cypriot unemployed persons.' Moreover, there are connotations relating to the Unemployment Fund that out to be protected and to used wisely and prudently.

The *topos of definition and name-interpretation* is similar to Pttokopitis of using the term 'foreign'/ 'xenos' with the usual connotations; in addition, he uses the more 'technical' and 'legal' term '*allodapos*', which is literally translated as 'alien'. This term in Greek is not the same word of describing creatures of outer space (*eksogiinos - εξωγήινος*), but the term *allodapos* is equivalent to *xenos*, i.e. 'foreign national', 'outsider', or 'stranger'. There is an interesting reference to emigration and migration at the end of the interview, which rounds off his argumentation, and it serves a triple cause, serving a triptych of topoi: (a) a *topos of disadvantage/uselessness*,(b) a *topos of danger and threat* and (c) a *topos of finances/economy*. The reference to emigration and migration is strictly referring to Greek-Cypriots, who had migrated abroad and have returned to Cyprus and may be forced to emigrate again, if unemployment continues to rise. It escapes Mr. Kittenis that there may be any connection to 'foreign' workers, who are also migrants. The argumentation becomes a *topos of finances/economy* when he refers to *the negative economic cost of emigration* abroad and becomes both a *topos of danger and threat* and a *topos of culture*, when he refers to the potential 'negative national consequences' of emigration abroad, which is some magnified by stressing that in the north the Turkish occupation regime is colonising the country by allowing more setters from Turkey. This argument is reference to one of thorniest problems of the Cyprus conflict, as the protracted conflict becomes more difficult as time goes by, and Greek-Cypriot political leaders are complaining that Ankara is attempting to 'colonise' the north and to 'alter the demographic balance' of the island by bring Turkish settlers.

There is a further *topos of finances/economy* which is primarily directed to politicians and policy-makers: He argues that 'those who are involved in the national issue know' that
> 'a strong economy is the largest support in the struggle to resolve the national issue'. If we lose this support, it will weaken our bargaining power. And this is something we cannot afford to bare.'

Moreover, the *topos of numbers* presents the figures and statistics of unemployment e.g. the '10.000 unemployed Cypriots' and the 4% as a mark that is 'alarming' for Cyprus standards, as he states that it is the fist time since the Turkish invasion that unemployment has been so high. In addition, the 10.000 Cypriot unemployed persons are juxtaposed to the '21.000-22.000 alien workers' and the indeterminate number of 'illegals', who can and indeed must be disposed of, so as to make employment possible for Cypriots. The *topos of law* is never articulated explicitly, but is implied when he chooses the term '*illegals*' (*paranomi - παράνομοι*).

The *topos of history* is employed right at the end when referring to the history of Greek-Cypriot who emigrated abroad:
> When we had full employed, we had the return of Cypriots, who have emigrated abroad, of Cypriots working in Greece, England, the Arabic countries. If now we have unemployment increasing, then many will emigrate with all the negative economic and national consequences.

3.3.1.3 Topoi in Speech/Statement 3
The articulation of anti-immigrant perceptions by Xenophontos appears in various *topoi*. The *topos of disadvantage* for Greek-Cypriot workers is that eastern Europeans will bring about 'unfair competition between firms and between workers', hence there is a need to check the existing 'foreign' workers and reduce their numbers. The *topos of definition and name-interpretation* creates the negative images for migrant workers: the adjective 'Asian' is

implicitly invoking the attitudes towards Asians as 'backward' when juxtaposed to the 'advanced' and 'modern' European Cypriot. The Eastern European is depicted as an opportunistic and grubbing competitor, who may 'invade' Cyprus for employment reasons; the *topos of danger and threat* is hereby also developed. The *topos of finances/economy* takes the form providing that unfair competition is bad for the economy, whilst the *topos of culture* – is implicit by stressing the Asian origin of most migrant workers in Cyprus.

3.3.2. Party Programmes / Programmatic Documents

3.3.2.1 Topoi in Party Programme /Programmatic Document 1 N/A

3.3.2.2 Topoi in Party Programme /Programmatic Document 2: AKEL 18ᵗʰ Congress 1995

The argumentation of this programmatic text summarises the Central Committee Theses and as such it aims to set out the key tasks of the party in a minimalist manner. Underlying is the *topos of numbers* appears to be dominant in the *Theses* (as the relevant section starts with the stress that 'the number of foreign workers who are legally employed in Cyprus has reached fifteen thousands, whereas there is an additional fifteen thousand who are working illegally'. This only implicit in the *Political Decision,* which proposes immediate action as a result. The *topos of danger and threat* is used to refer to the undermining of the working conditions and pay, whilst also referring to the fact the very same illegal workers are victims of violent exploitation. The *topos of culture* is implicit as the critique of 'invading subcultures' and 'values' is in the immediate paragraph and this connection in different discourses was widespread at the time.

3.3.2.3 Topoi in Party Programme /Programmatic Document 2: PEO 24ᵗʰ Congress 2004

The argumentation of this programmatic text is based on a larger and more analytical text approved by the Congress[37] as well as the chapters policies on employment and social policy. The Section on migrant workers under the heading 'alien workers' [*allodapi ergates*] is simple and programmatic in nature, only five paragraphs long.

The *topos of advantage/disadvantage and usefulness/uselessness* is employed to defend the *complementarity* of the function of employment of migrant workers and when referring to restricting the numbers of migrant workers to the 'necessary levels': the underlying or implicit argument is that (a) to the extent that they perform a useful function, they ought to stay and enjoy the same rights a Cypriot workers and (b) protecting the rights and equal participation is beneficial to all workers.

The *topos of definition and name-interpretation* is employed using various names and definitions depending on the context of argumentation. There is certainly some tension between the 'restrictive' approach and the call on fighting for inclusion and equal participation of migrant workers. Such topoi include *'alien workers' [allodapi ergates /«αλλοδαποί εγργάτες»]; aliens/ foreigners [allodapi/ αλλοδαποί]; 'migrant workers' [metanastes ergazomenoi /μετανάστες εργαζόμενοι].* The approach taken for domestic

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[37] Κεφάλαιο 4, Μετανάστευση και απασχόληση αλλοδαπών στην Κύπρο, *24ᵒ Συνέδριο ΠΕΟ*, 11-13 Μαρτίου 2004, ΠΕΟ, Λευκωσία.

workers and agricultural workers is even 'friendlier' as the term 'alien/ foreign' or even 'migrant' is dropped altogether (although implied) to become *'working people in farming and agriculture [ergazomenoi stin georgia kai ktinotrofia / εργαζόμενοι στη γεωργία και κτηνοτροφία]* and [female] Domestic helpers [ikikes voithi / οικιακές βοηθοί]. As for the locals the terms used are those 'softer' terms workers like to call themselves such as *local working people [ntopii ergazomenoi / ντόπιοι εργαζόμενοι],* local working force' *[ntopio Ergatiko dinamiko / ντόπιο εργατικό δυναμικό],* as the terms 'worker' may imply a more manual nature of employment. The *topos of danger and threat* is used to refer to a possible consequence of undermining labour relations and rights for all workers by not protecting migrant workers rights. The *topos of law* takes the form of an argumentation for the full implementation of labour law and rights, collective agreements and the agreed 'Criteria'. Underlying is also the *topos of numbers* but this is less dominant when compared to previous Congresses.

4. Analysis II ('Comparative Analysis')

4.1 Similarities and differences between Speeches/Statements 1,2 and 3

4.1.1 Discourse Topics

There are similarities between Statements 1, 2 and 3 in the discourse topics. We find that the 'dangers' as a result of the presence of 'foreign' labour is the underlying theme that unites these discourses. We find the same sort of issues present in all statements: migrant workers are a danger to Cypriot society, Cypriot workers and the economy; they are 'not necessary' and are undermining the Cypriot way of life and stability of employment.

The differences reflect the emphasis of each of the actors, all of whom represent sections of the right-wing trade union, SEK and political opinions of the Right/nationalist camp of Cypriot society. On the one hand, the three speeches/statements are indicative of the kind of right-wing trade unionism at each of the conjunctures as the first takes place straight after the decision to change policy to allow migrant workers, the second in the mid to late 1990s, where there were 'objections' to migrant workers on the grounds of cultural difference ('alien cultures') together 'economic' arguments and the third on the eve accession, where the topic is confined to economic dangers from EU workers (the Cypriot variant of the 'Polish plumber syndrome'). Also the difference reflect 'political style', posture and expediency: each person plays a different 'political role' as their careers are different: the first from a regional SEK official in Paphos became a populist local politician; the second was deputy leader of SEK who then became the leader and the third is the editor of the trade union paper.

4.1.2 Discursive Strategies

The discursive strategies show a remarkable similarity in the way the name migrant workers and differentiate with Cypriots, who are seen always as competitors: WE, the Cypriot workers versus THEM, the 'foreign/alien workers'. They all aggregate and collectivise migrant workers, they are seen as a nameless 'Other', who constitutes a threat. The 'numbers game' is replayed: by *forgrounding* that Cypriots may become or are unemployed; that Cyprus 'cannot afford' 'them' given the 'national' problem'. There is a *backgrounding* and *suppression* of the basic humanity and migration experience: migrants were impersonalised and dehumanised.

The differences largely reflect the changing contexts:
(a) In the late 1980s there was massive economic growth and shortage of labour; but in the early to mid 1990s the Gulf war and endogenous reasons begun a slow down in growth and a slow rise in unemployment (particularly in the tourist sector); by 2002-2005 there was the

lowest growth since 1974 and rising unemployment, still small in EU standards but has more than doubled.

(b) Although the 'import' of migrant workers justified as a 'temporary' measure, it was beginning to become more apparent by the mid 1990s that the numbers were increasing and this was likely to be a *permanent* feature of society, causing a reaction by nationalists and 'ethno-culturalists': hence the debate turned more and more cultural.

(c) The cultural rhetoric has gradually subsided or retreated to some extent, giving way to more 'politically correct' economic/welfare arguments. The 'etho-cultural frame' was of course not abandoned but became the rhetoric of some populist MPs and politicians, and become a 'background' or second line of defence of more mainstream politicians, trade unionist and intellectuals of the right.

4.1.3 Rhetorics and Argumentation (Metaphors)

A similarity of the statement is the use of the *topos of definition and name-interpretation* via the use of term 'foreign'/ 'xenos' with the implication of being 'temporary', which suggests that they are here for a specific purpose and limited period of time and shall leave when they are no longer 'useful'. The *topos of danger and threat* is connected to the *topos of culture* is the dominant argumentation strategy, even though the emphasis of the danger varies, as to whether the 'immediate danger' is 'economic' or 'cultural'. The *topos of disadvantage /uselessness* is common to all rhetoric: the 'test' is the usefulness of migrant workers to Greek-Cypriot society and the common feature is that migrant workers must be 'controlled', reduced' and Greek-Cypriot workers must be protected. Common metaphors are the 'waves' and 'flooding' that would 'come in' if 'our doors are left open'.

Statement 1 is more 'populist' and confrontational as Pittokopitis is 'local' actor with a 'local constituency' and appears happy to label those he considers responsible- all those 'distant' from the Paphian workers. Moreover, his reaction was a reaction on the basis of he thought would happen, rather than what was actually happening as regards the presence of migrants in Cyprus.

The second statement is of a 'national statesperson' addressing a 'national audience', who has the employers' federations and the Government (of his own leanings in power) as interlocutors. He thus appears more 'scientific' and ;justified' based primarily on 'economic / welfare' arguments.

The third statement is the national editor primarily addressing the readership consisting of Cypriot workers via his paper in an 'alarmist' manner, responding to accession to EU. He thus uses an abundance of metaphors to describe the 'immanent danger' of EU workers.

4.2. Similarities and differences between Speeches/statements and Party Programmes /Programmatic Documents

4.1.1 Discourse Topics

The Discourse topics are similar: they pivot around the use of migrant workers in reducing or undermining the pay and employment conditions of Cypriot workers, the super-exploitation and discrimination of migrant workers and the need to restrict the numbers of migrant workers to protect labour rights and pay. There is an apparent relation and political link between the two organisations as they are part of the same movement, 'the popular movement', each one having a distinct role, hence the similarity in the discourses, topics and general direction of policy.

The differences are in emphasis and elaboration due to the role of each: one is apolitical party and the other a trade union. Moreover, there is a shift in policy away from the ethno-cultural frames and the calls for restrictive measures in a dramatic manner, to more pro-migrant positions, retaining of course the overall insistence on the need to controlling migration and combating 'illegal employment of migrant workers'.

4.1.2 Discursive Strategies

The discursive strategies have similarities in that most of the actors are the same, the terminology is similar, with the usual assimilation, functionalisation and impersonalisation of migrant workers. However, PEO's approach ten years later has shifted dramatically the emphasis, the sophistication of the argument and more actors are present: migrant workers are no longer a mere unified category as there are special categories within.

4.1.3 Rhetorics and Argumentation

A Common rhetoric is part of the basic argumentation of both the AKEL 1995 text and the PEO 2004 text, which derives from the Marxist perspective that labour and capital are in an endless conflict, within which migrant workers are used as cheap labour. Thus the *topos of danger and threat* refers to the undermining of the working conditions and pay, whilst also referring to the fact the very same illegal workers are victims of violent exploitation. This is the basic commonality between the two texts.

The fact that we are dealing with different genres is of some significance in that the style presentation and approach varies depending on the audience and context. A speech or an interview will be structured differently than a programmatic document. This means that the comparison between different genres, in different time zones, audiences, contexts etc must be approached with causation and with reservations. In this sense the fact that no political party of the Right has any reference whatsoever on migrant workers or migration in their programmatic texts is of some significance: it is a subject not significant enough to be referred to in their texts.

We can locate a difference in argumentation and the shift in policy between the two documents: the *topos of definition and name-interpretation* shows that PEO's 2004 policy is more sympathetic, open and inclusive of migrant workers, at least in some instances. It retains the ambivalence on the subject as (a) the combating of illegal employment of migrant workers does not call for the regularisation of these workers and (b) it maintains the 'restrictive' policy but somehow modifies and softens earlier calls by referring to need to keep the employment of migrant workers at 'necessary levels'. However, the AKEL 1995 text is 'harder' towards migrant workers, who are always referred to as 'foreign', never as 'migrants'. Moreover, the term 'illegal workers' is particularly harsh, if we bare in mind the later rhetoric of PEO which started a campaign in 2003 with the primary argument that 'there no illegal workers, only illegal employers'. Moreover, AKEL strongly employs the *topos of numbers* as a *topos of danger and threat* for Cyprus, whilst PEO seems to shift the emphasis on the subject.

4.3 Discourses on Migration in/and Politics: Changes over time

The 'ethno-cultural' arguments were an initial reaction in the early 1990s to the introduction o migrant labour in Cyprus. The views expressed by Pittokopitis in statement 1 were to become commonplace amongst trade unionists, individual politicians and media discourses. Similarly in 1990 the then SEK General Secretary (M. Ioannou, 10.04.1990) similarly warns the following:

> "The consequences of migrants' employment are not limited in the economic
> sector, but inevitably to the society and culture [...] but mainly due to our

national problem we should avoid in any cost the creation of an additional problem."

The arguments raised by Pittokopitis are indicative of the kind of arguments which would be developed in the following years, targeting Pontian migrants as carriers of 'alien cultures', as not belonging to Cyprus, whilst their alleged 'predisposition towards crime' discourse would be repeated time after time.[38] The earlier discourses based on ethno-cultural racism were not altogether abandoned, hence there are statements repeating more or less the views referred in statement 1 e.g. see *Ergatiki Foni* 31.10.2001 under the heading 'The employment of foreigners has reached dangerous levels'.[39] However, one is able to locate a shift in emphasis away from the ethno-cultural towards more economic frames of reference: welfare, unemployment, economic impact.

The shift is apparent as the calls for integration, anti-racism and multicultural tolerances were increasing, particularly as accession to the EU was approaching. The shift for PEO and AKEL is even more dramatic. The AKEL 1993 text (as well PEO 1994 Congress text) is witness to attitudes at the time: There had been a difference between Left and Right on the way they analysed the role of migrant workers as AKEL and PEO may appear have *drifted* towards including on rare occasions a more 'ethno-cultural' argumentation in the early mid-1990s, nevertheless the emphasis had always been based primarily on the economic argument on the impact of immigration on the labour rights, class conflict etc. (see Trimikliniotis, 1999). By the late 1990s and ever since the argumentation of AKEL and PEO had shifted towards the need to integrate migrant workers and to attack employers for exploiting migrant workers and particularly undocumented workers.

5. Conclusions

The overall conclusion is that there are similarities in the discourses of the right-wing trade unions and populist politicians: in terms of the discourse topics, discourse strategies and argumentation there is a similarity, with differences only in emphasis between the texts and over time: there is anti-immigrant core that has not changed over time, although we can locate some shift away from emphasising on the 'ethno-cultural' frames. As for the Left, AKEL and PEOs programmatic texts we can see the similarities and differences and a similar shift but in a more dramatic manner.

As discussed in the introduction specificities of the political context of Cyprus and the Cyprus problem has not allowed, at least so far the development of an anti-immigration party as such. Migration is a recent phenomenon stretching and the political divide over the policies towards migrants does not correspond to other European contexts. Whilst forces on the traditional political Right / nationalism generally tend to be more xenophobic, racist and anti-immigrant than those of the centre or left, there are anti-immigrant sentiments expressed by individual populists with various political parties. A small society divided by ethnic conflict and war

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[38] See WP5. In a typical statement issued on 25th June 2004 by Nicos Pitokopitis MP, he accused Pontian Greeks of being the cause of rising crime in Paphos and urged the Government to deport anyone involved in criminal activity (*Cyprus Mail*, 25.07.2004). The statement came as a result of clashes between disgruntled migrants and the Police and allegations of Police brutality, which were as always denied by the Police. This is but one of many attacks on Pontians who are typically depicted as criminals and trouble-makers, particularly in the region and inner city of Paphos (and in other inner cities such as Nicosia and Limassol).
[39] The text title in Greek reads as follows: «Η εργοδότηση ξένων έφτασε σε επικίνδυνα επίπεδα»

may have so far prevented the emergence of a political party based on anti-immigration, however, the emergence of *a new politics of anti-immigration*. Development in the EU can play a significant role in Cyprus as a small society and a weak state are prone institutional and policy developments that combat racism, counter the politics of racism and anti-immigration and encourage political dialogue

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